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ABSTRACT
This dissertation combines Gregory Ulmer’s post-criticism
with multimodal composition resulting in a work that critiques the medium of comics in comics format. Six tradtional text chapters forge a theoretical and practical foundation; punctuated within and without by occasional visual interludes and three comic sections. I advocate teaching multimodal composition through comics’ interplay of image and text.
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“This book is not a good book.”
Lyotard, DF 191

uestes erant tenuissimis filis subtili artificio indissolubili materia perfectae,
quas, uti post eadem prodente cognoui, suis manibus ipsa texuerat; quarum
speciem, ueluti fumosas imagines solet, caligo quaedam neglectae uetustatis
obduxerat. harum in extremo margine Π graecum, in supremo uero Q legebatur
intextum atque inter utrasque litteras in scalarum modum gradus quidam insigniti
uidebantur, quibus ab inferiore ad superius elementum esset ascensus.
Her clothing was wrought of the finest thread by subtle workmanship brought to
an indivisible piece. This had she woven with her own hands, as I afterwards did
learn by her own shewing. Their beauty was somewhat dimmed by the dulness
of long neglect, as is seen in the smoke-grimed masks of our ancestors. On the
border below was inwoven the symbol Π, on that above was to be read a Θ. And
between the two letters there could be marked degrees, by which, as by the rungs
of a ladder, ascent might be made from the lower principle to the higher.
Boethius, Consilatio Philosophiae, 1. 3-4

As one of the first texts I read in Latin, Boethius’ Consolatio has had a great influence
on me. I remember when I first saw Lady Philosophy, decked in her homespun robe. In
my elementary knowledge, I imagined the two letters as the walls of a ladder, the steps
1
References to Discours, Figure will be abbreviated DF and by followed by the page numbers of
the original French edition.
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moving back and forth from practical to theoretical knowledge. Comparing my own
translation to others, I realized I had made an error. Practical knowledge lay at the bottom
of the garment, waiting to be overcome by one who would climb toward theoretical
knowledge. Philosophy banishes those meretricious muses, calling them scenicas
meretriculas (drama queens), knowing that only philosophy can heal the sick. They are
far too base for her higher theoretical knowledge.
I still like my first reading better.
Boethius is much more ambivalent than the informed (and oversimplified)
reading presents him. Certainly, he loves philosophy, his consolation, but he also loves
poetry and muses. The Consolatio’s prosimetrical form offers (in)[decon]struct-able/d
binaries, theory and practice, poetry and prose. The steps that join theory and practice are
productive (poesis).What Aristotle theorized, Boethius practices: knowing, doing, and
making.

I took these lessons with me in choosing a graduate program. I loved theory, but I loved
making things out of it. I loved teaching, but too many pedagogues tended to fear either
thinking about their work or using it to produce anything of worth; far too often they
avoid both. Clemson’s PhD program in Rhetorics, Communication and Information
Design stresses theoretical, practical, and productive knowledge. It offered me at once
a place to reflect and learn, while forcing me to teach and reflect, to create and again to
reflect. It struck me quickly that the warp of the weave was reflection. Shuttling back and
forth from production to practice to theory, reflection made it all work.
This dissertation was produced out of a desire to weave these three. In seeking
to theorize multimodal composition, I realized a truly multimodal text would be made
of knowing and doing. Comics appeared first as a way of discussing the marriage of
2

words to things, of theory and practice. Whereas much of multimodal composition theory
has stressed one medium over another, I found in comics a medium that operated quite
self-consciously on the hypostatic union of semantic and sensory that all media always
engage. Rather than offering comics as the supreme medium or a meta-medium or a
container medium, I find they perform the same basic operations all other media do, but
more obviously, more basically.
It is this obviousness that first presented comics to me as an object of study.
On every page of a comic, readers are forced to move rapidly, recursively from text to
image. Comic readers consciously and unconsciously read images and see text (and viceversa). The infinite gulf between plastic and print is routinely bridged in a medium rarely
considered beautiful or sublime.
Comics also offer a way of performing post-criticism, Greg Ulmer’s term for
using the medium to critique the medium. Ulmer advocates working in other media
rather than attempting to critique from the outside (text).2 Previously, I’ve employed this
methodology to create video games, comics, and videos. For the dissertation, comics was
an obvious choice. As the only print option, it seemed the most likely to be accepted by
the graduate school.
Early on in my research Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari provided me an
opening and a caveat. The notion of Rhiz|comics transports the rhizome into multimodal
composition. I firmly believe that comics and composition need the figure of the rhizome
desperately. Deleuze and Guattari present the Rhizome in opposition to the classical tree
model of the book (exemplified most notably by Peter Ramus, on whom more later).
Rather than constantly subdividing or obeying the species-genus-differentiae model of
definition, rhizomic writing moves up, left, east, out, down, through, over, against, et
semper cetera. My students had spent too long internalizing the five-paragraph essay.
2

Il n’ya pas de hors-texte.
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It gave them indigestion. Worse, I had to read their five-paragraph essays. A rhizomic
model of writing recognizes what composition teachers have known for so long: writing
is recursive, communal, fictional, multiple, nonlinear.
To this list I add that composition is always already multimodal. And here we
come to Deleuze and Guattari’s caveat:
Each plateau can be read starting anywhere and can be related to any other
plateau. To attain the multiple, one must have a method that effectively constructs
it; no typographical cleverness, no lexical agility, no blending or creation of
words, no syntactical boldness can substitute for it. In fact, these are more often
than not merely mimetic procedures used to disseminate or disperse a unity that
is retained in a different dimension for an image-book. Technonarcissism. (A
Thousand Plateaus 22)
A Thousand Plateaus is multimodal only in this philosophical, “always-already” sense
I used above. Certainly their text has a sensory nature, appearing as marks on a page or
illuminated pixels, but they took very little advantage of this property, almost ignoring it
completely. For them, such calls are mere technonarcissism.
Multimodal composition seems to draw technonarcissists. I’m probably the chief
offender. I love making my students download the latest open-source software and create
something new and exciting. I worry that I sometimes use Photoshop just because I’ve
got it. I fight against those who think that writing must always be (or ever was) just words
on paper. Technology is neither an end to itself or a destructive force.
Flipping the quote around we get the strange claim that their book may be read
out of order, for it is rhizomatic. Jean-François Lyotard made the same claim about his
Discours, figure. He called such a book, “a good book.” This is not such a book. It has an
order. It has rhizomic moments, but it is for the most part a traditional dissertation (albeit
4

a multimodally technonarcissistic one).
The dissertation is divided into three sections: knowing, doing, and making.
Part one, knowing, takes up the first three chapters. Part two, doing, consists of chapters
four through six. Making twists across the entirety. Three comic excurses punctuate my
overall argument, acting as notes toward a supreme composition (borrowing their titles
and much of their title pages from Wallace Stevens’ “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction”).
With its focus on theory, the first half may feel a bit heavier than the second.
Chapter one, “The Structure of Comics: Ut Poesis Pictura,” begins by querying
Derrida’s infamous hors-texte. It offers possible outsides while attempting to avoid the
inside|outside binary. In contrast to current definitions of comics, based either on the
movement across the gutter or on historical/generic contexts, I decenter comics around
the image-text binary. This focal point allows an expansion of comic theory into other
media and fields such as hypermedia. The subtitle inverts the typical order, ut pictura
poesis, showing that the play between image and text is bidirectional.
Excursus one, “It Must Be Abstract,” advocates a return to dialogue in
composition. It attempts to show rather than tell the advantages of a multimodal
composition always in conversation with itself.
Chapter two, “Signs of the Times: Figure, Discourse,” repeatedly deconstructs
the sign searching for a third way between discourse and figure. Close readings provides
ample evidence that the categories of image and text refuse to stabilize. Texts are seen
and images read. For the first time comics become the objects of criticism, but artifacts
traditionally considered texts leap alongside them to complicate the medium.
Chapter three, “Playing It Cool: Reflexive Multimodal Composition,” interrogates
possible syntheses for discourse, figure, finally finding the synthesis in the reader. The
reader’s participatory synthesis of modes remediates hot media towards cold. The chapter
5

itself relies heavily on a reader’s synthesis of multiple texts: both the main text and that
of three tangents on Greek philosophical terms. Finally, I advocate a reflexive multimodal
composition, the focus of the second half of the dissertation.
Splitting the two halves we have the second excursus, “It Must Change.” This
comic triangulates a future for composition based on design. The iterative design model
(design, test, analyze) offers old ways of new writing and vice versa. From the first
excursus’ dualism, we move towards possible third ways.
With the second half, the heady theories of the first half are brought to ground
in practical application. In Chapter four, “Restructuring Writing: Hypermedia and
Rhiz|Comics,” I begin my analysis of Rhiz|comics, a composition between and across
media and modes. Bernard Stiegler offers a complex, nuanced historical understanding of
technology and our relationship with it. The history of rhetorical theory can be read as a
marginalization of the canon of delivery. Recent technological advances have drastically
changed the importance of delivery, yet the academy seems oddly isolated from many of
these changes. Ignoring the importance of delivery, students and scholars have become
alienated from their labor.
Chapter five, “Plays Well with Others: Rhizcomics in the Classroom,” refocuses
my argument on teaching composition, explaining how comic composition teaches
electracy and rhizomatic thought in productive ways. Compositionists have recently
returned to delivery in document design and multimodal composition. Reflecting on
various teaching experiences in my Technical Writing classroom, I show the resistance
to new thought and the breakthroughs that Rhiz|comics can offer. In a technical writing
course, I assigned Greg Ulmer’s mystory, a project which fuses professional, popular, and
personal narratives into a single multimodal text. A student of mine prepared this short
comic relating the discovery of structure and equilibrium in his love for records to his
6

chosen career as a civil engineer. Another student answered the Mystory assignment with
a single poster, integrating popular, personal, and professional.
I add to this a final tool for pedagogical self-awareness and for constructing a
multimodal classroom: augmented pedagogy. In efforts to teach (with) electracy, I have
used Adobe Connect and traditional lecturing to achieve an augmented pedagogy. Adobe
Connect offers webinar modalities: chat space, video conferencing, collective notepads,
polling devices, and shared control of screens. By using emerging software like Adobe
Connect simultaneously with a traditional lecture we create an augmented classroom.
Students are free to engage in chat based conversations while the teacher lectures and
to engage the material in multiple representations. Augmented Pedagogy brings what
I theorized of multimodal composition in the first half together with the delivery of
composition.
The final excursus, “It Must Give Pleasure,” calls play back in from recess. The
prescription for student narcolepsy is playful pedagogy. We as scholars and teachers have
forgotten Sidney’s twofold use of poesy: to instruct and to delight. If we are to join poesis
to praxis and theoria, play must provide the glue. In order to enact such play, I practice
the comic art of the fugue, a braiding of meaning across various registers.
The critical reader may already have noticed patterns in the organization of the
chapters and in their titles. These patterns will continue throughout the dissertation,
especially as I multiply modes in subsequent chapters. This weaving across chapters
follows the general arthrology first termed by Thierry Groensteen, and most notably used
in Vladimir Nabokov’s prosimetrical Pale Fire. In Pale Fire the weaving of prose and
poetry, text and commentary, reader and writer, constructs a single object, a multiplexed
text. At one point a character seems to discover the text around him and the artist who has
constructed it:
7

But all at once it dawned on me that this
Was the real point, the contrapuntal theme;
Just this: not text, but texture; not the dream
But topsy-turvical coincidence,
Not flimsy nonsense, but a web of sense.
Yes! It sufficed that I in life could find
Some kind of link-and-bobolink, some kind
Of correlated pattern in the game,
Plexed artistry, and something of the same
Pleasure in it as they who played it found. (ll. 806-15)
Plexed artistry, then. There can be no more beautiful term for the reflexive, multimodal
composition I advocate. I offer it then as an homage to its greatest practitioner since
Boethius. May this work offer you the same pleasure as I found in playing it.
For now, abide these three: theoria, praxis, poesis, but the greatest of these is
poesis.
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the

Structure
of comics

1

ut poesis pictura

Eye am become a transparent I
I begin then with the eye, and all will spread
from this initial insistence. There are two aspects
of the eye’s physiology with which I will erect a
structure for the playing out of interconnections.
First, there is peripheral vision. The distribution of rods and cones on the back of
the eye makes peripheral vision more acute
at seeing difference — black and white —
and narrow vision more acute at seeing continuity — the range of color. While looking at
stars, for example, the periphery is far more
able to distinguish these small balls of light
against the dark sky, and every stargazer
must learn to look near but not directly at.
Second, there is the parallax view. Three
dimensional space is a mental construction
based upon two conflicting interpretations of the

world — those of the left and right eye. Keeping these two figures in mind, I will proceed to
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discuss comics, through the
two lenses of philosophy and
art, but also as a center I must walk around.
This first chapter then may seem to have little
to do with comics per se, but recognize that
they are evident in each assertion I make.

If we are to discuss the eye, we must
begin with its story’s teller, George Bataille:
The point of view I adopt is one that reveals the coordination of these potentialities. I do not seek to identify them with
each other but I endeavor to find the
point where they may converge beyond
their mutual exclusiveness. (Erotism 7)
Bataille’s figure of sex and death is at once
parallax and peripheral, combinatory and superficial. My task concerns concepts no less important to a unified description of being: image
and text, coupled with perception and action.

(Deleuze, “The Actual and the Virtual” nt. 9)

Change for a Pair ‘o dimes

Lol Cats

We are told everywhere that there is a change
underway. The digital revolution, the advent
of visual literacy, it is called by many names.
Sometimes it is a technological renaissance,
other times a paradigm shift. I however am interested not in defining this change, in finding its
limits, but rather in decentering it, both laying
down and (re)moving its center. As may seem
obvious, the center lies in the middle, between;
not with a finis on each side, the limits waiting to
be defined, but between other, older centers.
I will choose two centers and watch them
move: visual and verbal. These are not chosen
at random, but as a means of approaching the
question sidelong. This division may indeed be
hardwired into our brains, the verbal left hemisphere coupled to the visual right hemisphere
by the corpus callosum. Thought exists in the
communication across this fissure. Neuroscience
teaches us that ideas are not localizable within
the brain but are created by neural connections
(Damassio). Similarly, words are almost meaningless without context. Meaning is created
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through connections. New media make this more explicit as
context becomes removable.
Just as context and text are no longer
easily separable, visual and verbal modes
have become inextricable — rather have been
revealed to have always been the same thing.
I am not the first to argue this. W. J. T Mitchell
implies that the division between image and
text has always been illusory (46). Each new
medium uses these two modes in one way or
another. Film and television greet us with moving images coupled to an audio track. The average magazine today contains more space
devoted to images than text, and page layout
itself has always been a visual mode. Digital
media marry image and text throughout. The
DJ spins in front of old kung fu and blaxploitation flicks. If there is a new paradigm, it is
not a stable position but a method: interconnectivity of various modes. This interconnectivity must embrace its own inherent reflexivity.

For example, there is the contextless lolcat meme. Originally a
look inside the dubiously grammatical
world of cats, the meme has circled
the internets subsuming culture and
creating its own context along the
way. The context of the greater meme
of imitation lolcats becomes inseparable from the original. Context itself
becomes inseparable from the text,
in which case it is not context. In new
media context is (re)producible.

From defining to decentering
If it is everywhere, why start with comics? One
measures a circle starting anywhere (Charles
Fort or Alan Moore, I can never remember1) so
we might as well start there, at the periphery,
in that marginalized medium. However, they
also seem to evidence this multimodality more
explicitly than any other medium. The metatextuality of multimodal texts forces self-reflection,
and this is a good thing. Before we continue
then, allow me a digression on the indefinability of comics, bringing us closer to decentering.
We must start where every scholarly
work on comics starts, with Will Eisner and Scott
McCloud. Eisner pioneered comic theory, beginning with comic strips, creating the Graphic
Novel, and finally offering book length
treatises on what he called “sequential art.” This term is important for Eisner and for the field because it set in
stone a specific definition for comics:
the interrelationship of panels to create a narrative. Between one panel
and the next, the reader2 creates
closure, a sense of narrative and connection. Art Spiegelman calls this “time
mapped across space” and he too recognizes it as the quintessential comic
moment. Marshall McLuhan saw in this moment
comics’ participatory power — the reader is
forced to interact with the comic more consciously than with a traditional text. This then
is Eisner’s definition of comics: sequential art.
1
Don’t listen to him, it’s Fort.
2
I realize the problems inherent in the
term Reader, but I will complicate it in later
chapters to the degree that it is applicable to
comics.
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If Eisner is the Plato of
comics, McCloud is the Aristotle. He took Eisner’s definition and systematized it. His
definition of comics follows Eisner’s, becoming
more explicit as it does: pictorial and other images placed in deliberate sequence. McCloud
also notes a productive inconsistency in this
definition: it applies to things we would never
think of as comics. McCloud finds sequential art
in the Bayeux Tapestry, Trajan’s Column, a Mayan Codex, even cave paintings. And herein
lies the problem. Scholars have since tried desperately to pin down the finis, the limit of comics, in their definitions, mostly with little success.

Aaron Meskin’s 2007 article, “Defining Comics?” provides an erudite description of the issue. Meskin’s problem with most definitions is that they
offer an ahistorical account of comics, which leaves their account open
to plausible counterexamples from
the prehistory of comics. . . . One obvious response to this problem would
be to incorporate a historical condi-

tion into the proposed definition. (369)
The problem could be put more succinctly:
we all know what we are referring to when
we say comics, and it has nothing to do with
cave paintings. By defining comics historically, Meskin evades this problem elegantly.
The art of comics, which began in the
middle of the nineteenth century and
developed largely out of eighteenthand nineteenth-century caricature and
mid-nineteenth-century British humor
magazines such as Punch, can and
should be understood on its own terms
and by reference to its own history. (376)
However, this definition obliterates comics’ uniqueness and potency. If comics are defined solely
historically, they can only be studied through
historical modes and have little to say to contemporary issues across disciplines. Meskin recognizes this flaw and seeks to evade it by questioning whether we actually need a definition.

I follow Meskin to
a certain degree but am
unable to avoid defining
comics by the same means.
I have no definition I could
give that would surpass the
efforts of scholars who have come before me,
yet I cannot leave the term hanging and build
an entire structure on it. Rather than defining, I
seek to decenter comics. The de of define entails
laying down, in this case a limit. Here decentering takes on this meaning as well as the more
traditional meaning of destabilizing. On the one
hand, laying down the center entails focusing
on what comics do more explicitly than other
media; for me this is the combination of the visual and the virtual. On the other hand, moving
this center means moving terms, from comics to
rhiz|comics. Throughout the rest of this chapter I
will attempt this first move, laying down a center
and leave the decentering until the next chapter.
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The Center which is no Center
Image and text, visual and verbal have
been separated for as long as there
has been language. Saussure’s sign itself
speaks to this division, on one side an
image of a tree, on the other, the word
“tree” itself. Homer signifies a distinct moment in the history of this division. While the
original Iliad and Odyssey were presented
multimodally through oral presentation
(gesture at this moment inextricably tied to
speech), the moment it is written down it
becomes something else. Homeric scholarship has since been an archaeology of
of ekphrasis and the notion of ut pictura powhat was lost in translation from speech to
esis, echoing down through the history of art.
writing. The division has existed since the birth
W. J. T. Mitchell’s Iconography provides a

route in to art criticism for those of us who are
on the outside. The second half of his book provides a historical overview of the image|text division through four major critics. First, we have
Edmund Burke’s distinction between sublime and
beautiful. The sublime always signifies a depth
of feeling greater than signification can signify. It
could be viewed as the love and fear wrapped
up in the supplement. For Burke it exists only
in language, for painting cannot signify more
than what it is. Instead, its worth lies in beauty, in designating rather than signifying. Kant’s
aesthetic theory depends heavily upon Burke.
Gotthold Lessing built upon Burke’s work,
further elucidating the relationship between
painting and poetry. For Lessing, the relationship comes down to space and time: painting
is atemporal representation within space; poetry is temporal representation divorced from
space. Lessing abhors (a la Burke) any mixing
between the two. His simplistic definition is
complicated through various examples. Keats’
“Ode upon a Grecian Urn” is the classic refutation of Lessing, but comics work just as well. Like
Keats’ ode, comics signify and designate simultaneously. On every page the visual and the
verbal invert each other, from the onomatopoeias delivered in textured fonts to the designation of movement and emotions in emminata.

Ernst Gombrich known
for his embrace of the Nature/
Convention binary. Gombrich
wishes to erect a strict barrier
between art and literature on
the basis of this distinction — art
is natural, literature is conventional — but finds
that the binary deconstructs itself before his
eyes. For Mitchell, Gombrich lacks the naivety
of his predecessors to think he could ever maintain this distinction, but he has inherited their desire to do so. Gombrich, at once enamored by
nature and skeptical of its universality, chooses
a Platonic dialectic between phusis and nomos.
Nelson Goodman reacts to Gombrich’s
omphaloskepsis with an almost scientific rigor.
He divides between picture and paragraph
but allows that the distinction is relative to interpretation. One may read a picture and see
a paragraph. However, our readings are preconditioned. Contrary to his predecessors, “Hybrid texts are not only possible but are entirely
describable in his system . . . The only question is
whether the results are interesting” (Mitchell 70).
However, preceding all of this historical
narrative, the first half of Mitchell’s book begins
with definitions of image and text. Mitchell’s definitions suffer from the same problems that we
have seen in definitions of comics. We all know
the difference between image and text, but in
attempting to clarify this distinction we realize
it is no nearly as stable as we assume. Mitchell
ends this first section of his book with a summary,
Perhaps the redemption of the imagination lies in accepting the fact that we create much of our world out of the dialogue
between verbal and pictorial representations, and that our task is not to renounce
this dialogue in favor of a direct assault
on nature but to see that nature already
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informs both sides of the conversation. (46)
This interplay between image and word comprises our experience with the world, and we
cannot evade it in some attempt to access the
real, but instead must look at the conversation
going on between the real, image, and word.
While Mitchell insinuates that Structuralism may
provide a way around this binary (47), I will now
elucidated my reasons for thinking that poststructuralism can provide a form of indirect assault on nature through a peripheral parallax,
around and through, both and always another.

Mitchell, it should be noted,
does not come down on the
side of the structuralists but
rather hypothesizes that this
binary will continue to resist our
theories. Žižek would remind us
that this resistance proves the center’s reality. It is
the no which says yes, the repressed continually
reasserting its power. Perhaps the peripheral
and the parallax of poststructuralism can bring
us closer to the decentering I have promised.

15

The Outside is the Inside

Etymology Fun

We move now to Jacques Derrida and to a proviso: I cannot wholly embrace Derrida’s theories of language but I must utilize his methodologies of research and theory. My issue with
Derrida’s theory of language may actually be
illusory, but I think it worth stating. In Of Grammatology Derrida explicates the differences
between speech and writing, arguing brilliantly
and against common sense that the latter may
precede the former. The entire argument depends upon the play of presence and absence,
explicated in a truncated form in “Différance.”
Finally he brings us to his boldest and most con-

troversial move: “There is no outside-text” (158).
Much ink has been spilled in the argument over
exactly what this may mean. It certainly argues
for an immanence which recognizes that there
is no metalinguistic position while maintaining an
interest in metatextuality. However, the battle
depends more upon what is meant by text in
this formulation. Derrida has already complicated its definition throughout this work (and
others). Suffice to say, I am uncomfortable with
the word because I fear it might return us to a
kind of logocentrism; however, I also embrace
its evocation of textile weaving, folding compli-

This network of word descends from the Latin plectō, meaning “to
plait, braid.” Its sister, plicō, means “to fold,” and descends from the
same Greek verb: plekw, which means, “to plait, twine, twist, weave,
braid…metaph[orically] to plan, devise, contrive.” The original Greek
verb, plekw, split into two distinct meanings in Latin, but rather than
differentiating the metaphorical from the literal, each word retained
both aspects. From plectō we get “plexus” and “complex”, whereas
plicō yields both “explicate” and “explicit.” This particular lexical node
entails the concepts of planning and folding. When a critic explicates
a passage the author’s original complex plans are unraveled before the
reader — the latently metatextual becomes patent. All future puns may
be inferred by the reader with the author’s willing consent.

cations. An easy way to answer my fears is to exclude it by following Foucault’s
formulation instead: “There is no outside” (Discipline and Punish 35); this act of
cowardice on my part is not wholly respectable and when we get to Lyotard
I may become more gallant. My proviso given, I will proceed with Derrida.
The
initial
concept
I
must
take
from
Grammatology is of course the grammè. The grammè is the mark, writing, the
trace. It is the moment of différance and its effects become what is called text.
Derrida’s notion of the figural, at least within Of Grammatology, is
illusory, elusive (note the puns on the latin word for play, ludo, lusus, which will continue). The image is for the most part presented as a moment of the grammè: a moment between speechlessness and alphabet, a hypothetical unreachable origin:
Like the first word, the first pictogram is therefore an image,
both in the sense of imitative representation and of metaphoric displacement. The interval between the thing itself and
its reproduction, however faithful, is traversed only by transference. The first sign is determined as an image. The idea
has an essential relationship to the sign, the representative
substitution of sensation. (282)
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We saw this in Saussure’s sign. The signifier and signified are divided by an insurmountable gap. As we move to accept Derrida’s play along the chain of signification we find that
the gap itself is where his interest lies. Différance is not in the gap but rather is the gap.
One more example from Of Grammatology before continuing with différance:
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The gap is crucial to deconstructive
thought and to comics. We saw that McCloud and Eisner wish to fix the gap as
the gutter, the area between panels. I
however try to fix it as the gap between
sense and sign, visual and verbal. Put in
the language of comics, the difference is
between interpanel and intrapanel gaps.
McCloud and Eisner’s focus on interpanel
gaps reduces comics to time
stretched across space. Intrapanel participation forces its own
deconstruction at each viewing.

Here we see différance, the differentiation that is at once a schism and a deferral. The difference of différance becomes
entwined with the dual eyes of the parallax, while the constructed absent reality present within the mind figures deferral.
We also have the notion of a center which is
no center. This center cannot be seen directly,
but only peripherally. The structure depends
upon it. The sign gives it meaning (so long as
we forget the play along the chain of signification). Play swirls us back toward this center, at
times moving the center itself. This mode of periphery, of a center which is no center may be
seen in the trace, the origin which is no origin:

And with the trace we come to comics. I too am merely a tracer, adding depth to the work of
one who has gone before me. I have here traced he who traced the trace. Derrida’s methodology then comprises periphery and parallax, but it also gives me a more practical mode:

If the simulacrum is ever going
to occur, its writing must be in
the interval between several
styles. And the insinuation of
the woman (of) Nietzsche is
that, if there is going to be style,
there can only be more than one. (Spurs 139)
This simulacrum, the forgotten umbrella, calls for an
interplay of styles and modes, of image and text, I
would argue.
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The Given Is Not a Text
Jean-François Lyotard’s figure looms large here, as does his discourse. His frustratingly untranslated
Discours, Figure offers a much more sustained deconstruction of image and text than Derrida. Individual
chapters have been translated, and Geoffrey Bennington’s colossal chapter on Discours, Figure in Lyotard: Writing the Event provides a complex reading of the entire work, a reading upon which I depend.
In the first chapter of Discours, Figure,
Lyotard lays out the stakes of his argument: Such is the imaginary: to possess
This book protests: the given is not a both this side and the other. Such is
text, there is a density to it, or rather
sin and pride: possessing both the
a difference, a constitutive difference
which is not to be read, but to be
text and the illustration.
seen, this difference, and the immo(“Taking the Side of the Figural” 35,. DF 10).
bile mobility which reveals it, is what
is continually forgotten in signifying it.
(“Taking the Side of the Figural” 34, DF 9)
Here my reasons for not completely siding with Derrida become evident. The given is not a text.
The (originary) act is not reading but seeing, of which reading is only an aspect. Think of reading
as a fold of seeing, one of the folds of which earlier Derrida spoke and of which Deleuze would
soon speak. The fold however has grown strong while the THIS out of which it folded has been
left to atrophy. We see this particularly in the way images are now read while text is rarely seen.
When referring to “originary” thus far, consider it to have been placed between paranthe-

ses, bracketed from sense. This is presaged by Derrida and by Lyotard’s extensive
discussion of the arche:
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(“Taking the Side of the Figural 42, DF 18-19)
One advantage of this quote is that it at once displays the difficulty of Discourse, Figure and its
basic organization. Lyotard walks back and forth from Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology to Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis. The multivocality of the origin is the hinge upon which
these two turn. In a later chapter, he calls this THIS by the name of matrix-figure, that from out of
which all discourse and figure erupts, yet itself having neither form nor sense:
To establish the matrix-figure in a textual, a fortiori systematic space would be to imagine it as an arche, to entertain a double phantasy: first that of an origin, and then that
of an utterable origin. Far from being an origin, the phantasmatic matrix demonstrates
to the contrary, that our origin is an absence of origin and that everything that appears as the object of a primal discourse is an hallucinatory image-figure, located precisely in this initial non-locus. (“The Connivances of Desire with the Figural” 293, DF 271)
The question of origin returns elusively. The matrix-figure certainly occupies the non-locus of
an origin, yet can be no univocal, utterable origin. The matrixfigure takes the side of the figural, while not being a figure itself. What then of my earlier implications that the origin is somehow figural? Lyotard responds in the very next chapter: “The figure cannot lie,
since it has no pretensions toward univocality” (“The Dream-Work Does Not Think” 50).
We are finally approaching the THIS: Anaximander’s apeiron, the ur-stuff out of which existence exists. The boundless, apeiron can be made to dance with Lyotard’s figural, and out of
this dance we may begin to see. The apeiron signifies that which is perceived in the parallax
view, but that which is also constructed. We might look to Lacan’s triangle of Imaginary, Sym-

bolic, and Real. In my example the imaginary
and the symbolic occupy the places of each
eye, while the real is that which is perceived
and constructed through their mediation. Image and text in conversation with the apeiron.
The interplay of figural and discourse
leads us toward Lyotard’s later development of the libidinal band. The libidinal
band is a single surface, like a Moebius
strip. We might imagine this as an origin,
but only a hypothetical and impossible
one. One of the interesting things about
the Moebius strip is that when cut it does
two different things. First, if we cut it along
the middle, we get one very long strip with
two sides. Second, if we instead cut it along
an imaginary line a third of the way from
the edge, we get two new strips, one with two
sides and one new moebius strip, both strips
being interlocked. This second cut signifies Lyotard’s formulation of the relationship between
the disjunctive bar and the libidinal band. It
also signifies the relationship between discourse

Gregory Ulmer has hovered behind and above
this dissertation since its inception. His concept of
post-criticism birthed my rhiz|comics. Now he can
provide the glue (Ulmer’s Glue™) between grammatology and hypermedia. In some ways, the
glue exists between books. Applied Grammatology asks the question of how a deconstructive
pedagogy would proceed. That question is answered by the rest of Ulmer’s canon: hypermedia.
Ulmer devises new rhetorics and new
logics based not upon the word but upon new
media. Parataxis becomes the new movement,
always “and/and/and” rather than “or.” Concepts from disparate levels of our logocen-

and figure. Discourse is two
sided, binary, predicated by
différance as Derrida has
shown us. The figural, however could be likened more
closely to this libidinal band.
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Finally we have Lyotard’s Differend: an
imagined conversation across languages. My
own panmodal rhetoric signifies bearing witness to new idioms. Parallax and periphery finally come into conversation in Lyotard, resulting
in something new which is always something old.

Visual Illiteracy

tric hierarchy become parallel. How does he
accomplish this? Through a grammatology of
hypermedia; said another way, through Derrida. But this is still not enough, “Not to follow in
the footsteps of the masters, but to seek what

they sought.” Ulmer takes Derrida’s concepts
and applies them in new ways. Something old,
something new, something borrowed, something
true. Sampling the old, folding it in on the current, revealing our now in the currents of the
ancients. Here my earlier claims at reflexivity
and metatextuality begin to come into focus:
The mise an abyme [sic] is a reflexive
structuration, by means of which a text
shows what it is telling, does what it
says, displays its own making, reflects
its own action. My hypothesis is that a
discourse of immanent critique may be
constructed for an electronic rhetoric
(for use in video, computer, and interactive practice) by combining the mise
en abyme with the two compositional
modes that have dominated audio-visual texts — montage and mise en scene.
The result would be a deconstructive
writing, deconstruction as an inventio
(rather than as a style of book criticism). (“Grammatology Hypermedia” 4)
The notion of metatextuality, of a text which is
concerned with its own textuality, its own metaphoricity, belongs not just to hypermedia and
postmodern metafiction, but to comics. Here we
replace the mise en scene/abyme with the mise

en panel. “To count as an
abyss, resemblance must be
literally manifested across
the levels of the text. In short,
one part of the text must literally (at least in part) as well
as metaphorically reproduce the other” (Heuretics 147). This comes very close to McCloud’s
description of the interrelationship of image and
text in comics. They may reproduce each other
or merely converse with each other. Both acts
point towards an outside of the text (here used
as the woven object that is comics) and towards
the question of that outside’s validity, leading us
readers to question the gap between, on the
one hand, ourselves and the text and, on the
other, ourselves and our own metanarratives.
It is also important to note that comics cannot
become merely a new type of writing, but
must move beyond. The goal is not to create a
hypertextcentrism to answer logocentrism (or
logo centrism), but rather to move backwards,
to intervene. Writing speaks to comics and
comics speak back to writing, each to each.
Comics occupy this combination of grammatology and hypermedia, but rely upon interventions for their dissemination.
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Conclusions
Ulmer returned us to the metatextuality I
referred to in my opening. That comics tend toward self-referentiality has been noted before
(cf. Thierry Groensteen, “Bandes Désignées:
De la Réflexivité dans les Bandes Dessinées”),
but the importance of this fact has been over-

looked. Comics tend toward self-referentiality
because of their multimodality. Hence, McCloud’s straightforward Understanding Comics
belies its postmodern presentation. McCloud
appears throughout the book, often standing
in one panel and referencing another panel.
This is crucial. He references, not the ideas or
contents of another panel but another actual
panel.
The importance of such metatextuality reveals itself through the theorists I have
mentioned, Derrida, Lyotard, and Ulmer. Working backwards, Ulmer stresses reflexivity most
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explicitly, calling for a mise
en scene that would always
already be a mise en abyme. Remember, Ulmer is speaking of the composition classroom
here. The purpose of such reflexivity would be
to cause students to reflect on their own process, to become aware of the available means
of persuasion they utilize, rather than just utilizing them. Metatextuality makes rhetoric patent.
Stepping out of order, Derrida introduces metatextuality as inherent to text. All
text is always already about metaphoricity, textuality. But if there is no outside-text,
what are we left with? What is the point? In
the cramped abyme of Derrida’s grammatology, we find no space for reflexivity to reflect.
Lyotard offers us this space, this density
and difference that enables reflexivity and
gives it purpose. Reflexivity is the ultimate taboo in the text. Text presupposes a transparency without which reading would be too
laborious: one would have to reflect on the
shape and appearance of each individual
letter. Derrida does not deny this by stressing text’s inherent concern with metaphoricity.
Rather, Derrida points us towards something
like the return of the repressed. Figure provides
a way out of this over-oedipalized cycle. Figure demands opacity. When looking at an
image, one may indeed see through it, to the
signified, but one’s attention is also rapt by the
signifier itself. This is the strength of figure, and
its weakness. Figure demands reflection and
seems almost abused when forced into the textual preferences of clarity brevity and sincerity.
If we take these two axes then, discursive

and figural, and multiply them by themselves, Fire presents a plot depenwe get a table which might describe four ways dent upon its own reflexivity.
In the discursive discourse we
are left with the zero-degree
Figural Discursive
writing of Immanuel Kant or
Figure
Rothko Safety Manual
Lyotard’s style in The Differend.
Discourse Nabokov Kant
Lyotard’s concepts of
discourse and figure provide us with a way of
having our cake and eating it too. We live in
in which these paradigms greet us.
the world of the disjunctive bar where signifier
First there is the figural figure in which the and signified are always already separated
surface becomes focal, think of the paintings of by a vast chasm. But, we are not completely
Mark Rothko or any painter interested in the without access to the libidinal band. Reflexivity
flatness of the canvas. In the discursive figural, allows us to move from one side to the other,
we find figure in the service of discourse: the moves us through the band and around unairplane safety manual being the classic ex- til we realize that discourse and figure have
ample. In the figural discourse, Nabokov’s Pale always been one sides of the same coin.
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1

excursus 1

It must be abstract
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26

27

28

That’s one binary Janus can envelop. But
there are others. Man and woman. Before
and after. Image and text. Word and thing.

So this opening, it’s when
we switch the two? When
man becomes woman?

That’s part of it. That’s negative
deconstruction. But there is an
affirmative deconstruction as well
that maintains each, and maintains
separation and differance while
recognizing that each exists on the
basis of the other.
/

Hm. Difference. That’s all we
have, our differences. So the
goal is conversation so we can sort
them out into some bland malaise?

Absolutely not. Why would I want to have a
conversation with myself? That’s dialectic.
Thesis antithesis synthesis. What I’m looking
for is not dialectic, but –
Dialogue?
29

30

31

What else would it mean to be multimodal?

Do you ever feel as
though our words
are not our own?

Yes, language speaks us.
This is at the center of
the split subject.

No.
I mean more specifically, this
conversation. How did we move from
chess to multimodal composition?
This isn’t us. It feels like
we’re the mouthpiece for
a rhet/comp scholar.

So what? Have
we learned?

And what of these
reflexive moments?

Another binary. The distance between writer and
reader is surmounted only physically, through texts.

Reflexivity reveals the system. Makes
us aware. Makes learning possible.

So. What have
we learned?
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2

The mechanism at work here could serve
as the object of a scholarly explanation
of which I am incapable
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The explanation would be valuable even
irrefutable but the mystery would remain
undiminished
Rene Magritte
to Michel

Foucault

Heterotopia
I invited my friend Kyle to join me on my weekly
pilgrimage to the local comic shop a few days
ago. With his misspent youth reawakened, Kyle
began debating the epistemological implications of the übermenschen of our youths. This
quickly dissolved into various hypothetical battles between our superheroes: who would win
in a fight, Superman or Mighty Mouse? Batman
or Wolverine? Jean Grey or Dr. Strange? This
last one stopped us for a moment. Jean Grey
is/was (the character is currently dead, though
seems to get revived on a biannual basis) the
world’s most powerful psychic with powers of
telepathy and telekinesis coupled to an intimate understanding of psychology. Dr. Strange
is a master of the arcane, with a knowledge of
magic and the supernatural that beggars belief.
Both exist within the so-called Marvel Universe,

the self-contained universe wherein exist all the
characters published by Marvel Comics. It suddenly struck me that these characters existed in
incompatible worlds within the same universe.
Jean Grey’s abilities depend upon a scientific,
materialist world in which she walks through
psychic landscapes created by human beings.
Dr. Strange acts as a mediator between the
spirit realms and our own. The battle has no
common ground. Dr. Strange could rebuff Grey’s
powers of metaphor and metonymy with magic
and mysticism. Grey would meanwhile disperse
Strange’s demons as the physical effects of
psychic trauma. Though they occupy the same
space, their material is cut from different threads.
I was struck by the parallel relationship of
image to text: heterotopias coexisting in the mind.
The
relationship
between
im-

age and text is not Apollo and Dionysius, for the seeming binary gives
way. The answer is not a simplistic monism, but a self reflexive triad.
And counting to three offers possibilities of counting beyond numbers
In the previous chapter we discussed comics’ quest for a definition. From Eisner and McCloud’s canonical definition of comics as sequential art to Aaron Meskin’s disavowal of formal definition in favor of historicizing, comics have long sought to claim legitimacy through a clear definition. I
followed Meskin in rejecting formal definitions, outlining instead a formal decentering.
Whereas definition erects clear boundaries,
decentering focuses on central attributes which deconstruct
themselves thereby undermining the very center it posits.
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Such decentering allows formal elements to be used to distinguish comics
from other media while refusing to solidify any description of the medium.
My own decentering places comics’ center in the juxtaposition of image and text.

In this chapter, I follow the movement of the center
through successive deconstructions of binary centers:
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from image | text,
to visual | verbal,
to paradigmatic | syntagmatic,
to decoupage | tressage,
to discourse | figure.

Finally, the general aporia of
these binaries is embraced, allowing for the endlessly recreated binaries essential to the reading process.

This aporia turns back on itself in the
composing process, forcing students to create
self-aware multimodal compositions within the
medium of comics. When we embrace this aporia, comics become not a marginal genre but a
medium that currently finds itself at the center
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of all new media. The lessons
learned in comics composition apply to web pages,
graphic design, videos and
all media in so far as all media depend upon
multimodal reading and composition practices.

Image|Text
viously intimated such a redefinition (“Comedy
at the Juncture of Word and Image” 75ff), but
I feel we must move further into this division.
The traditional comics definition relates
comics as sequential art. McCloud perhaps
did the field a disservice with his focus on this
definition. His definition allows for theorizing the
gutter, the space between two comic frames

Thierry Groenstein's The System of
Comics, an important work that is
only just beginning to influence American comic theory differs vastly from
most American work. First off, it is far
more formal than the average piece
of american work. Groenstein erects
a structure applicable to all comics
and exemplified by the best of comics. His structure breaks down along
two poles: the spacio-topical system
and arthrology, on which more in a
moment. He also employs the strategic use of two terms throughout to
build this structure: decoupage and
tressage. Decoupage, translated as
"breakdown," gets used fairly loosely
throughout the work, signifying the
way a page/work is broken down into
discrete units, the piecing together of
those units, and the indissolubility of
the page/work itself. Tressage, translated as "braiding," signifies something similar: both the generation of
meaning through the layering of discrete units and the division of meaning into discrete planes/threads/layers. Both terms come closer to my

The justaposition of image and text occupies
the most obvious of these binaries, and the one
with which I began my decentering process in
the first chapter. Becoming frustrated with sequential definition’s exclusion of single panel
comics like The Far Side or The Family Circus, I
created a new center: image and text. Nor am
I alone in this move. Robert C. Harvey has pre-

Groensteen

38

own decentering of comics than
to the sequential definition. The
spacio-topical system characterizes the layout of the page and the
conversation between various elements. Here, Groenstein develops
various comics terms and specific
definitions of each (such as panel,
frame, balloon, image, icon, gutter, etc.) and introduces (is he really the first?) new terms such as
the hyperframe. The hyperframe
is the page itself in which all the
units coexist. This subtle move allows him to talk about anything
that could conceivably be considered a comic (for it must, in the
end, exist on a page), however, it
also signifies nothing particular to
comics. Groensteen covers over
this latter point through silence,
but I actually find it quite valuable. In a nutshell, my argument
is that any productive definition of
comics will inevitably not only apply to other media, but through reflection, will show that the moves
that typify comics are central to all

in which the real substance of comics happens same gutter occurs be(or so McCloud argues), a site which has since tween the image and its
been extensively archaeologized. But the caption in single-panel comics. As we shall see, the
gutter is very much the center of comics: it is
everywhere and nowhere at once. We’ll begin
by defining image as mimetic and text as semantic and see what trouble that gets us into.
In the average Far Side comic the difference between image and text is fairly clear, and
thus acts as a primary example for our analysis.
Here the caption depicts a character’s
speech. The speaker is clearly delineated from
the four other characters in the image by his
open mouth. Nor is it an accident that Gary
Larson is obsessed with anthropologists. I like
to imagine the disembarking anthropologist
as Claude Levi-Strauss. He steps off the boat
looking for a definition of culture, something
that clearly separates physis and nomos. However, everywhere he goes he finds the incest
prohibition, a universal interdiction, a natural

any productive definition of comics will
inevitably not only apply to other media but
through reflection will show that the moves
that typify comics are central to all media
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media. That Groensteen passes over this in silence makes
it all the more important to
stress. Groensteen breaks
arthrology into two parts:
special and general. Special
arthrology refers to the sequence itself, the strip and in
its placement shows how provincial most comics criticism
has been content to remain.
The sequential definition of
comics occupies no more than
forty pages of The System.
The majority of the book is
devoted instead to the definitions of the spacio-topical system which then provide the
building blocks for the final
chapter on general arthrology. General arthrology is the
multilayered meaning of a
text (comic) erected through
the
oscillation
between
tressage and decoupage, or
rather, through the tressage
of decoupage and vice versa.

law. Would that he could arrive before he got late” the text into a visual form, speech balloons
there and see the savages with a culture not and handwriting. The task is as impossible and
unlike our own. What do they watch on their
TV? What do they read with their lamp? Perhaps their favorite show is Survivor: Paris, in
which twelve Bororo are transplanted to the
16th arrondissement and forced to eat fois
gras, escargot, and other local delicacies
through clenched teeth, while performing feats
of street painting wearing aboriginal berets.
Who knows what one looks like through the
eyes of the Other. Larson’s humor often revolves around these types of deconstruction
which I defined as negative in my first excursus.
Things become more complex with the
introduction of word balloons, as in our next
example.
Here the difference between image and
text becomes a little more slippery. Now the image actually contains text. The image must “trans-

unwanted as a canine decoder. How could a
dog’s life be translated into English and would
we really want to know what they say? Traduttore, traditore. Translation is betrayal. Translating the image into text is equally impossible and
unwanted; like explaining a joke, it removes the
humor, the substance. Similarly a purely negative
deconstruction merely reveals the possible without actually entering into possibilities. Negative
deconstruction clears the ground, an important
act, which takes us from grund to abgrund, from
ground to abyss. The affirmative deconstruction
which I espouse erects possibilities, impossibilities, and compossibilities upon this abgrund.
Things can of course get infinitely more
complex with repeated acts of translation. In
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the next comic, the caption
occupies the position of text,
but within the image we then
have two more levels (at
least) of representative translation. The thought
balloon represents in a semantic, textual manner
the ideas contained within a character’s thoughts. Traduttore
However, within thought
traditore
balloon we find, not text,
but another image. In the
semantic thought balloon we find a mimetic
reproduction of a textual object, the classified
page from a newspaper from the future. The
newspaper communicates semantically, but
the typeface of the classified ads has been re-

Nietzsche Family Circus
There is always a supplement. Here
it is BIll Keane’s The Family Circus,
the comic that asserts itself as a
deconstruction of sequentiality. Why
focus on Larson instead of Keane?
The answer is fairly simple. I hate
The Family Circus.
I am able to both ignore and
address the hated one through an interesting meme that circled the interwebs a few years ago. The Nietzsche Family Circus pairs a random
quote from Nietzsche with a random
image from The Family Circus, often
with gratifying results. http://www.
losanjealous.com/nfc/

God is dead! God remains dead!
And we have killed him.

fonts, it has now evolved
to a more decorative
font choice, reflecting the
type used for Larson’s
name on the covers of
many of the Far Side collections. Would this change be mimetic or
semantic? The difference is disappearing.
When I first read this comic, I thought
of myself as the child. Now, that we have
passed the newspaper’s futuristic date, I
wonder whether there are jobs for former
video game playing experts. Was my own
youth squandered reading comics and playing video games or did they prepare me to
teach multimodal composition? The lineage
is unclear, but present. Similarly the divisions beI wonder whether there
tween im- are jobs for former video
age and
game playing experts
text in the
comic are unclear but present.
placed by Larson’s handwriting, which I might
Far Side comics provide my readadd looks little like his signature in the lower
right. If this binary has not yet deconstructed ers with a certain familiarity, in that they are
itself clearly enough, there is still the caption, read widely and conform to a common view
which we note by comparison has changed of comics: they should be funny and found in
font from the previous two examples. Whereas a newspaper. They also seemed at first to fit
the caption earlier consisted of simple sans-serif nicely into the schema of Image|Text. As we’ve
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Visual|Verbal
By dividing our investigation of comics into visual
and verbal modes, we are able to at once carry
with us our mimetic/symbolic distinction and focus more clearly on what might be traditionally

found at the core of multimodality. Looking at
the last Far Side example through this lens, we
find that it breaks down a bit more neatly. The
verbal describes the captions, word balloons,

and even the newspaper text. The visual then
describes both the depictions of the characters
and the newspaper in the parents’ imagination.
Just as soon as we have things neatly divided,
though, they begin to disintegrate, or rather reintegrate into an uninterpretable aporia. Each
verbal element acts visually as well. The words
in the newspaper are handwritten, the font of
the caption distinctive. Similarly, the visual elements slip unbidden into the position of verbal element by making themselves utterable,
readable, describable.1 In fact, it would be difficult to find any visual artifact that could not
be reduced to the verbal. The opposite is only
somewhat less true. The verbal can of course
be spoken, not just written, and then could be
devoid of visual elements (unless we consider
lip-reading). Just as we were unsure whether
to classify a particular element as image or as
text, we are now unsure how to stop oscillating
between elements which are always already at
once visual and verbal, seen and read. Whereas the image|text binary broke down because
of undecidability of content, the visual|verbal
binary breaks down because of undecidability
of interpretation. Perhaps Derrida could provide us with more elaborate and convincing
arguments about the spoken word’s written
1
See Groensteen (The System of Comics 121-127).
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and therefore visual nature.
He might also provide
us with another way of thinking of the verbal and the visual. His Glas confronts readers with a text that
is not purely linear. Glas features two parallel
yet intersecting essays, one on G. W. F Hegel
and one on Jean Genet. Within each column,
there are also peepholes of inset text peering
out at the reader and across the gutter to the
other essay. For the most part, the visual nature
of Derrida’s text is owing to length. His Genet
essay is shorter, and therefore its font is enlarged to allow it to fit, but this carries with it a
supplement, namely that it allows the reader to
more easily differentiate between essays. The
essays repeatedly comment upon their own visual nature and reach across the aisle towards
each other. Derrida mimics Genet’s formatting, attempting to evade a Hegelian synthesis
through contraposition. Finally, the essays begin
and end in mid sentence, allowing us to begin
again. But these rebeginnings need not set up
two closed systems. Instead we might end the
Genet essay with a half twist by beginning
the Hegel essay and vice versa, creating an
infinite Moebius strip of a text. The disjunctive
bar dissipates into its “originary” libidinal band.

La Séance Double
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To read Glas as visual, we must first dive into Derrida’s “The Double Session” (Dissemination 173-285). Published just two years before Glas (but presented four years prior and published in Tel Quel
three years prior), “The Double Session” opens with two quotes in Glasian format.
The quote from Plato’s Philebus concerns the nature of thinking and the interplay of writings
and paintings. The quote from Stéphane Mallarmé’s Mimique concerns a play, which Mallarmé
may or may not have seen, and a quote, which Mallarmé may or may not have composed him-

Derrida Family Circus

Derrida finally made his confession during a subsequent confrontation with visuality and representation. In his introduction to Visions
d'Aveugle, L'Autoportrait et autre Ruines, the exhibition he selected and
prefaced at the Louvre in 1990, he revealed that his sense of a “secret
election” to writing as a vocation was directly related to his brother's
prowess at drawing. His own
efforts were pitifully clumsy: thus a substitution took
place; a deliberate strategy
of fraticide. “My hypothesis
for work also signified a work
of mourning. Throughout
my life I have never drawn
again, never even attempted
to draw.” Painting, a “degenerate and superfluous
expression” as it is called in
“La Double Séance”, is subsumed in portraiture, a practice Derrida extravagantly,
metonymically, immemorial- I employ these words, I admit, with a glance toward the
ly, represented by the trope business of childbearing-but also with a glance toward
of blindness. (Wilson 13) those who, in a company from which I do not exclude
Derrida’s renunciation of the visu- myself, turn their eyes away in the face of the as yet
al in favor of the textual both ex- unnameable which is proclaiming itself and which can do
plains and indicts his writing. For so, as is necessary whenever a birth is in the offing, only
his family circus, we must reveal under the species of the non-species, in the formless,
his juvenile longwindedness for mute, infant, and terrifying form of monstrosity.
what it is: shadows and simulacra.
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self. However, when placed side by side, Plato
introduces a question which Mallarmé perhaps
answers. Derrida poses the question toward
the end of the first session or rather toward
the center of the double session: La question
du texte est—pour qui le lit (224)1. Restated,
the question is who reads and who is read.
The text is where one lies. It
is at once fiction and bed, text and
hymen. The text is a textile, woven
through différance. But it is also the
hymen: a marriage between opposites, an impossible moment, an event
defined by rupture, a test of purity
and a rejection of testing. However,
the hymen of the text is also continuously resutured, oscillating between
innocence and experience, between
known and unknown, between. The
pleasure of the text is found in rupture and rapture. The medium is always between author and reader.
The text is the bed wherein two become one. What better way to read
the central margin of Glas then as
the continually perforated and reconstituted Hymen of textuality?
Derrida’s central interpretive metaphor is play, the allusions
and illusions of the text, but to what
purpose? “The practice of play
1

in Mallarmé’s writing is in
collusion with the casting
aside of ‘being’” (216). Play
avoids is. We must remember that play is always already sexual, the playsure of
the text. Play is the proper act of the bed:
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La question du texte

Barbara Johnson helpfully points out the ambiguity of the sentence:
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(216)
To play is to act, to screw, to lie. The central
margin of Glas creates the excluded muddle
that exists only in silent collusion between
author, reader, and text. Play, as Derrida
suggests, is allusion and illusion. But it is also
elusive.
Derrida began his essay with an

unstated promise of developing the relation
between image and text, a promise that lies
undelivered. The entire essay is an attempt to
elude that which is always already excluded
in text: image. Perhaps his brother could have
drawn more compelling conclusions.
Viewing a text such as Glas as visual

seems perverse to say the least. There are
no illustrations, no drawings, no images and
the visual makeup of the page carries minimal
significance.

However, at a critical moment in Glas, Derrida raises another binary:
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Paradigm|Syntagm

Metaphor

often make explicit paradigmatic sets. Yet,
they are still organized along
the syntagmatic dimension”
(232). The design process in
new media priSyntagm
marily revolves
around choices,
utilizing the file/folder metaphor. However, the
end result is almost always syntagmatic. Gamers are greeted with paradigmatic choice, but
through their own actions reduce the infinite into
the finite syntagm of narrative structure. The only
truly open game is the unplayed game. Why is
the syntagm unavoidable even in new media?
Why does new media insist on this lanParadigm

The division between paradigmatic and syntagmatic is often shown on a graph, similar to
the difference between metaphor and metonymy. The paradigm is the replaceable, that which
is placeholder. The syntagm is the ordered, linear thread. The syntagm constitutes languages’
one dimensional
operation.
The
paradigm opens
language
into
two dimensions
through potentiality. Reflexivity
then constitutes
Metonymy
a third dimension
to language. We
see this clearly in Glas. The sentence comprises the first dimension, the layout the
second (including both the words used and
unused, paradigm here signifies not just the
potential for other words, but the position
in two-dimensional space of the words we
do see), the commentary across the gutter,
the third. We might even hypothesize a fourth
that reaches across pages and even into other
texts (intertextuality). It is through the interplay
of paradigm and syntagm, linear and spatial,
actual and virtual, that a text constructs and
deconstructs itself. Paradigm and syntagm
are the warp and woof, if you will, of the text.
Lev Manovich has asserted that to a certain degree new media favors the paradigmatic over the syntagmatic: “Interactive interfaces
foreground the paradigmatic dimension and
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The only truly open game
is the unplayed game
guage-like sequencing? My hypothesis
is that it follows the dominant semiological order of the twentieth century - that
of cinema. Cinema replaced all other
modes of narration with a sequential
narrative, an assembly line of shots which
appear on the screen one at a time. For
centuries, a spatialized narrative where
all images appear simultaneously dominated European visual culture; then it
was delegated to "minor" cultural forms

as comics or technical illustrations. "Real"
culture of the twentieth century came to
speak in linear chains, aligning itself with
the assembly line of an industrial society
and the Turing machine of a post-industrial era. New media continues this mode,
giving the user information one screen at
a time. At least, this is the case when it
tries to become "real" culture (interactive
narratives, games); when it simply functions as an interface to information, it is
not ashamed to present much more information on the screen at once, be it in
the form of tables, normal or pull-down
menus, or lists. In particular, the experience of a user filling in an on-line form
can be compared to pre-cinematic spatialised narrative: in both cases, the user is
following a sequence of elements which
are presented simultaneously. (232-3)
We should pause for a moment and realize that
here the comic slips again into its traditional role
of “spatialized narrative.” Is this sequential art?
Somewhat. The narrative facet certainly is, and
the word spatialized reminds us of Spiegelman’s
“time represented in space.” However, for
Manovich it occupies a space between database and narrative, paradigm and syntagm.
Manovich at first appears ambivalent on
the place of spatialized narrative. He wishes
to set up a binary between database and narrative, but the spatialized narrative provides a
third option, “following a sequence of elements
which are presented simultaneously.” Cinema
then supplies the split, firmly occupying the position of narrative. Manovich finds himself interested then in films that problematize this easy
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division. He cites Vertov’s
Man with a Movie Camera
as a multilayered database
projected into narration:
The overall structure of the film is quite
complex, and on the first glance has little
to do with a database. Just as new media
objects contain a hierarchy of levels (interface - content; operating system - application; web page - HTML code; highlevel programming language - assembly
language - machine language), Vertov's
film consists of at least three levels. One
level is the story of a cameraman filming
material for the film. The second level is
the shots of an audience watching the
finished film in a movie theater. The third
level is this film, which consists from footage recorded in Moscow, Kiev and Riga
and is arranged according to a progression of one day: waking up - work - leisure activities. If this third level is a text,
the other two can be thought of as its meta-texts. Vertov goes back and forth between the three levels, shifting between
the text and its meta-texts: between the
production of the film, its reception, and
the film itself. But if we focus on the film
within the film (i.e., the level of the text)
and disregard the special effects used
to create many of the shots, we discover
almost a linear printout, so to speak, of
a database: a number of shots showing
machines, followed by a number of shots
showing work activities, followed by different shots of leisure, and so on. The paradigm is projected onto syntagm. (240-1)

But Manovich’s system is too content based,
leaving little room for formal analysis. This “if”
of his penultimate sentence signifies a motivated analysis with which I am uncomfortable.
Instead, I think we would find a more promising avenue for paradigm in the analysis of the
film across layers. At any moment, each of the
layers becomes evident to the viewer and the
others are hidden. This interplay of presence
and absence creates the metatextual. Here
we have more than the spatialized narrative,
we have the textured text, woven through
with significations at once paradigmatic and
syntagmatic, metaphoric and metonymic. Nor
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ielewski’s remediated film,
House of Leaves (forthcoming). House is of course a
text, not a film, but it borrows
much from of the cinematic.
Danielewski’s father we must remember was a
film maker, while Danielewski himself did sound
for the Derrida documentary. Which brings us
to Danielewski’s appropriation of Derrida in
House. House of Leaves consists of multiple texts
within texts. First there is The Navidson Record,
a documentary film following a renowned photojournalist who discovers that his new house
is haunted by space: it is bigger on the inside
than on the outside. Next, there is a dissertaThis interplay of presence and
tion entitled House of Leaves, written by a blind
man named Zampanò. Our protagonist, Johnny
absence creates the metatextual
Truant, discovers the dissertation and creates
need we restrict ourselves to film as medium. a third text, the one we hold in our hands, by
Katherine Hayles has extended adding notes to Zampanò’s text. Slowly two
Manovich’s database analysis to Mark Dan- stories unfold, Navidson’s, as told by Zam-

Danielewski Family
Circus
Danielewski’s relationship with his family is

This is not for you

complex to say the least. The short story that
became House of Leaves was a metaphor for
his strained relationship with his film maker
father. “He showed it to his father in the hospital, who understood it was about their relationship. The father responded by becoming
enranged, taunting Mark by saying he should
… quit wasting his time writing and get a job
at the post office” (Hayles, Writing Machines
126-8). His sister, the rock singer Poe, has
worked on joint enterprises including a tour
that coincided with Danieleski’s House of
Leaves book tour.
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panò, and Truant’s, as told through footnotes
to Zampanò’s text. That Danielewski’s text is
not only readable, but actually enjoyable by a
popular audience, is a testament to his dedication to cinematic pacing throughout the book.
When one story lags, the other picks up. His
fourth chapter in particular, Labyrinth, borrows
heavily from Glas, expanding the typographical play into a claustrophobic, textual labyrinth.
While House of Leaves’ interplay of
paradigmatic and syntagmatic tropes steps
beyond the bounds of linear text, it still remains
within a fairly verbal world. Its visual components are always at the service of the text,
and never vice versa. He has traded logocentrism for what Mark Taylor calls logo centrism:
Contrasting interpretations of reality lead
to alternative aesthetic strategies. While
logocentrism struggles to erase signifiers
in order to arrive at the pure transcen-

dental signified, logo
centrism attempts to
extend the sign to infinity by collapsing the
signified in the signifier.
Union with the real—regardless of how the
real is understood—holds out the promise of overcoming alienation and achieving reconciliation. (Disfiguring 222-223)
Danielewski’s plot mirrors his technique holding
out (at once promising and denying) the possibility of escape from the chain of signification,
an exit from the house which we are always already inside. My own system, then, must maintain an interest in both visual and verbal modes
without privileging either (whether image as
real or text as sufficient) while also realizing their
distinction from each other: Logocentrism and
logo centrism, Scylla and Charybdis. Jonathan
Hickman’s work provides just such a navigation.
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Decoupage|Tressage
Jonathan Hickman’s The Nightly News shocked
the comics industry with its antiestablishment
message and nonconformist style. Coming out
of a career in graphic design, Hickman created not just a new style but a new possibility for comics. His slick layouts look more like
glossy magazine pages than superhero comics.
This two page spread from issue one offers an example of Hickman’s a/typical layout
(2-3). The text boxes in the upper left contain
simple narration, but look a bit more like menu

bars than text boxes. Below that we have what
looks like a well designed business proposal.
On closer inspection, the proposal includes
disturbing facts clothed in an ironically cheerful tone: “To find out more about globalization,
read below. However, if you’re like me and
only care about your own personal entertainment (certainly not anything like children dying
of dysentery in Togo), keep reading on the
next page!” The images on this page oscillate
from realistic to abstract images with a happy
medium found in the stylized white outlines of
protesters found standing on top of the proposal. In the upper right we find the masthead,

You know: Contentious Objectors, Protestors…Activists.

This, of course, means so are they…

The WTO/IMF/World Bank* are in town for
their semi-annual Third World gangbang.

The bull chases
the bear chases
the bull chases
the bear...

Wall Street – The Financial District

List of Managing Directors

?

Currently the world’s
richest 500 people have
a greater wealth than the
combined income of the
3.3 billion poorest?

Did you know?

...\\ CAPITAL

ON

E DOL

60%
40%

ASIA
MIDDLE EAST

This is Global Democracy

70%

AFRICA

Privatization > Deregulation > Free Trade > Market Capitalization > Ruin

These loans come with a set of at least
conditions.

ATTENTION: In the case of a national
financial emergency, if you are an emerging
market country and you hear the phrases
structural assistance program or
poverty reduction strategy, RUN!

The amount of funds held by individuals in offshore and onshore tax havens and
undeclared in the country of residence is around $

11.5 trillion

ONE DOLLAR•ONE VOTE

55%

EASTERN EUROPE

65%

50%

SOUTH AMERICA
WESTERN EUROPE

60%

NORTH AMERICA

The shocking favorabilty ratings for the World Trade
Organization, International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank by geographic region.

To find out more about globalization, read below. However, if you’re like me
and only care about your own personal entertainment (certainly not anything
like children dying of dysentery in Togo), keep reading on the next page!

List of Presidents
Eugene Meyer
John J. McCloy
Eugene R. Black
George D. Woods
Robert S. McNamara
Alden W. Clausen
Barber B. Conable
Lewis T. Preston
James D. Wolfensohn
Paul Wolfowitz

Countries in financial crisis can apply for a crisis loan
package from the IMF or the World Bank.

FLIGHT //...

1946
1947 - 1949
1949 - 1963
1963 - 1968
1968 - 1981
1981 - 1986
1986 - 1991
1991 - 1995
1995 - 2005
2005 – Present

•

free markets equal

ONE DOLLAR•ONE VOTE

Camille Gutt
Ivar Rooth
Per Jacobsson
Pierre-Paul Schweitzer
Johannes Witteveen
Jacques de Larosière
Michel Camdessus
Horst Köhler
Anne Krueger
Rodrigo de Rato

•

1946 - 1951
1951 - 1956
1956 - 1963
1963 - 1973
1973 - 1978
1978 - 1987
1987 - 2000
2000 - 2004
2004
2004 – Present

World Bank

ONE VO

Internation Monetary Fund

*modified group awareness: globalization

re/.02

R
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Sign Reads:
Illegal Downloading
is a Sin! Repent!
Micropayments for
Absolution.

Sign Reads:
I was raped by a
UN Peacekeeper
and all I got was
a lousy t-shirt.

NN.01

jonathan
hickman

by:

What are you willing to do?

Nothing to cause real change.

Nothing of significance.
Nothing of remembrance.

They want change, but offer nothing of consequence.

But these people just lack the backbone,
the will, to do anything about it.

Understand this: Their cause here today is just.

I hate their weakness.

I’m mad as hell and
I’m not going to
take this anymore.

re/.03

05. Negotiation
page22 (The Capitol Building, Washington, D.C.)
06. Investigation
page24 (The Financial District, New York City)
07. Delivery
page26 (The Womb, New York City)

01

I love these guys. I love their passion.
I love their sit-ins, their slogans, their protest songs.
I love their believing they can change the world.

01. Introduction
page01 (The Financial District, New York City)
02. Recruitment
page12 (Blackrock, New York City)
03. Assignment
page16 (New York Times Building, New York City)
04. Commitment
page18 (GWU, Washington, D.C.)

the
issue
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including a table of contents for the comic. Be- matic, using various shades
low that the narration continues down into an of red, pink and orange.
image of three protestors drawn (finally) in what
The example of Hickman serves a few purposes
here. First, it completely
resists interpretation as sequential art. There
are no panels, let alone gutters. While Hickman does use panels on subsequent pages, it is by no means the norm of the book.
However, The Nightly News is obviously a
comic. If we were to define it as a comic on
the basis of its few examples of sequential
panels, then any textbook that utilized comics
as examples would also have to be a comic.
Second, it offers a chance to investigate
Thierry Groensteen’s concepts. As mentioned
appears to be a fairly traditional pencil and earlier, Groensteen utilizes the concepts of
ink comic book style (though Hickman is always spatio-topia and arthrology (corresponding
generous when it comes to ink, rebelling against roughly to the terms I introduced at the beginthe principal of bounding line and embracing a ning of this chapter, decoupage and tressage,
respectively) to interpret comics. Hickman’s
The necessary if not sufficient work resists restricted arthological interpretation as it has no strips, no gutters, no strict
condition required to speak of
However, it is suited quite well to
comics is that the images will be sequence.
the tressage of general arthrology in its remultiple and correlated in some peated motifs, icons, and color (Hickman is
careful and consistent in his monochromatic
fashion
palettes, oscillating between the narrative
kind of apeiron). The protestor’s signs are blank,
but we find captions above, offering us more
biting sarcasm aimed at the status quo. In the
lower right we find “*the {voice} says: what are
you willing to do?” “The voice says” acts as an
icon, alerting us to a special kind of text, similar to the icons used throughout the for Dummies series. The text following is formatted the present [reds] and various flashbacks [blues])
same as the narration above but with a differ- and, more obviously, to the decoupage of the
ent color. The entire page is fairly monochro- spatio-topical system through its layout. Howev-

er, these two criteria do not make it a comic, for
they could apply equally well to other media.
Groensteen, wisely, does not seek to
define comics (indeed, he rejects any efforts
to define comics quite clearly), but to provide
a “foundational principle,” iconic solidarity: “The
necessary, if not sufficient, condition required to
speak of comics is that the images will be multiple
and correlated in some fashion” (19). This signifies a great advance over either the sequential
or the historical/cultural definition by moving towards a foundational principle, or center, and
in this way guides my own pursuit. However,
Groensteen does not seem sufficiently perturbed or inspired by the fact that his necessary
condition could describe an issue of Sports Illustrated, a genetics textbook, or Watchmen with
equal fidelity. Instead, he likens it to the frustration of trying to define literature without resorting to claims of cultural superiority or formal
naïveté (that is to say, literature can be neither

“good” texts nor mere words
in sequence). This issue, of
course, still haunts literature
departments, but there have
been a few compelling solutions. One is seen in the gradual expansion of
literary studies to include e-texts, films, comics,
plastic arts, inanimate objects, political theories, et cetera ad infinitum. How did literature
manage to move itself from the margins of the
humanities to its center in the latter half of the
twentieth century? By defining itself through its
own central practice, the production and analysis of meanings, rather than through its limits.
Can comics perform a similar metamorphosis?
If so, we must correct Groensteen’s
foundational principle of “iconic solidarity.” Groensteen himself proceeds by analyzing comics not by means iconic solidarity, but primarily and throughout his work by
the principles of decoupage and tressage.

55

|Discourse
Where have we gotten then? From a firm division between image and text we’ve moved
to decoupage and tressage. We’ve made
a Heideggerian move from nouns to verbs
at least. However, we’ve yet to make the
supreme Heideggerian move of the always
already reflexive. I will leave that to the next
chapter. For now, we will end with Lyotard
and the question of any ending at all.

There is no absolutely Other, but there
is the element which splits itself, overturns itself, that constitutes the face-toface and the sensible at the same time;
there is the ‘there is’ which is not initially
heard speech, but the work [oeuvre] of
a sort of drift-work [travail de dérive],
splitting the single element into two
sides and leaving them in this disequilibrium of which ethical life speaks,
but that is the disequilibrium of the
seer and the visible, which is unheard

Lyotard Family Circus

speech. …
But to know what happens as a
consequence of mixing speech and
gesture, of dissolving saying in seeing:
either speaking is silenced, or the seen
is necessarily already like speaking.
(Lyotard, “Taking the Side of the Figural”
36, DF 11)
The hymen must be preserved, resutured so
that it can again be violated through multimodal dialogue, moving across and back,
weaving, creating a text which will truly require
braiding, tressage. This chapter has not yet done that. My
visual play has heretofore remained restrained to discourse.
But as Lyotard reminds us, this is
not sufficient. Yet we must also
resist seeing it as a promise of
ultimate escape, as Jacques
Ranciére reminds us:
The Image—that is, the
‘original image’ of Christian theology, the Son
who is not ‘similar’ to the
Father but partakes of
his nature. We no longer
kill each other for the
iota that separates this
image from the other.
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But we continue to regard it as the promise
of flesh, capable of
dispelling the simulacra of resemblance, the artifices of art,
and the tyranny of the letter. (8)
The next chapter will be devoted to hanging
the twin heads of Lyotard and Ranciére on the
ship with which we will sail twixt whirlpool and
sea monster.

We must attack the
sufficiency of discourse
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3
reflexive
multimodal
composition

Here we find ourselves once
again with the text, but this
time nobody has written it, and
it reads itself.
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Jean-Francois Lyotard
("Taking the Side of the Figural" 36, DF 12)
In this chapter I begin by finishing our discussion of Lyotard’s Discourse, Figure from chapter
two. This draws us into a discussion of reflexivity and media. Finally, I draw a new vision of
composition that is at once multimodal and

We need to remember again that Lyotard’s
figural is neither identical nor unrelated to the
visual. He introduces it as a supplement to text.
The given is not a text, there is a density
to it, or rather a difference, a constitutive difference, which is not to be read,
but to be seen; this difference, and the
immobile mobility which reveals it, is
what is continually forgotten in signifying
it. (34, DF 9)
Lyotard likens this difference to the unconscious
and expression, calling it laterality. To say that
this density signifies the figural is to fall into the
trap of discourse:
depth greatly exceeds the power of the
reflection that would like to signify it, to

reflexive. Throughout there will be tangents, rebuses, discursive figures and figural discourses,
including three Greek words beginning with
alpha: aletheia, apeiron, and apophansis.

Figure

place it in its language, not as a thing,
but as a definition. Meaning is present
as the absence of signification; yet signification takes hold of it (and it can, one
can say everything), and it is exiled on
the borders of a new speech act. Here
the death drive is always intertwined
with Eros-Logos. The construction of
meaning is only ever the deconstruction
of signification. (42-43, DF 19)
Whence my own argument for decentering
over definition. To define figure would be to
forfeit the game. Some may find this incredibly
disheartening, but I see in it great promise and
great danger. Here we get to the heart of
composition, the construction of meaning.

Lyotard critiques the structuralist notion that the unconscious is structured like
a language. For him, the unconscious is the
matrix-figure. The matrix-figure precedes the
figure-form and the figure-image, acting as the
impossible origin of all fantasy and desire. It
is the other of discourse. However, this is not
figure qua figure, but rather something else.
The figural describes all three levels (image,
form, matrix), while the discursive only has recourse to the first two levels. The figure-image
is what we see, what we might normally think
of as the visible. Lyotard calls the figure-form

to be linguistic components
to the unconscious. However, they are by no means
discursive. The unconscious
is figural. Perhaps the unconscious is the only place where figure is neatly
divided from discourse. However, everything
on this side of the unconscious is “adulterated
by discourse” as Lyotard will say (“Connivances
of Desire” 333, DF 271).
Reverie, dream, phantasm are mixtures
containing both viewing and reading
matter. The dream-work is not a language; it is the
effect on language
of the force exerted
by the figural (as
image or as form).
(“Dream-work” 50,
DF 270).
Earlier, Lyotard implies that the figural exists as some kind of referent of which language
always falls short. This is not to endlessly
repeat that there is no outside-text, nor does
it put figure on a referential pedestal of truth.
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The construction of meaning is
only ever the deconstruction of
signification.

the schema of a scene, its layout, architecture,
centering. While it is obviously visible, it is not
what we might call visual in the traditional
sense. The figure-matrix is invisible, indescribable, immersed in the unconscious. There seem

¢l»qeia
If a lÒgoj as ¢pÒfansij is to be true, its Being-true is ¢lhqeÚein in the
manner of ¢pofa…nesqai—of taking entities out of their hiddenness and
letting them be seen in their unhiddenness (their uncoveredness). (Heidegger, Being and Time 262, H 219).
Heidegger has perhaps done more than anyone to bring ¢l»qeia (alētheia)
into philosophical parlance. His reading of it in Being and Time, complicated
and continuously reflected upon throughout his life, centers on the word’s
etymology. Those unfamiliar with Greek may seem annoyed by the seemingly
obscure pedantry of this tangent should note Heidegger’s warning:
we must avoid uninhibited word-mysticism. Nevertheless, the ultimate
business of philosophy is preserve the force of the most elemental words
in which Dasein expresses itself, and to keep the common understanding

Truth, Lyotard argues, occurs between the two,
or rather, as the event of their noncoincidence.
And this is the figural, not the real world, but
the forces that move between language and
the depths it describes, depths of the unconscious and the real which are ever the same.
Nor should we merely oppose discourse
to figure thinking we’ve found a more elemental way of dividing the given,
Lyotard’s intuition … is that figure and
discourse cannot be opposed. Unlike the
history of the aesthetic, which has much
at stake in distinguishing them as incommensurable ontological territories, in
Lyotard’s view, figure and discourse are
divided not by a bar but rather by only
the slightest of commas. (Rodowick 5)
Nor am I the first to struggle to pin down
the exact relationship of discourse to figure in
Lyotard’s text. Geoffrey Bennington has written
brilliantly on Discourse, Figure without arriving

at any clear-cut conclusions,
The figure is always
already bound up
with the discursive,
and only this could
account for the existence of a book
such as Discours, figure. This is not to
reduce the argument of the book to a
dialectic: the battle of discourse and
figure is never, even in principle, resolved either way. The ‘critical function’
of the work is not that of delivering up
the primary process (this would itself
be an illusion of the secondary process
(DF 23), but of resisting its absorption
into the secondary, from within the
secondary. Conscious thought is all for
secondary revision, and is disconcerted
by its failure to bind and order. To the
extent that ‘truth’ irrupts in the event of
that failure, then it is not surprising that
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¢l»qeia
from leveling them off to that unintelligibility which functions in turn as a
source of pseudo-problems. (262, H 220, italics in original)
These pseudo-problems arise when we refer to Seinfeld as deconstruction or
a computer as multimedia (How many media exactly? Is there a literal newspaper inside it? A book? A movie? The computer is a single medium that remediates previous media). When we fail to think critically, thought “levels off”
and becomes mere common knowledge. We can also hear in Heidegger’s
taboo a search for origins. This search, and its futility, will concern much of
this chapter. For now, however, we will pursue truth.
¢l»qeia can be broken into two parts: ¢ (a) and l»qeia (letheia). The first
denotes negation, the second concealing. From these Heidegger constructs
a complex theory of truth involving revealing and concealing which attempts
to circumvent the correspondence theory while maintaining something like the
common meaning of truth. This theory gets reworked throughout Early Greek
Thinking. Heidegger spends time with Heraclitus’ fiftieth fragment,

Discours, figure should itself scarcely
form a harmonious totality, or that my
own account of it should have caused
me so much difficulty, and required so
much secondary revision itself. (101)
Lyotard subverts discourse from within by
pointing to its supplement, figure. Lyotard does
not clearly define his primary term, let alone
advocate a turn toward it. He does not merely
maintain the question of the figural as always
open, but instead he maintains the figural as
the question which opens.
Finishing the penultimate chapter of
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Discourse, Figure, Lyotard
writes, “Now we understand that the principle of
figurality which is also the
principle of unbinding (the
baffle) is the death drive: ‘the absolute of antisynthesis’: Utopia” (“Fiscourse Digure,” 357,
DF 354). Lyotard arrives at the death drive
circuitously. He proceeds through Freud’s “A
Child Is Being Beaten” (SE XVII.1-123), building
various tables for analysis. One table shows
the progression of the verbalized phantasy of
the abuse victim:

(346, DF 342)

¢l»qeia
tÕ m¾ dànÒn pote pîj ¥n tij l£qoi;
How can one hide himself before that which never sets?
He points out that the word for hiding here is l£qoi, the core of ¢l»qeia.
The thing which never sets for Heidegger is being, which makes possible
truth, ¢l»qeia as unconcealing. Heidegger spends a bit of time talking about
the light metaphor that truth is thus involved in, both because truth is an unsetting sun and because concealing involves the play of light and dark. The
unsetting sun of being, for Heidegger as well as Heraclitus, is logos: “LÒgoj,
in whose lighting they come and go, remains concealed from them, and
forgotten” (122). ¢l»qeia makes possible assertion, the ¢pÒfansij which will
concern our next tangent.
Lyotard brings up truth early on in Discourse, Figure in the context of
utopia, to which he returns at the end of the book:
Freud has taught us what utopia is; utopia strictly defined. Utopia is that

Here we may glean two axes, namely
horizontal relationships and a vertical progression. The horizontal relationships oscillate
between love, hate, and beating among actors and victims. Lyotard articulates the vertical
progression as four transformations: active to
passive voice, feminine to masculine gender,
definite (“me,” “the”) to indefinite (“a”), and the
disappearance of the extension of the predicate (“by an adult”). The effect common to all
of these transformations is a distancing, dissociation, deconstruction, which requires Freud
to construct before he may interpret, because
“regression has pushed the deconstruction of
the verbal and iconic representatives so far
that the signs produced by desire no longer
satisfy the conditions for recognition by the
preconscious, and there is almost nothing left
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to interpret” (352, DF 347).
Is this a delicate way of
saying that Freud’s ultimate
construction (“masturbatorial phantasy” not “abuse victim”) has little to
do with what is presented to him? Perhaps,
but Lyotard continues into an investigation of
beating. The beating here signifies both the
genital and the anal-sadistic, both love and
hate, Eros and Thanatos/Logos. Lyotard further
connects the beating to the Iamb, the rhythmic
dot-dash of poetry or a heartbeat. It’s not that
one is eros and the other thanatos. Rather,
thanatos causes the gap between the dot
and the dash, eros pushes its connection. If we
transfer the metaphor to gaming, eros provides
the play, thanatos the board. Lyotard’s translator Mary Lydon sums the section up:

¢l»qeia
truth never appears where it is expected. . . . truth shows itself as an
aberration when measured by signification and knowledge. Truth is out
of tune. To be out of tune in discourse is to deconstruct its order. Truth in
no way passes through a discourse of signification, its impossible topos
cannot be located by the co-ordinates of the geography of knowledge.
Rather, it makes itself felt on the surface of discourse by its effects, and
this presence of meaning is called expression. (“Taking the Side” 41, DF
17)
Elle détonne, truth is out of tune. Détonne signifies clashing, being off
key, but its homonym détone signifies the destruction such a statement implies. Truth has nothing to do with correspondence at all. In fact, truth surprises us by not corresponding, by appearing unexpectedly. The tuning involved
may hearken back to Heraclitus’ palintropoj (palintropos, backturning). For
Heraclitus there is a harmony to the world, a logos which aligns all things
through tension. Lyotard recognizes the tension but refuses the harmony.
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(24)

¢pÒfansij
In Being and Time and again in “The Question Concerning Technology,”
Heidegger invokes ¢pofa…nesqai (apophainesthai) in his discussion of phenomenology. The word is a middle verb and, according to Lidell and Scott,
means “to show off.” It is made of two parts, ¢po, meaning “away, out, off,”
and fa…nesqai, meaning to show and connected, as Heidegger notes, with
fîj, light. Interestingly enough, fèj means man (the accent mark distinguishes the two only when spoken as the majority of Greek texts did not include
them).
Heidegger makes a great deal of the fact that ¢pofa…nesqai is in the
middle voice, neither active nor passive. The middle voice often denotes a
reflexive verb, “I blank myself.” The middle voice also appears to have been
gradually phased out so that by the time of written records we will often find
a verb in the middle voice that carries a completely different (idiomatic and
not necessarily reflexive) meaning than the active form of the same verb.
Some philologists have therefore theorized that there was a point in which the
middle voice was the only voice and that the active and passive were added

utopia

“Now we understand that the principle
of figurality which is also the principle of
unbinding (the baffle) is the death drive: ‘the
absolute of anti-synthesis’: Utopia” (“Fiscourse
Digure” 357, DF 354). The principle of figurality is the death drive. It should be no surprise
to us that discourse would line up with Eros (as
Norman Brown had already stressed), but to
assign figure the position of thanatos comes as
quite a shock. Lyotard presaged this in the first
chapter when he rejects the possibility of any
unified theory:
We have renounced the madness of
unity, the madness of supplying a first
cause in a unitary discourse, the fantasy
of the origin. The Freudian utopia maintains us under the rule dictated by the

so-called death drive,
which is that the
unification of diversity, even in the unity
of discourse (even
in that of Freudian theory), is always
repelled, always forbidden. (“Taking the
Side of the Figural” 42, DF 18)
The figural (under the command of the
death-drive) resists any possibility for a unified
discourse. Here we may distinguish Derrida’s
différance from Lyotard’s difference. Lyotard
situates difference in the figural (always
already intertwined with discourse) whereas
Derrida sees différance inherent in discourse
without any need to invoke the figural. The
difference is subtle, but telling, hinging on Uto-
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¢pÒfansij

(some would say divided) later.
With Heidegger’s erasure of the distinction between subject and object,
we can understand his love of the middle voice. Objects are not “seen by”
subjects, nor do subjects “see” objects, rather things show themselves. It is
this showing with which Heidegger concerns himself. The fa…nesqai (phainesthai) of ¢pofa…nesqai becomes the pheno of phenomenology. The very
voice of the verb foreshadows Edmund Husserl’s immanent transcendence.
Heidegger often uses a noun derived from the verb, ¢pÒfansij (apophansis), which means statement, declaration. However, there is another
noun that comes from ¢pofa…nesqai, ¢pÒfasij (apophasis, note the missing
n), which can mean a sentence, decree, or list. I bring this up because there
are two words spelled ¢poÒfasij with two completely different meanings. The
second word means negation, and is far more common than the ¢pÒfansij
meaning sentence. This second word is taken from ¢po and fhm… (phēmi),
meaning to speak. We get the term apophatic discourse from this second
word.
¢pÒfansij: sentence and its negation. The two meanings are indistinguishable and therefore always already there when using either. Logos and
thanatos. Eros and the death drive.

pia, both “good place” and “no place” in the
original pun. For Derrida, discourse will always
be capable of the former. For Lyotard, figurality always occupies the latter.
Discourse, Figure, then, anticipates The
Differend. The given entails a pockmarked
landscape of difference and repetition, untranslatable, unsmoothable. Everywhere we
look we find differends, injudicable regions
between places, utopias. The call then is not
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to smooth over, but to bear
witness to new idioms, to
the construction of new
places, to the composition
of new topoi, always between and across modalities. After all, jouissance only ever exists as
a difference between two states. This dissertation constructs incompossible theories of such
a composition, each theory in tension with the
others, never failing into a unity.

Dans la technique psychanalytique, il n'est point
besoin d'un travail spécial
de synthèse; cela, l'individu In the psychoanalysis,
s'en charge mieux que nous. there is no need for a
special work of synthesis;
here, the individual does
it better than us.
Letter from S. Freud to O. Pfister,
October 9, 1918 (DF 389)

noitcefleRReflection
Rudolphe Gasché’s The Tain of the Mirror
builds and complicates a case for reflection as
the central problem of Western metaphysics.
He initially creates a history of reflection, from
Socrates’ “know thyself” through Descartes’’
skeptical reflection and into Hegel’s absolute
reflection. Reflection here means more than
careful consideration of an object. It progresses toward thought which takes the self
as its object, then takes ever and ever closer
objects for reflection (self - thought - reflection). With Heidegger, the subject-object relationship has been complicated sufficiently to
merit dropping the term “reflection” altogether
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– Heidegger uses Besinnung, which Gasché is
careful to distinguish from reflection.
Besinnung, consequently, is the term by
which Heidegger calls the non-reflexive
capturing of what is turned back to
through a destruction of the history of
ontology, not only insofar as its representations of Being are concerned, but
also as concerns its major methodological concept of reflection. (117)
Heidegger’s Destruktion makes way for Derrida’s deconstruction.
Here we return to the impossibility of the
hors-texte with which I have already identified

¥peiroj
In the earliest surviving fragment of Greek philosophy, Anaximander introduces the concept of tÕ ¥peiron (to apeiron), “the infinite” (Barnes 28ff.). Jonathan Barnes sums up Anaximander’s “Urstoff” (original material out of which
all things came) thusly: “the first principle or element of things, the original and
originating mass of the universe, was apeiros, unlimited” (29). This seemingly simple limitlessness is complicated by the realization that originary is in
itself a limit (whence Lyotard’s pseudarche). As such, Anaximander’s apeiron
prefigures Derrida’s shocking statement that “différance, in a certain and very
strange way, (is) ‘older’ than the ontological difference or than the truth of Being” (133). The limitless is a necessary precursor to a world predicated upon
limitation (differentiation). Through calling attention to the fundamental limiting inherent in epistemology and language, the Milesian Anaximander may
have posthumously influenced the Ephesian Heraclitus.
That Heraclitus makes sidelong reference to Anaximander in his opening fragment has, to my knowledge, gone unnoticed far too long. Heraclitus’
opening fragment reads,
Although this account [lÒgoj] holds forever, men ever fail to comprehend,

Derrida. Gasché makes clear that for Derrida this does not mean that all is language (a
reading I have perhaps leaned toward) but
that there can be no final arbiter of meaning:
the general text … has no extratextual
signified or referent, no last reason,
whether empirical or intelligible, at
which its referring function could come
to a final halt. It also means that the
generalized text does not refer to something outside the system of referentiality
that could do without being referred to,
but that its referentiality is such that it
extends abysmally out of sight without,
however, entailing the text’s self-reflexivity. The absence of all extra-text, about
which one could decide independently
of the textual system of referral, implies
that there is no one final meaning to

the text. Again, it must
be repeated that
this is so not because
of the general text’s
semantic wealth or
unfathomable depth,
nor because of the finitude of its human
decipherer, but for structural reasons.
(282)
Note first that there is no depth to the
general text. This is not to make of it a plane
of immanence (as will be shown below). Nor is
the text totalizing in the sense of excluding any
real world. It is more closely aligned with a
structural (though not structuralist) analysis of
Heidegger’s referential totality (on which see
below).
Referral itself is made possible by the
separation of self and other, of subject
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¥peiroj
both before hearing it and once they have heard. Although all things
come to pass in accordance with this account, men are like the untried
[¢pe…roi] when they try [peirèmenoi] such words and works as I set forth,
distinguishing each according to its nature and telling how it is. But other
men are oblivious of what they do awake, just as they are forgetful of
what they do asleep. (K.1, D. 1, Charles Kahn’s trans.)
While the first word, logos, is one of the most recognizable of Greek words,
the other two may be gleaned from our introduction to tÕ ¥peiron—the first
(¢pe…roi) being the masculine plural version of the same word, the second
(peirèmenoi) being a verbal form lacking the negative prefix. However, the
question might arise as to what (in)experience has to do with infinity. To answer that, we first trace the history of the infinite.
Liddell and Scott’s Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon records three
separate words (n.b. not meanings) spelled ¥peiroj (apeiros). The first is
a Doric version of ½peiroj, meaning land (as opposed to sea or air). The
second is defined as “without trial or experience” and traced to pe‹ra (peira).
The third, defined as “boundless, infinite, countless,” is traced to pe‹raj
(peiras). The latter two of these words are negative forms of a word (pe‹ra)

and object, the arche-trace. The trace is
constitut(ed)ive of/by différance. Derrida
notes,
And we will see why that which lets
itself be designated différance is
neither simply active nor simply passive, announcing or rather recalling
something like the middle voice, saying
an operation that is not an operation,
an operation that cannot be conceived
either as passion or as the action of a
subject on an object, or on the basis
of the categories of agent or patient,
neither on the basis of nor moving toward any of these terms. For the middle
voice, a certain non-transitivity, may be
what philosophy, at its outset, distrib-

uted into an active
and a passive voice,
thereby constituting
itself by means of this
repression. (Margins
of Philosophy 9)
The original philosophical move was to divide the middle voice into active and passive
thereby separating subject and object. Heidegger’s reinvocation of the middle voice divorces his ontology from traditional philosophy as
it demolishes the subject-object opposition.
In short, the arche-trace must be understood as the fold of an irreducible
“bending-back,” as a minimal (self-)difference within (self-)identity, which secures
selfhood and self-presence through the
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¥peiroj
which means an attempt or try and related forms include the idea of piercing or passing over, hence limit. The ¥peiroj therefore means without either
experience or limit. This particular word cluster descends into experiment,
empiric, pirate (one who makes an attempt), emporium (either a place of attempts or a meeting of limits), port, and experience (Hasley §296-7).
Apparently the word originally connoted testing something by poking at
it. Hence it would evolve notions of limit (determined by trial), experience,
and piercing. Somewhere behind all this lurks Pirsig’s notion of the rhetorical
scalpel, which establishes limits—and thereby determines experience—by
piercing the Urstoff. The concept of tÕ ¥peiron becomes incredibly productive then for Anaximander, but it remains to be shown why Heraclitus would
invoke such a word with such semantic weight. Perhaps its ambiguity is
indicative of Heraclitus’s sibylline style which, “oÜte lšgei oÜte krÚptei ¢ll£
shma…nei”(K.33, D.93).1
This punning signification should be allowed only if productive. Seemingly, Heraclitus’ use would be just the opposite—why would Heraclitus link
his inexperienced listeners with Anaximander’s Urstoff? Perhaps it was an
1

“Neither states nor lies but signifies” (my trans.).

detour of oneself (as Other) to oneself.
(Gasché 192)
The trace then makes possible self reference
through identification of distinct entities at the
same time that it makes self-reference impossibile by making identification always approximate.
The immediate take away is that, as a
reference system, the general text cannot get
outside itself, nor ever refer to itself exactly
(see Kurt Gödel). In this sense, there can be no
reflexivity:
The illusion of self-reflection of a text
is witness only to the representational
function of a text, not to its representation of something outside the text or
it self-representation. It is an effect of
the text’s nature as a system of referral.
(291)

Referral makes reflection possible and impossible
in the same movement. The
general text is a “system of
traces” based upon metaphor.
Metaphor makes possible the originary
split of the middle voice, the beginning of philosophy. Derrida concludes, “différance, in a
certain and very strange way, (is) ‘older’ than
the ontological difference or than the truth of
Being” (Margins of Philosophy 22). Différance
then reveals a certain metaphoricity in being.
Gasché sees in Derrida’s notion of the metaphoricity of the general text, a subtle gesture
toward the transcendental:
Since, as an “originary” synthesis,
metaphoricity is more originary than
what I have formerly referred to as
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¥peiroj
insult to Anaximander (long dead by this point). Perhaps an attempt to separate himself from Anaximander’s empiric followers. I would however argue
that much more is at stake than a 2500 year old squabble.
Hereclitus’ first sentence plays with the word logos. Normally the phrase
“this logos” would refer to the book itself—a sort of proem preparing the
reader for what is to come. Yet by claiming both that “this [logos] holds forever” and that men fail to understand it both “before hearing it and once they
have heard,” Heraclitus points toward a more elegant reading of logos (Kahn
96-7). Rather than a mere account or argument it is the discourse of nature
itself, possibly language itself. As Kahn writes,
The tension between word and content is essential here, for without it we
do not have the instructive paradox of men who are expected to understand a logos they have not heard. (98)
Playing between medium and message, Heraclitus unites them (and this,
over two millennia before Marshall McLuhan). The logos is not only the structure of his book but the argument itself: both form and content.
The careful wording of the next sentence (really still the first in the

transcendentality, and since it also combines with the most exterior qualities of
metaphor, with metaphor’s exteriority to
the concept, I shall try to define it as a
nonphenomenologizable quasitranscendental. (295)
Let us aim at an understanding of this
final phrase through a division first.
Nonphenomenologizable signifies the
recognition of the limits of phenomenology.
Phenomenology always entails a return to
Sachen selbst, the things themselves. Gasché
writes, “Derrida’s inquiries are concerned with
a difference that is no longer phenomenologi-

zable, that has no “itself” to
itself but that, in its irreducible plurality, ceaselessly differs from itself” (88). When
discussing metaphoricity,
différance, or trace there can no longer be
any “itself.”
By quasitranscendental Gasché signifies
an alternative to Heidegger’s finite transcendentals. Finite transcendentals are the constitutive features of Dasein, “quasitranscendentals
are, on the contrary, conditions of possibility
and impossibility concerning the very conceptual difference between subject and object
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¥peiroj
Greek), sets up a delicate play between experience and empiricism. The
statement that “all things come to pass in accordance with this account” once
again plays toward the new science that had been brewing in Miletus—a
blend between philosophy and proto-empiricism. Heraclitus is quick to challenge such a reading by saying that “men are like the untried [¢pe…roi] when
they try [peirèmenoi] such words and works as I set forth, distinguishing each
according to its nature [fÚsij] and telling how it is.” Again the idea of physis (as opposed to nomos) common in the new science rears its ugly head,
promising a simple resolution. Instead, the subtle phrasing of the central
section yields more complex readings. The complexity hinges upon the word
“like.” Kahn calls this “a surprising phrase; for it suggests that in fact men
do have the experience in question” (99). This problem may be dis-solved
through the implementation of Kahn’s earlier argument about the logos: if it is
universal and originary, then all have experienced it already.
Finally we have reached the apeirotic. The aporia is made evident in the
central phrase:
¢pe…roisin ™o…kasi peirèmenoi
They are like the inexperienced [or limitless ones] even as they experience. (My trans.)
Fortuitously the congruence between the two terminal words in this phrase
appears, granting it a certain harmony in its paradox. If we invert our usual

and even between Dasein and Being” (317).
The quasitranscendentals (metaphoricity, trace,
différance) precede Dasein.
Nonphenomenologizable quasitranscendentals occupy a position between the
transcendental and the empirical and between immanence and transcendence thereby
coupling the two binaries. It is through Derrida’s move away from phenomenology that
the transcendental blurs into transcendence.

Transcendentals imply a
transcendence through
the hierarchical principle
of identity. However, when
identity is under erasure,
immanence reasserts itself
within transcendentals.
Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari’s immanence does not lie outside of thought, but
rather makes thought possible:
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(What is Philosophy 37)

¥peiroj
interpretation, we find that people are like the apeiron itself when they experience the logos. As we learn to listen to the logos, we find that form and content merge. Rather than Heraclitus’ statement being about the logos, it becomes a part of the logos. As we study the structure of language, we find that
we are an expression of language rather than the reverse.
Always already returning to us we see Plato’s notion of rhetoric as experience (empeiria) rather than art (Phaedrus 462 C). Plato calls rhetoric a “made
art” and when asked by Polus of his meaning replies, “I mean a certain habitude [™mpeir…a]” (Lamb’s trans.). Empeiria, as you may have guessed, stems
from the same root as apeiros. Concordantly, it provides a useful analog to
Heraclitus. Rhetoric is indeed an experience—an experience in the infinite,
boundless Urstoff from which reality is constructed: a discourse on the figural.
Heraclitus somehow manages to inform Plato’s disparaging remarks about
rhetoric even after his death. Deleuze and Guattari recognize that the immanence of the rhetorical subject lies in its existence as habit:
Empiricism knows only events and other people and it therefore a great
creator of concepts. Its force begins from the moment it defines the subject, a habitus, a habit, nothing but a habit in a field of immanence, the
habit of saying I. (What is Philosophy 48)

These three thinkers—Derrida, Deleuze,
and Lyotard—all seek to subvert and combine
the twin binaries of immanence-transcendence
and transcendental-empirical. Lyotard makes
clear his distinction from Derrida:
As we pursue the analysis we come
up against a density, an opacity: the
locus, I will assume, of the figural which
deconstructs not only discourse but
the figure, in as much as the figure is a
recognizable image or a regular form.

Not just the trace, not just
presence-absence, period,
indifferently discourse or figure, but the primary process,
the principle of disorder, the
incitement to jouissance.
And underneath the figural: difference.
Not just the trace, not just presence-
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absence, period,
indifferently discourse
or figure, but the
primary process, the principle of disorder, the incitement to jouissance. Not
some kind of interval separating two
terms that belong to the same order,
but an utter disruption of the equilibrium
between order and non-order. As we
sound these depths of the pseudarche
we may perhaps get a handle on the
truth of difference, whose presence was
already felt in the tangible order, the
order of the visual field, but where it is
simply a metaphor. Its proper field, the
environment it requires in order to try to
establish itself, is the pseudarchaic. (“The
Dream-work,” 334-5, DF 328)
Figure is not merely a trace. The given is not a
text.
I have so far been reading Discours,
Figure as a complex response to Of Grammatology. Lyotard later clarifies this relationship:

¥peiroj
Rhetoric is an experience which yields infinite inexperience. Through
looking through language, rather than at it, people “are oblivious of what they
do awake, just as they are forgetful of what they do asleep.” This epistemological somnambulism reflects a public incapable of laughing at/with the sesquipedalian philosophizing in which this aside revels. Instead the demand is
to “be clear,” a notion as dishonest as it is impossible. Hopefully it has found
its way into the hands of a reader who glances off of it rather than staring it in
the face. Only in this manner can it provide sufficient misreadings to merit its
own creation.
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(Dérive 228-9, Quoted in Bennington 102)
The line is not the letter. The image Lyotard constructs for dealing with their relationship is the Moebius strip interlaced with a
band. This construction may have originated
as a Moebius strip which was cut (like the
cut in the middle voice), but this must always

Mirror

remain pseudarchic. We have no access to the
figure as origin, whether in a historical sense,
or in a more personal, psychoanalytic sense.
Instead, we are surrounded by a given which
is constituted by both discourse and figure,
forever intertwined.

Window

Windows and Mirrors
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Shedroff

Selber

One way of seeing/reading the
immanence-transcendence relationWhen we are encouraged
ship is with the images of windows
to look through technologies to our
and mirrors. Transcendence hypothwork rather than at the technologies of
esizes a window through which the
our work, we perpetuate the false assubject gazes at the object. Immasumption that the relationship between
nence requires instead a mirror which
a technology and its design is "natural"
folds the plane upon itself. Nor need
and not conventional. Moreover, we
facilitate a consistent reflection, an
discourage users from examining how
aedequatio. Instead, it must be conthey might modify or work around techvex or concave, bent like the comma
nologies that fail to support their backseparating/joining discourse, figure.
grounds, educations, learning styles,
The image is taken from Bolter
and worldviews. (§ 5)
and Gromala’s Windows and MirStuart Selber offers an intriguing view of
rors, which advocates reflexivity in in- the effect of technology on technical comformation design. They first show that
current Information Design canon
requires transparency and abhors reflexivity, prefers windows to mirrors. In the window metaphor, GUIs are transparent, showing
you information as it is. This is of course,
One aspect of an experience that can
just a myth, though a useful one, to be
make it surprising and amazing is that
sure. Users rarely see information as it
of confronting one’s beliefs. When we
is (except perhaps in the most applied
are challenged to rethink possibilities
uses like statistical and cad software).
(when our beliefs and expectations
Nathan Shedroff, as well as Stuart
are confronted by the evidence in front
Selber, would argue that Information
of our eyes) we can have a profound
Design always carries with it the myth
reaction. (6)
of transparency. The alternative would
Nathan Shedroff replaces Information
be a mirror, which reflects its own
Design with Experience Design. Shedroff
creates a progression, Data→Information→ methods, capabilities, and user. Reflexive GUIs encourage users to reflect on
Knowledge→Wisdom (34-59). Information
the process itself.
Design works at the first two levels, using
Think of the relative reflexivity
data (passive, given) to construct informaand transparency of the Macintosh
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OS and Linux. For the most part,
munication. He first addresses
OS X is designed to work thoughtthree myths of technology: the myth of proglessly. A user’s immediate impulse
ress, the myth of access, and the myth of
for getting something done should
transparence. Technology does not produce
be the way that it works. On the
real progress, but is a complex system with
up side, this narrows the learning
benefits and disadvantages. Merely giving
curve tremendously while meeting
everyone access to technology will not deexperienced users’ gut need for a
crease the distance between the haves and
feeling of immediate control. On the
have-nots. Technology does not have to aim
other hand, Linux, an open-source,
at transparency, nor does it often achieve
cross-platform operating system,
that goal.
forces users to learn how it works on
a much deeper level. Rather than
Normally, these are viewed through the
anticipateing users’ every move, Linux requires
lenses of Usability and Customizability. Usa bit of flexibility on its users’ part. Linux’s major
ability = good. Customizability = good. Usability
advantage is its flexibility in return. Users can
and customizability are assumed to be inredesign every aspect of the operating sysversely related. Various information designers
tem, customizing it to their own needs on the
have found ways of splitting the difference.
fly.
Think of the EQ on the receiver of a modular
stereo. The more aspects users are allowed to
control, the more difficult the device is to use.
Apple’s designers have reinvented the EQ for
the iPod by combining usability and customizability brilliantly. Rather than increasing dials,
the iPod’s EQ system multiplies presets: quality
over quantity in an interesting way
tion (meaning). With the added dimensions
an experience entails, we move from information to knowledge (deeper, personal),
and occasionally to wisdom (generalizable
approaches and values). Reflection makes
possible the transition from knowledge to
wisdom.

(dials being quantitative and presets being
qualitative).
Like I said, OSs are usually seen through
the lenses of customizability and usability.
Instead, I’d like to look through the lens of
user adaptability. OS X is an incredibly stable
system, but when it does crash, users are
often completely helpless. They lack the tools
with which to adapt to breakdowns. On the
other hand, Linux crashes far more often, but
its users are left relatively unfazed. Linux gives
its users tools with which to adapt. When users are taught to look only through the GUI,
they internalize a technological myth: users’
desires should be met immediately; if they are

not, then the machine has
failed; if the machine has
failed, users are inculpable.
Conversely, users who
are taught to look through
technology learn how technology works. They
realize that computers will only do what users
tell them and that, most likely, if something has
gone “wrong,” it is the user’s fault and can
therefore be solved by the user.
This may seem far afield of comics, discourse, and figure. However, if you’ll bear with
me for one last tangent, we can build a new,
more useful understanding of comics.
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Heidegger’s Hammer
Heidegger’s Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit
roughly correspond to windows and mirrors
respectively. Zuhandenheit, often translated
by “readiness-to-hand,” signifies Dasein’s
relationship to tools during use. Vorhandenheit,
often translated by “presence-at-hand,” entails
the conspicuousness of tools which are not
currently usable for one reason or another.
The interplay of ready-to-hand and presentto-hand has recently been integrated into
usability and cognitive science research. (cf.
Dotov et al.) Heidegger’s hammer, then.
Heidegger employs a hammer as his
primary example (Being and Time, 97-107: H
68-76) . If I hold the hammer and use it for
hammering, then the hammer is “ready-tohand” [zuhanden]. In a sense, the hammer is
invisible. I do not think, “Alright Jason, pull the
hammer back, now bring it back firmly, but

with just a touch of flexibility so that it doesn’t
bounce to much, and use the bounce of the
hammer off of the nail to create a kind of
rhythm with which to continue hammering until,
ah, there the nail is in.” Instead, my thoughts
look a little more like, “Hammer. Nail. Hammer
nail,” though even that may be much more
thought than I generally give to hammering
while hammering.
Now, if in the course of hammering,
something goes horribly awry, the hammer
will become “present-at-hand” [vorhanden].
My thoughts will look something more like
this: “Hammer. Nail. Hammer nail. Hammer
nail. Hammer na—sweet cupcakes, my thumb!
Why hammer why?! We had an agreement!”
Now every movement of the hammer becomes completely reflexive. Now my thoughts
are on the process of hammering and how it

works. My hammering actually gets worse as
I find that I can’t hammer while thinking about
hammering. However, I also might discover
new ways of hammering that prevent me from
crushing my thumb. Perhaps the new methods
eventually turn out to be too
slow. The hammer is failing
again (though without causing me to scream). I look to my
watch and instinctively move
the hammer from zuhanden
tool to conspicuous Vorhandenheit. “Perhaps if I do this, I
can hammer more quickly and
still avoid crushing my thumb.
Let’s see … yes!” This oscillation
describes not just a special circumstance, but
our basic mode of being in the world.

According to Heidegger, these two modes
reveal something about the
world as it is. In the ready
to hand, we discover the
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Vorhandenheit

Zuhandenheit

referential totality of the world. The world is
a system, and everything we access works in

that system in some relation to other things in
that system. A hammer would not be a hammer if we gave it to an alien who has never
seen a nail. The presence-at-hand reveals
the inescapability of objective reality, a more
traditional, Cartesian reality which Heidegger
does not deny, but complicates. The hypothetical alien would indeed have an object in its
hands, and could examine and analyze that
object, even determining what we use it for.
These are all present at hand uses. However,
it would then occupy a completely different
position in the alien’s referential totality (probably something like “artifact discovered on
distant planet used in conjunction with other
artifacts for attaching things”), assuming the
alien partakes of Dasein in a way similar to us.
I promised above that this would bring
us back to comics, to discourse, figure. Though
this may do some disservice to Heidegger’s
terms, we can see a certain tendency for
text to act more as ready-to-hand and image
to act as present-at-hand. With text, we are
encouraged to look through, into the content,
beyond the medium itself. With image, we are
encouraged to look at, seeing brushstrokes,
lines, curves, drops, and the medium itself. This
is more true of the discourse|figure distinction
than of text vs. image. Discourse concerns itself
primarily with meaning, not form. Figure, on
the other hand, cares intimately about form
and content simultaneously.
None of this is to say that text does
not reflect. I have already given multiple
examples of texts which reflect and of texts
which engage in the interplay of discourse
and figure. While my examples have all been
twentieth century so far, we could of course
include Tristram Shandy, the Book of Kells,
and any number of other documents in a

list of metatexts engaging
in the interplay of figure
and discourse. My MA
thesis traced these roots
through Shakespeare and
into Homer. As the opening
section of this chapter made clear, there is no
discourse without figure.
However, in text (and here I am speaking
primarily of print or digital alphabetic artifacts
not Derrida’s general text) the distinction
between looking through and looking at is
sharp. In text reflexivity often causes humor,
shock, a distinct shift in reading modes. However, in paintings for instance it is not uncommon to shift easily from symbolic readings to
noticing shading, color, line, stroke, etc. The
shift occurs more easily in the realm of the
figural. Note especially here that discourse
equals looking through, but figure does not
necessarily equal looking at. Instead, the figural consists of interplay. This was foreshadowed
in my first chapter during the discussion of the
Moebius strip. The figural is the pseudarchè
of the discursive. The discursive is never truly
isolated from the figural.
Comics encourage this interplay in a variety of ways. First, by juxtaposing images and
text, readers are forced to oscillate between
reading (looking through) and seeing (looking
at). However, comics complicate this by having readers see words and read images, as
shown in chapter two. In fact, this oscillation
regularly happens in each element: reading
the image while reflecting on its composition,
seeing the text balloon and reflecting on how
its content relates to its form in subtle and
informative ways. This interplay is central to
reading comics; in my own experience, more
central even than the closure of the gutter.

79

Marshall McLuhan defined comics as a
cool medium for two reasons: they are low
definition (cartoony) and highly participatory
(amplification through simplification and the
closure of the gutter). Chapter one explained
the closure of the gutter, while chapter two
showed why I don’t feel it’s the key to comics’
uniqueness. Amplification through simplification,
a concept I’ve not yet covered, is McCloud’s
way of saying that because of the reduced
definition of comics, their cartoony character,
comics require the reader to intuit more, and
also to more greatly identify with characters.
The cartooniness of comics has changed
greatly in the last fifty years, with comics
becoming more and more complex and more
and more interested in their own composition.
At the same time, many documents benefit
from amplification through simplification, which
might be another way of discussing the CBS
(Clarity, Brevity, Sincerity) model of composition, alternately praised and lambasted
by Richard Lanham (Economics of Attention
140-2). Comics, then, can be separated from
other media by neither the gutter nor their
cartooniness.
Comics maintain their participatory
nature in spite of a variety of levels of definition. Their participatory nature, however, is not
wedded to the gutter or simplicity of form. The
above pages have built an argument instead
for their interplay of two diverse acts: looking
through and looking at, which can be restated
as reading and seeing.
One interpretation would be that such
oscillation better imitates the world of our ex-

Cool Media
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perience. This interpretation
would be similar to Hubert
Dreyfus’ dismissal of Cartesian models of artificial intelligence: they do
not adequately take into account the world as
Dasein encounters it. While Dreyfus saliently
critiques a certain kind of information design,
his critique does not adequately address
composition. To do so would be to assume that
the goal of composition is mimesis. Instead, we
might say that the basis of composition is putting together (com-posit) of disparate concepts
and modes, that this kind of oscillation is built
into composition from the etymological level
up to the most theoretical.
Here I must resist a tendency toward a
hegemonic espousal of comics. Other theorists
have called various media “meta media.” Video, digital media, the internet have all been
cited as so-called container media which
encompass (and by implication supersede) all
previous (other) media. However, to embrace
the differend is to recognize,
There is no genre whose hegemony
over the others would be just. The philosophical genre, which looks like a metalanguage, is not itself (a genre in quest
of its rules) unless it knows that there is
no metalanguage. It thereby remains
popular, humorous, (Differend 158)
comical. Nor should we consider rhetoric or composition metalanguages. They will
always carry with them the danger of hegemony. And as Lyotard writes at the end of The
Differend,
The only insurmountable obstacle that

the hegemony of the economic genre
comes up against is the heterogeneity
of phrase regimens and of genres of
discourse. This is because there is not
‘language’ and ‘Being,’ but occurrences.
(181)
The only insurmountable obstacle that
the hegemony of current-traditional, C-B-S
style composition comes up against is the
heterogeneity of multimodal composition.
So far I’ve argued that all composition is
multimodal. Why advocate multimodal compo-
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sition if all texts are multimodal? It may seem like I’m
not advocating anything at
all. However, by invoking
reflexivity I am creating a new vision of multimodal composition, one that is interested in its
own composition and mediation. A reflexive
multimodal composition binds discourse to figure while recognizing its own construction. The
practical application of that theory comprises
the second half of this dissertation.

Note

Among our more vestigial
states of mind.
Nothing had happened because
nothing had changed.
Yet the General was rubbish in
the end.
IV

Gutter

The following excursus bridges the two halves of the
book: knowing and doing. It engages in traditional
argument with aleatory form. Please print the entire
excursus on double sided copies, shuffle all pages
except this one, and arrange the pages into a book,
with this page as the cover. Then staple the center.
The images and the text will then arrange themselves
around this center into always new arguments. This
rhizomic argument has no beginning or end, and is
all beginning.

It
Must
Change

Said that as keen, illustrious
ornament,
As a setting for geraniums, the
General,
The very Place Du Puy, in fact,
belonged

Two things of opposite natures
seem to depend
On one another, as a man
depends
On a woman, day on night, the

imagined

On the real.
real This is the origin
of change.
Winter and spring, cold copulars, embrace
And forth the particulars of
rapture come.

clasped together

And North and South are an
intrinsic couple
And sun and rain a plural, like
two lovers
That walk away as one in the
greenest body.
In solitude the trumpets of
solitude
Are not of another solitude
resounding;
A little string speaks for a crowd
of voices.
The partaker partakes of that
which changes him.
The child that touches takes
character from the thing,
The body, it touches. The captain and his men
Are one and the sailor and the
sea are one.
Follow after, O my companion,
my fellow, my self,
Sister and solace, brother and
delight.

2

Excursus

Music falls on the silence like a
sense,
A passion that we feel, not
understand.
Morning and afternoon are

V

On a blue island in a sky-wide
water
The wild orange trees continued
to bloom and to bear,
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conversation, words between two or perhaps three. The difference here is important: dialogue or dialectic.
I claimed in the first excursus that dialectic is a conversation
with oneself. I drew my definition from Michel Serres:
Dialectic makes the two interlocutors play on the same side;
they do battle together to produce a truth on which they
can agree, that is, to produce a successful communication.
(67)
I implied that by enacting a conversation, a dialogue I was escaping this kind of totalitarian version of truth implicit in dialectic.
Serres is not so sure:
To hold a dialogue is to suppose a third man and to seek
to exclude him; a successful communication is the exclusion
of the third man. The most profound dialectical problem is
not the problem of the Other, who is only a variety-or a
variation of the Same, it is the problem of the third man.
We might call this third man the demon, the prosopopeia of
noise. (67)
There is always an excluded third, a supplement whose history
resides behind the official story.
In the first excursus I counted to two. A great improvement, I
feel, over most dissertations which can only count to one. I have
tried in this excursus to count higher. Once one counts to three
something changes and there is always more and more and more.
We do not need to count to four, for now we can count as high
as we like.
The question of rhetorical device returns now with prosopopeia, in which our interlocutors speak for a third man, NOISE. I
might propose another device, aposiopesis. Rather than putting
words into another’s mouth, perhaps I could let myself be cut of-

There is
always an
excluded
third
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its own demise. Not only do they inform our current moment, but
such a juxtaposition offers uncanny visions of the future.
Andre Leroi=Gourhan makes language an outlet of evolution. The slow expansion of the brainpan coupled with changes
in the hand and mouth facilitate gesture and speech. However,
figure has a separate origin.
We can therefore say that while motor function determines
expression in the techniques and languages of all anthropoids, in the figurative language of the most recent anthropoids reflection determines graphism. (188)
For Leroi Gourhan the tie between word and thing is reflection,
abstraction. The first marks were not mimetic but abstract: “graphism did not begin with naive representations of reality but with
abstraction” (188). Notes, numbers, shapes, female symbols.
We might think then that the discursive precedes the figural. In terms of mimesis and language, we’d be right. Primative
drawings “reflect the very slow development—lasting more than
10,000 years—of efforts to render with the hand a content that
verbally had already been mastered” (373). The earliest inscriptions were likely aides memoire. However, the figural is not merely
the visual, as we have seen. Lyotard rebuts Leroi-Gourhan by
invoking the thinkness of the world (DF 83) and pointing to the
importance of male and female symbols in these early drawings.
This importance points us toward the original site of fantasy, the
differences between the sexes, and therefore to not the discursive
but the figural.
Lyotard’s rebuttal makes way for reflection to be added as
a subsequent function for the figural through the guise of technology. Composition was from its beginning multimodal, reflexive, and
dependent upon fantasy, the figural, which is always the agent of

refLection
determines
graphism
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a return of the repressed. Ontogeny recapitualtes phylogeny in
the individual and the multiplicity.
The history in question is that of dasein, always ek-sisting
outside of itself through prostheses. Stiegler continues,
The logic of the supplement, always already the supplement’s history, is a techno-logic through which inorganic
matter is organized and takes on the appearance of the
living organism which is the originary supplement. Since
this “logic” is comprehensible only through its history, it is a
dynamic whose engine is différance. (Disorientation 4)
A différance engine, if you’ll pardon the pun. I refer of course to
William Gibson and Bruce Sterling’s The Difference Engine, the
ur-steam punk novel. Gibson and Sterling propose a new technological history in which Charles Babbage actually carried out
his plans to create a computer in the mid nineteenth century. The
resulting society experienced the information and industrial revolutions in overlap. Steam punk as an aesthetic offers us a glimplse
of the texture of the future anterior. The coming community flies an
airship while wearing bad-ass goggles.
Stiegler’s point, however, is the history of the supplement,
a repressed history which will have returned. The supplement in
question is technics, or, more accurately, supplementarity is technics. In the first volume, Steigler is careful to confuse the organic
and the inorganic. Interrogating the phrase “The invention of the
human,” he notes, “the ambiguity of the genitive imposes the
following question: what if the ‘who’ were the technical? and the
‘what’ the human?” (134). What invented whom?
All this hinges on the “ambiguity of the genitive. If poetry is
“intricate evasions of as,” as Wallace Stevens writes (“An Ordinary Evening,” §8), perhaps philosophy is vested interrogations of

What
invented
whom?
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signification as signifiers and signifieds.
Barthes’ doesn’t think so. He posits a third meaning beyond
the obvious and the metaphorical,
The obtuse meaning is a signifier without a signified, hence
the difficulty in naming it. My reading remains suspended between the image and its description, between definition and
approximation. . . . the obtuse meaning is outside (articulated)
language while nevertheless within interlocution. (67)
The third meaning remains excluded, not by either interlocutor, but
by language itself. This is why so many are uncomfortable with
terms like “visual rhetoric” which seem to place visuals firmly under
the thumb of the logos.
However, the logos is a place of third meanings as well, and
I am not persuaded rhetoric is or ever was tied to signification.
Barthes’ third meaning does not rely exclusively on the visual but
rather embodies any kind of discretization of narration, breaking
the flow,
In short, what the obtuse meaning disturbs, sterilizes, is
metalanguage (criticism). . . . obtuse meaning is discontinuous,
indifferent to the story and to the obvious meaning (as signification of the story). (67)
The third meaning ruptures and resists metalanguage. In this sense,
defining comics as sequential art excludes the third meaning, or
sees it as an unhappy accident, interrupting the flow of meaning
across gutters.
My own definition of comics, however, relies upon the third
meaning as its primary mechanism. The correlation supplied by the
reader between image and text, can of course embody the first
two meanings alone. However, the juxtaposition of image and text
found in comics creates a supplement, one which speaks to us of

The third meaning
disturbs
and resists
metalanguage
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historical movement.
However, resistance is always resisted by the structure of
rhetoric itself, as Vitanza points out,
As hard as I might try, I could never exclude all binaries,
for they keep creeping back in. Parataxis becomes hypotaxis; hypotaxis, parataxis. Just as anything that has been
repressed, purged, excluded eternally returns such as thirds.
And, yes, yes, yes, I would do what I am capable of doing
when doing hystery and schizography to enable these thirds
to creep and ooze in and in and in, back into The History of
Rhetoric. I want to denegate The History. (22)
Opening the gap between figure and discourse is never an issue
of saying the right thing. There is no othography. Instead, it consists
in always saying the wrong thing in new ways. Binaries reemerge
where we least thought they would. Hopefully, though, we can
make a space, a gap for thirds to “ooze in and in and in, back into
The History of Rhetoric.”
And moreover it is this very difficulty, rhetoric’s resistance
to our resistance that lets us know we are working against REAL
forces, not “mere rhetoric.” Žižek asks, “is not, for a human being,
‘reality’ ONTOLOGICALLY defined through the minimum of RESISTANCE — real is that which resists, that which is not totally malleable to the caprices of our imagination?” (“No Sex” para. 10).
The real resists us at each step. We may want to open third
spaces and allow an endless free play of signifiers, as the poststructuralists are often accused of wanting. But the play, serious as
it may be, is always a play on something: always bound to reality
even in its resistance to reality. The pleasure principle has no hope
of evading the reality principle.
If resistance is resisted, the way out lies in our acceptance of

resistance
is resisted
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materiality itself, for nothing can exist without form. One might
argue that Nothing has a form, that it is the naked form of supplementarity itself.
Image seems different from text in that it always has materiality, wheras text is abstract and arbitrary. This is less true after
the digital revolution. The image communicated on the left half of
this page has no more or less materiality than the words on this
half. And yet, it still retains a semblance of materiality over and
above the text, as Ranciére notes,
The imprint of the thing, the naked identity of its alterity in
the place of its imitation, the wordless, senseless materiality
of the visible instead of the figures of discourse — this is what
is demanded by the contemporary celebration of the image or its nostalgic evocation: an immanent transcendence,
a glorious essence of the image guaranteed by the very
mode of its material production. (9)
Whereas Stiegler wants to emphasize the discretization of the
image, Ranciére stresses its continuity, even if the continuity is a lie.
Even at our most cynical we still long nostalgically for the materiality of images.
For Ranciére, Barthes’ critique of images balances precariously between words and things:
But the semiologist who read the encoded messages of
images and the theoretician of the punctum of the wordless
image base themselves on the same principle: a principle
of reverse equivalence between the silence of images and
what they say. (10)
The gap, the gutter is not between the right side of the page and
the left only — it resides in the image itself. Perversing Ranciére’s
quote, I propose a reverse equivalence between the loquacity of

we still long
nostalgically
for the
materiality
of images
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images and their critique. Are images mimetic reproductions of a
real world or unique creations that are part of the world?
Mark Tansey depicts poststucturalist philosophers in photorealistic scenes. In one piece, Derrida and DeMan fight to the
death at the edge of a waterfall. In another, Harold Bloom oversees the (de)construction of the grand canyon, made completely
out of text. His work denies realism, expressionism, and the heterocosm, instead relying on a more self-aware mimesis: “In contrast
to the assertion of one reality, my work investigates how different
realities interact and abrade” (Danto 132). The mere fact that a
work exists means that it becomes part of the world it supposedly
imitates.
And yet these two modes, discourse and figure, seem like
two very different worlds. Discourse seems abstract, the letters
arbitrary signifiers of speech. Figure has a materiality to it. Derrida would deny that speech precedes writing. Lyotard argues that
figure needs no material other than psychic. Serres finds ethical
implications in attempts at orthography,
To exclude the empirical is to exclude differentiation, the plurality of others that mask the same. It is the first movement of
mathematization, of formalization. In this sense, the reasoning
of modern logicians concerning the symbol is analagous to
the Platonic discussion of the geometric form drawn in the
sand: one must eliminate cacography, the wavering outline,
the accident of the mark, the failure of the gesture, the set of
conditions that ensure that no graph is strictly of the same
form as any other. (69)
To exclude that which does not fit the ideal is to deny our own
materiality. When technical writing demands clarity, brevity, and
sincerity, it implicitly excludes the figural that lies at the center of
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Hypermedia and Rhizcomics
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To distract ourselves from the unwatchable
drubbing of the Clemson Tigers in the ACC
championship game, my colleague Josh Hilst
introduced me to a party game he enjoys
with his wife, a combination of Pictionary and
“telephone.” Every player begins with a stack
of paper. Each writes a simple phrase and
passes the stack. Each player then draws a
picture of the phrase then passes the stack
again. Looking only at the picture, the next
person tries to recreate the original phrase
(although deliberately obfuscating the original phrase through feigned stupidity is much
more fun). The play continues, alternating from
image to text and back, until each stack has
rotated fully around the circle arriving at its
originator. The originator then shows the last
entry and walks through the stack backwards
to reveal the original entry. Hilarity ensues.
Beer helps.
Being the pedantic academe I am, after
I had a few drinks in me, I wrote “there is no
outside-text” on a card and passed. By the
time the stack returned to me, I saw a fearsome logos threatening a diminutive text. The
path between has ultimately been lost, but I
thought it interesting how a party game could

enact deconstruction so fittingly. With this
simple game we move from Derrida’s logo
centrism to Lyotard’s assertion of the figural as
an outside text, an unconscious, a real which
precedes and shapes the symbolic: a logos
which threatens the text which purports to tell
it.
The translator acts as a middle ground,
a gap. In chapter one, I argued that the gap
in comics is not between but within panels—
I move the critical moment from interpanel
play to intrapanel play. With chapter two, I
problematized the notions of text and image,
visual and verbal, so as to broaden the effects

of my first
modes. Bernard Stiegler
move. The
offers a complex, nuanced
gap exists
historical understandacross the
ing of technology and
actual (syn- our relationship with it.
tagmatic),
Whereas chapter two
the virtual
found examples of print being remediated
(paradigby an increased focus on image and text,
matic), the
here I refer to hypermedia, games, websites,
page (decoupage), the work (tressage), and
computer programs, videos, for examples and
ultimately across discourse itself. The figural
paradigms of rhiz|comics. Recent technological
is this gap. Chapter three traced the figural
advances have drastically changed the iminto the unconscious through Lyotard, beginportance of delivery, yet the academy seems
ning to lay the groundwork for a composition
oddly isolated from many of these changes.
which would encourage the reflexive synthesis Ignoring the importance of delivery, students
of discourse and figure. Reflexive multimodal
and scholars have become alienated from
composition plays between transparency
their labor. The remaining sections investigate
and reflection, Heidegger’s Zuhandenheit
a return to delivery in scholarship.
and Vorhandenheit
respectively. McLuLogocentrism
Logocentrism
han’s system of hot
Post-structuralism’s critique of “logocentrism”
creates
logo
logo
and cold media fits
a new “logo
logo
logo centrism” by privileging language over
this dichotomy in
image.
Mark
Taylor writes,
terms of participaContrasting interpretations of reality lead to
tion but falls behind
alternative aesthetic strategies. While logo
logocenlogo
in terms of definitrism
struggles
to
erase
signifiers
in
order
to
tion. Advances in
arrive at the pure transcendental signified, logo
logo
technology have
centrism
attempts
to
extend
the
sign
to
infinincreased particiity by collapsing the signified in the signifier.
pation and definiUnion with the real—regardless of how the real
tion simultaneously
is understood—holds out the promise of overleading to a cooling
coming alienation and achieving reconciliation.
across media.
(Disfiguring 222-223)
This chapter
The logos
logos speaks to us through us. Rather than
begins a broad
returning to the hierarchy of logo
logocentrism,
we may
logo
sketch of Rhiz|comics,
logo
challenge
the
abstraction
of
logo
centrism
and
a composition
ground language in action: applied grammatology.
between and
across media and
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On December 19, 1991, Penn and Teller appeared on NBC’s The Late Show with David
Letterman. I was ten, so I’m almost certain I
never saw it live (there’s no way I was allowed
to stay up that late), but I vividly remember
their magic trick. Penn, the loquacious front

man of the duo, asked to
see Dave’s expensive watch. Teller, the silent
partner, goofed around with Penn, pretending
to almost drop the watch, and then smacked
it on Dave’s desk, threw it to the floor where
Penn crushed it to bits with a sledge hammer
and began stomping on the watch’s remains.
Dave was shocked; Penn and Teller acted
nonplussed. Just to show there were no hard
feelings, Penn led Dave to a deli case full of
dead fish, wheeled out for this occasion, and
offered Dave his pick of the lot. Still unable to
reconcile the loss of his watch, Dave went with
the rainbow trout. Penn then proceeded to lay
newspaper across Dave’s desk and clean the
fish. With a surprised look on his face, Penn
drew Dave’s attention to the watch, sitting inside the gutted fish. Dave removed the watch,
which at this point of the trick reeked horribly,
and Penn and Teller danced victoriously.
Magic tricks are one of the purest
examples of rhetoric our society. As a rhetoric
scholar interested in citizenship and agency, I
should say that law, politics, or medicine are
the purest examples of rhetoric in our society.

But none of those
examples encourage the interplay
of reflection and
persuasion which
facilitate magic
tricks. At the end
of a book full
of magic tricks,
Penn and Teller
reflect on their eagerness to reveal the
secrets that made them famous,
Deciding whether to explain a
magic trick is an aesthetic/personal
choice. It is not like selling military secrets in wartime. No infant has ever
died of magic trick exposure. Still,
you should consider your goals.
If you want credit
for being clever,
you should probably not
tell. Good
tricks usually have
dopey, unimpressive explanations. Look at
the Letterman Fish/Watch trick.
If you saw us do the trick on
TV, you probably thought we
were amazing sleight-of-hand
wizards. Then we told you how
the trick was done, and you realized
we were just liars willing to pay a man
to hide in a table full of cold fish guts.
Of course, we had a reason for telling
you. We thought it made a good story.

Good stories make
good books, and
people buy good
books. (Jillette and
Teller 209, italics in
original)
Penn and Teller are triply reflective. First,
they reflect on the trick
itself, the original rhetorical act. They make its
tropes explicit, like the
importance of feigning carelessness with
Dave’s watch. Then, they
reflect on their reflection
abstractly: should one
expose one’s tricks or
not. Finally they reflect on their own motives
for sharing the first two reflections: money.
The more seemingly more rhetorical
examples of law, politics, and medicine share
magic’s use of tropes and tricks as well as
its dependence on gadgets and technology.
The lawyer uses precedence
and theatre, relying upon the
technology of the codex to
persuade an audience. The
politician’s microphone facilitates the audience’s interpellation into specular society.
The MRI
reveals to
the doctor not a
mere body, but a docile
body already normalized. However, none of
those three situations
encourage the reflection
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examples depend on a
deliberately constructed
transparency that magicians eschew. Magic tricks
depend on reflection, on
the revelation of their means, most specifically
on delivery and its relationship with technology.
wrapped up in magic.
Even should magicians choose to maintain secrecy, their tricks are always dependent
upon reflection. After all, no child runs up to
a doctor after a successful surgery and asks
how docile bodies work. These more scholarly

Aristotle defined rhetoric as
ʼalla to ʼidein ta ʻuparconta
piqana peri ʻekaston
the ability, in each particular case, to
see the available means of persuasion.
Looking over the history of technology and rhetoric, it seemed
obvious that today we have
more means than ever before.
The last century has seen an
incredible expansion of persuasive means. The history of this
expansion has engendered a
variety of metanarratives, often
of progress and decline:
How did people live before the

Rhetorics
Mul-

things were so much better off before they
!
invented this newfangled
Rhetorics multiply with
technologies. In order to
understand the current
relationship(s) between
rhetoric and technology we
will begin with their intermingled histories.
How then should we
define technology? Here I
do not of course mean just
computers, as I have
implied in the drop menus above. Rather,
technology is an externalization of self
allowing humans to construct/modify our
world. Bernard Stiegler’s Technics and
Time, gives us a useful framework for
discussing such a view of technology.
?
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In the first volume The Myth of Epimetheus,
Stiegler recalls us to the anthropogenic myth
of Epimetheus and Prometheus. In the beginning, Epimetheus was charged with giving
each of the creatures means whereby to
defend themselves. However, when he got
to humans, he found that he had neglected
to save any gifts for them (Epimetheus means
afterthought). Prometheus (forethought), thinking quickly, stole the arts from the gods and
gave them to us.
Yet, this gift is our curse: we are always
already in need of prostheses, tools with
which to enable ourselves:
Man invents, discovers, finds (eurisko),
imagines (mêkhanê), and realizes what
he imagines: prostheses, expedients. A
pros-thesis is what is placed in front,
that is, what is outside, outside what it
is placed in front of. However, if what
is outside constitutes the very being of
what it lies outside of, then this being is
outside itself. The being of humankind is
to be outside itself. In order to make up
for the fault of Epimetheus, Prometheus
gives humans the present of putting
them outside themselves. (The Myth of
Epimetheus 193)

At a certain point in prehistory, evolution
moved out, from the biological to the technological. Since then humans have been defined
as external to themselves. Da-sein ek-sists.
Stiegler defines these prostheses for us:
Prosthesis means “placed-there-in-front.”
Pros-theticity is the being-already-there

The being of humankind
is to be outside itself
of the world, and also, consequently,
the being-already-there of the past.
Pros-thesis can be literally translated
as pro-position. A prosthesis is what is
proposed, placed in front, in advance;
technics is what is placed before us.
(235)
The term proposition recalls us to the sentence, both thought and speech. Every
proposition is placed before and therefore
outside of its speaker/thinker. We are in turn
propped up by these false limbs, in fact defined by them:
Dasein is outside itself, in ec-stasis,
temporal: its past lies outside it, yet it
is nothing but this past, in the form of
the not yet. By being actually its past,
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it can do nothing but put itself outside
itself, “ek-sist.” But how does Dasein
eksist in this way? Prosthetically, through
pro-posing and pro-jecting itself outside
itself, in front of itself. (234)
Humankind’s dependence upon prostheses,
its inherent externality, results not just from our

beginnings, but our modes of
living. To be is to be outside oneself: to “ek-sist.” As
a
result that which makes us human is forgotten.
Our false limbs become phantom limbs, an
integration of technology and organics—a
hybrid creature.

We are in a state of perpetual incompleteness,
outside of ourselves and outside of our tools.
Lacking tooth and claw we default to prostheses, tools which are at once part of us and
outside of us.
Jacques Lacan notes, “we find in man a
veritable specific prematurity of birth” (“The
Mirror Stage” 4, italics in orginal). We are unable to defend ourselves or get food at birth.
In his second volume, Disorientation, Stiegler
connects technology more explicitly to Lacan’s
mirror:
The mirror constitutes an interminable
maieutics of the self in which exteriority is constitutive (the desiring body
originarily instrumentalized), reflecting
a Gestalt, producing in it a remarkable
symmetry in which the object delays
itself. (Disorientation 26)
The key word, constitutive, reflects the term
formative in the full title of Lacan’s essay: “The
Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of
the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience.” The recognition of self in a mirror ushers

the infans (unspeaking) into the symbolic order.
Stiegler also invokes the splitting of the subject, a subject both premature and delayed.
For Lacan our maturity lies not in equipping ourselves with any conventional tool, but
with the most conventional tool: language.
Stiegler takes the same approach, first pointing out the prematurity of man and correlating
that to language: “They do not yet possess the
art of the political, which will be made necessary by their prematureness, directly ensuing
from the technical” (Epimetheus 188). The art
of the political, the ability to have conversation, is the first and primary art. The true gift
of Prometheus was not just fire, but the
:
“Language, the
as language, occurs . . .
through technics, through the theft of the fire
and the ‘arts’ (tekhnai)” (194). So language is
merely another tool.
Or so it might appear if Stiegler were
not quick to correct:
The metaphysical illusion from Plato onward that turns language into a means
through which humans express them-

selves, rather than its being located
as the site of their very constitution, is
abundantly criticized by Heidegger. Yet
it is the same error that induces consideration of an instrument as a means.
. . . But if the instrumentalization of language is possible, this is only because
its instrumentality is inherent to it. (205)
Language is not a means to an end any more
than technology. Rather, they are our very
mode of living. We are defined through language not vice-versa, and yet that does not
diminish language’s technicity and instrumentality. The sophists, we must remember, saw
language as a techne, for which Plato lambasted them. He had forgotten the instrumental nature of the
, or rather, of mythos.
As we have seen Stiegler expands
on this instrumentality in the second volume,
continuing,
This dynamic [the constitution of the subject through delay], proceeding from an
originary exteriority . . . , is experienced
in life as prostheticity: the mirror stage is
essential unaccomplishment; the mirage
is deformation. All mirrors are deforming
ones, just as much the tekhnê of the
gaze as of time. There are only clumsy,
gauche memories, especially when they
are accurate.
.
(Disorientation 27)
Whereas volume one portrays the exteriority of Dasein primarily through the lenses of
speech and thought, volume two expands
to what might be more typically considered
technology: writing, print, photography, film,
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and computers. The division
between the two hinges upon
Daseins’s retentional finitude
and the role of tertiary memory.
Coming out of Heidegger and Husserl,
Stiegler describes three types of memory.
Primary memory is continuous memory, all
memories which construct the present; it may
last moments or minutes. Secondary memory
denotes the construction of memories from
one’s discontinuous past: my first trip to the
zoo, my favorite high school teacher, what I
ate for breakfast yesterday. Tertiary memory
allows for a memory outside of oneself: I
remember the five canons of rhetoric handed
down to me from Cicero, the War of 1812,
and the germ theory of disease. This tertiary
memory is made necessary by retentional
finitude: I can remember what happened to
me, but I cannot remember what happened
to Napolean, unless someone passes that
memory onto me via tertiary memory.
Stiegler introduces the terms “tertiary
memory” and “retentional finitude” in the first
volume to introduce linear writing’s overcoming
of the latter. He calls this new techne “literal
synthesis.” However, “Writing is no longer, for
us, of ‘recent constitution.’ And we must know
what that means” (224). We stand then at
an age in which something other than literal
synthesis appears:
We would knowingly affirm here, in plain
and somewhat brutal terms, that it is a
form of writing, linear and phonological,
that gives this opening [the opening up
of the epoch of historiality]. . . . [We] des-
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ignate the completed form of alphabetic writing (phonological writing), literal
synthesis. A temporality that is deferred
belongs in principle to literal synthesis. In
the second volume of this work we will
develop the notions of analogical and
numerical synthesis, which dominate
contemporary technology, oriented,
inversely, by an asymptotic tendency
toward real, live temporality, temporality without detour, that is, toward a
particular atemporality—one that does
not exclude the work of différance but
conceals it in an essential manner. (230,
italics in original)
This “particular atemporality” comprises
a digital age characterized by oral

components: ubiquity,
integration, return to rhetoric, kairos over chronos, formulaic-ness, etc. If
linear phonological writing was characterized
as closed, the coming digital era seems intrinsically open.
In the first volume of Technics and Time,
Stiegler examined why Dasein is defined
through prostheticity. Volume two explains
how this prostheticity relates to disorientation
throughout modern history, specifically in literate and post literate Dasein (Disorientation 7).
We saw that he connects this disorientation
with reflection. Let us engage in our own return
inquiry (Rückfrage) into this relationship.
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Stiegler carefully distinguishes mnemo-technics,
what are often sloppily called “media,” from
other technics:
All supplement is technics, and all
supplementary technics is a storage medium “exteriorizing” a program. But all
technical supplement is not thus a technics of memorization: mnemo-technics
only appears after the Neolithic period.
And “the history of being” (the properly
“historical” age of historiality) begins
along with the history of language. (8,
italics in original)
Mnemo-technics begin with language, writing
and orality intertwined in the trace. Stiegler’s
first volume dealt with this relationship. The
second begins with an analysis of orthography, both writing and righting, rectitude (13).
Whereas language’s inception began the
overcoming of retentional finitude through
tertiary memory as oral tradition, writing
introduces rectitude, thus (de)stabilizing tertiary memory as more correct than primary or
secondary. The advent of tertiary memory is
constitutive. Tertiary memory as writing overcomes retentional finitude through instrumental
retentionality.
But that is not all, “This instrumentality
opens the possibility of a Rückfrage” (37).
Writing opens the space for reflection: “The
writer is affected in writing, encountering and

reflecting on the writerly self” (37). Writing
brings with it a new disorientation, incommensurability of primary, secondary, and tertiary
memory—a false continuity between phenomena defined precisely through their discontinuity. However, this fault is overcome with an
intensification of reflection.

discrete

a. 1a. Separate, detached from
others, individually distinct. Opposed to continuous.

In a more recent article, Stiegler summarizes and updates the ideas presented in
Disorientation: “The analogico-digital image
is the beginning of a systematic discretization of movement – that is to say, of a vast
process of the grammaticalization of the
visible” (“The Discrete Image” 148-9, italics in
original). To summarize and rewrite Stiegler’s
argument, discretization consists of a series
of epochal steps. Linear writing discretizes
speech and speaker; print, writer and writing;
photography, participant and viewer. With
photography, this discretization is still analog.
The digitization of photography separates
then and now: “The digitization of the analog
destabilizes our knowledge of the this was,
and we are afraid of this. But we were afraid

of the analog, too: in the first photographs we
saw phantoms” (152, italics in original). If the
verb discretize disorients the viewer, this is
intended. We might have substituted the verb
separate, however discretize has a particular
meaning: the breaking of continuity (154). The
general movement of discretization away from
continuity results in reflexivity. Language allows
speakers to reflect on their situation in a new
way. Writing made new forms of reflexivity
possible, “no geometry without instrumental retentionality” (Disorientation 37). What of these
new modes of discretization, then?
Just as certain kinds of writing actually liberate certain kinds of reflexivity
(for example, certain kinds of linear,
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alphabetic writing,
without which law,
science, and in particular history would be inconceivable),
so certain kinds of image-objects are
doubtless destined to liberate reflexivity in the domains of the visible and of
movement, just as alphabetic writing
reveals the discrete characters of language. (“The Discrete Image” 162, italics
in original)
Stop.
Reread that quote.

The term continuity likewise carries a historical weight
through Walter Benjamin’s critiques of reproduction The historical materialist
cannot do without the conand history.
cept of a present which is
Discontinuity links Benjamin’s two not a transition, in which
critiques. Photography explodes a time originates and has
moment from the continuum of time come to a standstill. For
in the same manner that the histori- this concept defines precal materialist explodes a moment cisely the present in which
from the continuum of history. Histor- he writes history for his perIt may be that icism and cinema both rely upon the son. Historicism depicts the
“eternal” picture of the past;
the continuity construction of a false continuity.
the historical materialist, an
of tradition is
experience with it, which
mere semblence. But then precisely stands alone. He leaves it to others to give themthe persistence of this sem- selves to the whore called “Once upon a time” in
blence of persistence pro- the bordello of historicism. He remains master of
vides it with continuity. (The his powers: man enough, to explode the continuum
of history. (“Theses on the Philosophy of History”
Arcades Project N19,1)
para 16)

Now, revise that quote.
Multimodal composition is “doubtless
destined to liberate reflexivity in the domains
of the visible and of movement.” Writing
changed the way we thought. So far I have
argued that new media changes the way we
write. Now I lay my cards on the table: new
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is determined by existence (ontological). Dasein is
able to reflect on existence
and on Dasein’s determination by existence
(ontico-ontological) (34, H:13-14). This fundamental definition of Dasein affects composition.
Dasein composes ontically, ontologically, and
ontico-ontologically. Because of the general

composi
composi
o
n
ontologi
cal
compositttiiio
on
n iiisss onti
ontic
co-ontologi
cal
media changes the way we think in a fundamental way. For Heidegger, Stiegler’s muse,
reflexivity is the fundamental defining characteristic of Dasein: “Dasein is an entity which
does not just occur among other entities.
Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact
that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue
for it” (Being and Time 32, H:12). Dasein is the
being for whom being is an issue. If we are
to take Stiegler seriously, we must recognize
his claim for what it is: new media constitute a
redefinition of Dasein.

discreet

a. 1. Showing discernment or
judgement in the guidance of
one's own speech and action;
judicious, prudent, circumspect,
cautious; often esp. that can be
silent when speech would be
inconvenient.
For Heidegger Dasein has its being
at issue ontically, ontologically, and onticoontologically. Dasein exists (ontic). Dasein

unwieldiness of these terms, I have so far used
transparency and reflexivity to correspond to
translate ontic and ontological, respectively.
Ontico-ontological composition describes
the work you are currently reading and its
ilk: metacompositional works of composition
theory.
Multimodal composition bears with it a
redefinition of composing in all three senses.
Ontically, we write differently now. New media remediate the old. Composition changes
with each new epoch. Ontologically, new
media change the way composers think about
composing. This is another way of saying that
remediation affects all five canons of rhetoric,
not just delivery (as has often been naively
understood). Finally, new media changes composition theory. This last point too often goes
unnoticed. Ontically, composing with a word
processor is different than composing with a
typewriter or with paper and pen. Ontologically, Richard Lanham knows this. Greg Ulmer
tells us that logic itself changes with new media: the advent of conduction over deduction
and induction. However, the ontico-ontologic
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Stiegler introduces the concept of
“epochal redoubling” in Disorientation. It revolves
around a series of puns. Epoche here means both era
and suspension, thereby combining phenomenology with
“Great
historicality. Indeed, it refers to the suspension of each
moments of
era by the subsequent era (think of the bracketing
technical innovation
are moments of suspen- of oral culture involved in literacy, or the bracketing
of silent film through the talkies). The redoubling
sion. In its development,
the technics that interrupts refers to an acceleration of change. Not only are
things moving more quickly, but they are speedone state of things iming up (moving more and more quickly). Redouposes another.” (“The
bling also carries with it the dichotomies of doubles:
Discrete Image”
Epimetheus
and Prometheus, Technics and Time,
149)
what and who, and the mirror image Stiegler so deftly
interrogates throughout Disorientation.
change is un(der)reported. Why? While we
feel the effects of remediation across all five
canons, we identify it with delivery, and we
scholars are alienated from our scholarship
primarily through the outsourcing of the canon
of delivery.
Stiegler promises the overcoming of
this alienation through cinema and television. While he does not specifically mention
desktop video editing, YouTube, the ubiquity of
video cameras, these technologies should be
read across his conclusions:
The real problem here is to rethink or
think otherwise what Hollywood has up
to this point done in the domain of the
culture industry, to which cinema and
television belong. For what it has done,
it has done in accordance with a reifying schema, and by opposing produc-

tion to consumption, that is to say: by
putting analysis on one side (production)
and synthesis on the other (consumption). Technology is giving us a chance
to modify this relation, in a direction that
would bring it closer to the relation of
the literate person to literature: it is not
possible to synthesize a book without
having analyzed literally oneself. It is
not possible to read without knowing how to write. And soon it will be
possible to see an image analytically:
“television” [“l’écran”] and “text” [“l’écrit”]
are not simply opposed. (“The Discrete
Image” 163, italics in orginal)
The overcoming of the separation of production and consumption in video through the
aforementioned technologies has not gone
unnoticed. We are actually quite overwhelmed
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with this consequence of new media. Likewise,
this realization has had an effect upon scholarship with the advent of journals like Kairos,
which “strive[s] to bridge the gap between
print and digital publishing cultures” by publishing “texts authored specifically for publication
on the World Wide Web” (Eyman and Inman).
The conditions in place when Dialectic of
Enlightenment was written no longer hold
sway in the same way. The blurring of lines
between author, text, and reader outlined by
(post)structuralist and reader response theories have been enacted with the advent of
generation YouTube. What does composition
look like now? Rhiz|comics.
Rhiz|comics does not undo the arguments of reader response criticism, nor does it
repeat them. Instead it complicates the terms
reader and response. The acceleration of the
expansion of rhetorical means changes our
conception of reading, linking it to its etymological roots. To read has always been also to

write. Heidegger points us
to the roots of the Greek
legein as gathering (Early
Greek Thinking 61). Imagine what it must have
been like for illiterate Greeks to see the act of
reading: someone takes a miasma of obtuse
signs and gathers them into coherent ideas. To
read is to com-pose.
Lawrence Lessig creates the metaphor of
two types of culture: Read Only and ReadWrite (Remix 28-9). Read only culture is epitomized by the culture industry: passive audiences watch/read/listen from their couches while
media operate unidirectionally from corporations to audiences. THEY produce while WE
consume. Read-Write culture problematizes the
Cartesian subject-object dichotomy by (com)
positing the text as rhizome.
“It is not possible to read without knowing how to write.”
A reading which is always already a
composition—rhizcomics, rhizcomposition.

Aposiopesis
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Throughout Spring and All, William Carlos Williams proposes
a theory of art that conflicts with traditional mimetic theories. To call it a theory may be a stretch—it is difficult to lump
Williams’ various assertions into a cohesive whole—, but
certainly he everywhere affirms the creations of the imagination as separate
from nature. In his closing prose section Williams sums up what he means by
“Imagination”:
Imagination is not to avoid reality, nor is it description nor an evocation
of objects or situations, it is to say that poetry does not tamper with the
world but moves it—It affirms reality most powerfully and therefore, since
reality needs no personal support but exists free from human attention
as proven by science in the indestructibility of matter and force, it creates
a new object, a play, a dance which is not a mirror up to nature but—
As birds’ wings beat the solid air without which none could fly so words
freed by the imagination affirm reality by their flight. (149-50)

Deleuze and Guattari propose the rhizome
as a way of looking at texts. There is the
traditional (Ramusian) tree model of the book,
based on hierarchy and genealogy—every
leaf has its root, every page its conceptual
origin.
A first type of book is the root-book.
The tree is already the image of the
world, or the root the image of the
world-tree. This is the classical book, as
noble, signifying, and subjective organic
interiority (the strata of the book). The
book imitates the world, as art imitates
nature: by procedures specific to it that
accomplish what nature cannot or can
no longer do. The law of the book is
the law of reflection, the One that be-

comes two. (A Thousand Plateaus 5)
Art as a mirror held up to nature, mimetic,
representative, relying on a transcendental
signifier. To this, Deleuze and Guattari oppose
the rhizomic image of the book:
The same [aparallel evolution] applies
to the book and the world: contrary
to a deeply rooted belief, the book
is not an image of the world. It forms
a rhizome with the world, there is an
aparallel evolution of the book and the
world; the book assures the deterritorialization of the world, but the world
effects a reterritorialization of the book,
which in turn deterritorializes itself in the
world (if it is capable, if it can). Mimicry
is a very bad concept, since it relies on

Aposiopesis
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This passage embodies Williams’ view of the relationship
of art to reality. He describes art first pragmatically: not to
tamper, not to avoid, but to move reality. Next he investigates its affirmation of reality and the implications thereof: since reality needs
not, art creates anew. Williams then envisions that new creation (dance, play)
in opposition to Hamlet’s description of mimetic theatre: a mirror held up to
nature. Finally, unable to define art adequately (or explicitly) Williams cuts off
his sentence with a double-dash—

binary logic to describe phenomena of
an entirely different nature. (11)
The relationship between the book and the
world is similar to that of Dasein. Dasein is
always already in the world (but not of the
world). The book does not communicate unidirectionally with the world, nor vice versa, nor
even both, that is to say, the world and book
do not exist in two-way communication. Instead
each constitutes, composes itself and the
other and even itself in and through the other.
After Heidegger, subject and object become
complicated: so too with authors, texts, and
readers. They are not identical and yet they
are inseparable.
The world has become chaos, but the
book remains the image of the world:
radicle-chaosmos rather than rootcosmos. A strange mystification: a book
all the more total for being fragmented.
At any rate, what a vapid idea, the
book as the image of the world. In
truth, it is not enough to say, “Long live
the multiple,” difficult as it is to raise
that cry. No typographical, lexical, or
even syntactical cleverness is enough

to make it heard. The multiple must be
made, not by always adding a higher
dimension, but rather in the simplest
of ways, by dint of sobriety, with the
number of dimensions one already has
available— always n - 1 (the only way
the one belongs to the multiple: always
subtracted). Subtract the unique from
the multiplicity to be constituted; write
at n - 1 dimensions. A system of this kind
could be called a rhizome. A rhizome as
subterranean stem is absolutely different from roots and radicles. (6)
The multiple is made by subtracting the unique.
By separating the separable (which does not
ek-sist) we are left with the inseparable.
This was the process of the first half
of this work. I attempted (unsuccessfully) to
separate image and text, visual and verbal,
discourse and figure. The relationship of image
to text is that of the rhizome. It is not linear.
Chapter one redefined (decentered) comics,
breaking with a linear, sequential definition
and embracing a more rhizomatic one:
Principles of connection and heterogeneity: any point of a rhizome can be
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connected to anything other, and must
be. This is very different from the tree or
root, which plots a point, fixes an order.
(7)
This is very different from Eisner and McCloud
whose theories assume a transparency of text:
words reveal things and pictures help us by
getting us closer to things. Instead comics as
rhizome demand more and more connections,
and reflect the experience of reading comics
more closely.
McCloud’s notion of closure, reader response across the gutter, is too linear, sequen-

tial. As we saw in Lyotard,
the reader provides the
synthesis of discourse and
figure, responding consciously and unconsciously across gaps. However, we must note
that the response is recursive, iterative. As in
the previous sentence, I have relied heavily
upon the use of scesis onomaton throughout
this chapter: allowing multiple synonyms to coexist, offering the reader a chance to gather,
read, close, synthesize. This is rhizomic writing.
Rhizcom(ic)position.

Delivérance

I will speak, therefore, of a letter.
Of the undeliverable letter, if the rhetorical tradition, and most of the speculations
which have ventured into it, are to be believed.
I will speak, therefore, of the handdelivered letter which it apparently has been
necessary to insinuate, here and there, into the
often resistant canon of rhetoric; and to do
so in the course of a writing on writing, and
also of a writing within writing whose different
trajectories thereby find themselves, at certain very determined points, intersecting with
a kind of gross paronomasia, a lapse in the
discipline and law which regulate writing and
keep it seemly.
All apologies to Derrida, the spectre that

haunts this dissertation, the name on the return
address of this undeliverable text. Liber non
liber est: the book/letter is not free. The canons of rhetoric have been liberated somewhat
throughout the twentieth century, no doubt as
an effect of (post)modernism and the avant
garde. However, to use an archaic form, we
must liberate delivery in order to learn to
write more deliverly.
Deleuze and Guattari saw that linear
writing did not have to obey the rule of the
line but could offer new, open lines of flight:
To attain the multiple, one must have a
method that effectively constructs it; no
typographical cleverness, no lexical agility, no blending or creation of words,
no syntactical boldness can substitute

for it. In fact, these are more often than
not merely mimetic procedures used to
disseminate or disperse a unity that is
retained in a different dimension for an
image-book. Technonarcissism. (22)
Technonarcissism makes us think that an oral
digitality promises an era of openness impossible in the print age. Deleuze insists that if
we did not seek openness then, we would not
now: “A language is never closed upon itself,
except as a function of impotence” (8). Technonarcissism falls into the trap linguistics has
fallen into: that of thinking epistemically rather
than technically. Their tendencies toward transcendence, toward transparency, make writing
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a signification, an entrance
into the real. Deleuze and
Guattari counter that
“Writing has nothing to
do with signifying. It has to do with surveying,
mapping, even realms that are yet to come”
(4-5). When thought radically—or even rhizomatically—all forms of technê (whether oral,
print, or digital) can map or trace.
The rhizome is not a special type of
book, but perhaps a way of composing (which
is done by those traditionally considered
readers at least as much as it is done by those
traditionally considered authors)—a way of
composing that connects invention to delivery.

on August 26, 1572 during the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre. Mere words could
not save him from the sharp edge of a blade that decapitated him or the rough
hands that threw him out the window. However, in many ways he lived on. Walter
Ong claims that Ramus marks the turning point from Renaissance to Modern Age
and that his methods reside in every textbook and indeed in the very foundations
of modern academia. If we are going to get down to the core of who Ramus is
(which of course, is the core of who we, his inheritors, are), we must paradoxically
stay close to the surface.
Puns are of course superficial. They distract from the real significance of a
text and point sidelong rather than downward—the direction of proper hermeneutics. However, this lateral movement, far from any kind of equivocal sidestepping,
engenders new
thought
while
evading the trap
of transcendent
interpretation,
the goal of which
always resides
underneath
a
text.
It is customary in writing about mnemo-techR a m u s ’
nologies to give a nod to Plato’s portrayal of
name provides
Socrates as Luddite. In the Phaedrus, he tells
many rich points
the story of two Egyptian gods, Theuth and
of departure for
Thamus. Theuth invented numbers, arithmetic,
discussions on
geometry and many other things, including letwhat it might
ters (reminding us of Stiegler’s statement that
mean to be
you can’t have one without the other). He
modern (or at
then presented these inventions to Thamus
least contempowho judged each. In displaying letters, Theuth
rary). The term
promised “an elixir of memory and wisdom.”
ramifications
Thamus responded, “O most ingenious Theuth,
might well deone man has the ability to beget arts, but the
scribe this essay
ability to judge of their usefulness or harmfulin both surface
and content—for
this essay might

be seen as an argument that the
two are indissociably linked. We find
that Ramus has
already inscribed
himself into the first
half of the word. In
Latin ramus means
twig or branch. Ramus-ification then
is the making of
new branches, the
web that occurs
when a window
is cracked for instance, spreading
out into a hundred
new directions. It is
a seed crystal enabling new thought.
While Ramus himself seemed incapable of innovation
(he was known
as usuarius, an
academic parasite
merely
hanging
on to previous authors), his method

cemented a new
mode of thought. He
used dichotomy extensively, breaking
things into eitheror statements, flow
charts that served
as heuristics. In his
mind there were always two branches,
not an unbearable
multiplicity.
Which brings
us to our second
definition. Ramus
also signifies a
branch of the Greek
letter gamma (g),
which Pythagoras
employed to describe the two roads
of life: virtue and
vice. Ramus’ dialectic serves in a similar way. In fact the

curly bracket which so often
ness to their users beexemplifies this dialectic “{”
longs to another” (274e)
could perhaps be a gamma
— one may invent, but
turned ninety degrees with
another must judge usethe emphasis placed upon
fulness. Thamus saw writthe branches rather than
ing to be not a memory
their
conproducer, but a memory
nective trunk.
eraser:
O n g
This invention will
points
produce forgetfulout
that
ness in the minds of
this
bithose who learn to
nary
logic
use it, for they will
shares an
not practise their
uncanny
memory.
Their
(Das
Untrust in writing,
heimliproduced by exche,
internal characters
deed)
which are no part
resemof themselves, will
blance
to
discourage the
use of their own d i g i t a l
c o m memory
within
puters
them. You have
(xvi).
invented not an
Ramus
elixir of memory,
gives us
but of reminda heurising; and you oftic which
fer your pupils the
finds only
appearance of
what
it
wisdom, not true
already
wisdom, for they
knows:
will read many
things
things without inare either A or
struction and will
B with noroom for middle ground.
therefore seem to
Upon circularly proving
know many things,
this thesis the modern lets
when they are for
out a perverse gasp of “(h)
the most part igeureka”.
norant and hard
Letting out our own
to get along with,
cry of discovery, we find
since they are not
that a third possible definition

of ramus has been
obscured
(even
pruned) by our rather
pending
prudish (and pudenof course upon
dal)
Latin
dictionary.
the dictionary, “memWe
are
given,
brum virile” or “a man’s
deyard”. In layman’s terms, a penis. It’s true. At the core of Ramus’ name not only lies the
ramifications he was so incapable of, but perhaps his most salient characteristic. He was
a dick. Which is perhaps why he wrote so much.
A beautiful, raven-haired classmate of mine offered an interesting counterpoint to
l’ecriture feminine. She was a half-Libyan, half-Egyptian theory geek who wrote her body
in cursive. Once, when I drank a few too many, she held my head as I made my own coni n g
tributions to a friend’s garover the San
den. A few days later we
Francisco skyline.
stood on the top floor
She said that perhaps
of the de Young
the act of writing is itmuseum gazself a kind of “womb
envy”. In other
words,

wise, but only appear wise. (275a-b)
Because this all occurs during a discussion on the supposed merits of rhetoric, Plato is quick to get
back to the point. He has Phaedrus accuse Socrates of making up stories, only to have Socrates
reply with an appeal to the ways things once were:
The people of that time, not being so wise as you young folks, were content in their simplicity to hear an oak or a rock, provided it only spoke the truth; but to you, perhaps, it makes
a difference who the speaker is and where he comes from, for you do not consider only
whether his words are true or not. (275b-c)
Plato thus exemplifies two things. First, he shows us that even the most careful of philosophers have
Luddite tendencies—or, to nod at our grandparents: the TV was not the first technology to turn
our minds to mush. Second, he stresses the Greek conception of truth—one already in flux as he
was writing. In an oral culture, truth is momentous—concerned with the present not chronological history; it does not matter whether or
not there were any historical
figures of Theuth and Thamus who
had this conversation,
only that the conversation itself
is true in our own
time. In a written culture, ethos
takes precedence
over exigency; whether or
not someone really
said something (and their
relative reliability)
becomes more important
than whether or
not it has relevance to the
moment. In rhetorical terms, this signifies the
death of kairos
(time as expressed in terms
of quality and
exigency) at the hands of
chronos (clock time
or historical time).
Many have argued
that the computer
has given us back our
kairos.
Commenting on the
similarities between
digitality and orality, Richard
Lanham moves us away
from technics and toward
philosophy:
When we ask how electronic technology affects
us, then, we are inquiring, in
terms of electronic technology, into the most profound
distinction in Western culture.
The rhetorical/philosophical
distinction, though it grows
from the technological distinction between oral

and literate cultures, concerns more than writing is man’s sublimation for his own
technology. It debates opposed theories lack of ability to create biologically.
This does not diminish l’ecriture
of human motive, human selfhood, and hufeminine, but rather frees it from the Raman society. (Lanham 203)
Yet each of these last items, “human motive, hu- mist methods of male hegemony.
Interestingly, Ong often describes
man selfhood, and human society,” are by nature
Ramus’s heuristics in terms of matrix.
prosthetic, technical.
Orality certainly seems like the Real. It is Matrix, descending from mater, denotes
multimodal, relevant, and dynamic. It cannot be a womb. In Ramus’ case his womb prolocated in any medium but overtakes all media duced more writings. The creation of a
within which it comes in contact. Think of a speak- text is prosthetic in that it creates someer using PowerPoint or posters. The rhetor become thing outside of its author which is still
inseparable from the moment, from the oral com- very much its author. It is both apart
ponent of the presentation. Likewise, in conversa- from and a part of its creator— much
tion anything is fair play—from a nearby squirrel, like a fetus, which brings us to the core
to the weather, to a book. Yet, just as Derrida of what it means to be human in more
showed us that writing is not the representation ways than one (to have a part of oneself
of speech, so too Stiegler shows us that second- be outside oneself). Yet rather than livary orality is not mimetic but rhizomatic in nature. ing this out, Ramism separates creator
While digital media are certainly tied to orality, from created and stresses the outsidethey provide no more exit from the instrumentality ness of text rather than its internality.
In contrast, l’ecriture feminine enables
of language than oral culture did for Plato.
The history of rhetorical theory could be an author to step from dialectic to diatold as a marginalization of the canon of delivery. logue.
The difference between these two
In an oral culture, rhetoric is overly concerned
with enunciatio, hand motions, paraverbal com- terms may seem negligible. They are
position. Literacy represses the paraverbal. Re- etymologically identical, both coming
cent technological advances have drastically from saying (legî) and between (dia).
changed the importance of delivery, yet the They describe a conversation between
academy seems oddly isolated from many of two people. However, dialectic stresses
these changes. Ignoring the importance of deliv- the rightness of one over the other. Diaery, students and scholars have become alienat- lectic is debate. It cuts the world firmly
ed from their labor. Electracy signifies the return into two halves: right and wrong (or Pythagoras’ virtue and vice). As such, it
of the repressed.
Imagine a world in which scholars are not aims at transcendence, getting to the
allowed to come up with their own ideas. Instead, heart of the matter. Dialogue on the
journals and publishers give scholars specific other hand recognizes two subjects not
necessarily in conflict, but perhaps a
ideas for research.
Or a parallel universe in which journals con- harmony of opposing ideas. As such, it
trol the organization of articles, whether or not evokes immanence. Its participants aim
they should have a hook, where the literature not at a heuristics of finding truth but of
producing more dialogue.
review should go.

Returning now to our original pun, we find that for Ramus the pen acts as
sword, dividing issues in half. Is it necessary to remind the reader
o
f
the phallic connotations of both sword and pen to
Pubthe
Latin mind? Perhaps. The act of inscription belishers could mancomes a double entendre for penetration, used
date style guidelines going
far beyond the scope of MLA or punningly by Milton for example. Likewise the
APA, having specialized stylists who image of sword, if not already phallic enough,
would rewrite articles to maximize is coupled with the connotations of vagina,
the use of specific rhetorical tropes. which of course originally meant sheath. The
Now, what if journals and pub- term vagina thus exemplifies phallologocentric thinking by showing that it is not an organ
lishers separated scholars from the
but
a container. The vagina for the phalloldelivery of their work, from its
ogocentric man is always viewed in terms of
layout and design? Sudthe
penis
and never vice versa. When all you
denly we are
have
is a hammer, everything looks
back
like a nail,
and when all you have is a
to our own unidick,
everyone
gets
screwed.
verse. Rhiz|comics offers the
The link between
the literate revolution
possibility of changing our world
(Ramus) and penis
betrays the underlying
ever so slightly to allow scholars influcastration complex of
modern society and
ence on the delivery of their research,
its subsequent fetishization of the pen/
connecting invention with delivery.
text.
Phallogocentrism
presupposes
We must remember that Socrates
linearity. If we are to
castrate the logos
was right. We have forgotten more
we must cut the line
and move toward
because of our technicization
nonlinear,
nonbinary
thought founded not
than we have remembered.
upon depth of meaning
but upon superficial mulHis diagnosis was
tiplicity. At the core of Ramus’ heuco
r
ristics lies this crucial puncept.
B y
rect, but his progkeeping close to the surface, we avoid the traps
o f
nosis
was
lacking.
Forgetting
transcendence and embrace an immanence
constitutes our humanity as much
which allows dialogue over dialectic.
What might this look like? Well, for as instrumentality and prostheses. We
starters, it might look like this. It would em- will be forever outside ourselves in the
ploy puns, biography, fragmentation, and new digital age; not necessarily further
metatextuality. Puns, as stated previously, tie from the Real but certainly capable
us to an immanent heuristic rather than a tran- of new lines of flight. In dealing with
them, we must remember our forscendent hermeneutic. Biography reconnects
getting: remember that the
the author to her text, overcoming a fundamendesktop or webtal division in phallologocentrism. Fragmentation
i n versely disconnects the normally connected. Rather
than a
glossy veneer, this new text offers a patchwork quilt or collage which
shows its sutures. Metatextuality offers the final blow against transcendence, ironi-

site
a re
m e re
metaphors
and not be
taken in by the
illusions we create. We must
avoid the myth
of
transparency which tells
us that virtual
representations
are
another
reality. Simultaneously we
must beware of
thinking of the
Real as impossible and removed. Rather
than tip-toeing
between Scylla
cally pointing out the impossibility of metapositions.
Therefore, when I say it would look like this, I do not mean the above
stated list, but this section itself. This section employs the cut. Returning
us to our original introduction by way of (dialectic?) reversals it asks the
following question: “The penis: Mightier than the sword?”
and Charybdis,
Deleuze and
Guattari offer
us a nomadic
war machine
that blasts as
it
constructs.
The
rhizome
bridges
the
gap between
reflection and
transparency.
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Rhizcom(ic)position reintroduces delivery into the composition classroom doubly: in the students’
production of multimodal texts and in the teacher’s delivery of lessons. In this chapter I’d like
to highlight each of these individually. The first part of the chapter focuses on the student side:
teaching electracy with student mystory projects. The second part describes what I term “augmented pedagogy”—using teaching as electracy.

Mystory as
Multimodal
Composition
Electracy refers to a new kind of literacy,
one based on electricity and digitality, one
characterized by a new kind of logic. While
deductive and inductive logic are of course
quite familiar, electracy’s conductive logic
may raise an eyebrow or two. Deductive
logic proceeds from generals to particulars (all
men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore
Socrates is mortal) while inductive does the
reverse (My father was mortal, so was his,
so was his, therefore all men must be mortal).
To this electracy adds a third kind of logic:
conductive logic. Conductive logic might
meditate upon the Proto-Indo-European root
of mortal, mbrotos, and its surviving ancestor in
the negative: the immortal ambrosia fruit salad
sitting in the deli-case.

Greg Ulmer developed a tool to teach,
theorize about, and practice electracy and
conductive logic. The "Mystory" (pronounced
"my story" or "mystery" depending upon how
one feels at the moment) engages all five of
the rhetorical canons (inventio, dispositio, elocutio, pronuntiatio, and memoria) and thereby
teaches composition and teaches through
composition (referencing both writing to learn
and learning to write pedagogies). Ulmer
writes, "A mystorical essay is not scholarship,
not the communication of a prior sense, but
the discovery of a direction by means of writing" (Teletheory 113). Writing to learn cannot
be separated from its counterpart so easily:
Although “writing to learn” has frequently been isolated from “learning

to write” in workshops, often by means
of a split between so-called “formal”
(“learning to write”) and “informal” (“writing to learn”) assignments, conscientious workshop leaders try to keep the
connections before the minds of participants. (Thaiss 303)
A multimodal mystory project connects the formal and informal. The non-traditional demands
of conductive logic free the students to write
to learn, while the fact that these are major
projects forces them to learn to write. Reflecting on the impact of technology upon CAC,
Reiss et al. write,
But the influence of technologies has not
changed the basic tenets of CAC. Indeed, we
expect these technologies to extend our ability
to insinuate CAC concepts like writing to learn
and collaborative learning. Electronic media
also can extend our ability to expose students
to a variety of purposes and audiences as
well as to spread students’ involvement in
complex communication projects across the
curriculum and across their tenure at our institutions. (xviii)
Because this experiment was conducted
in a technical writing classroom, some faculty
may not see its use in other disciplines. However, if CAC has taught us anything, its that the
rules of composition apply to any discipline in
which people communicate, that is, all of them.
Ulmer’s mystory engages four different categories and ties them into a single
multimodal text: career, entertainment, family,
and community history. Career engages the
professional scope: specific issues in one’s
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career/discipline that need
to be addressed. Entertainment can include anything
from Brittany Spears' latest
malapropism to a favorite novel. Family invokes
autobiographical data. Community history
can refer to anything that constitutes history:
perhaps Clemson's recent issues with race
relations or a famous civil war battle fought
nearby or even a twelfth century Japanese
shogun. The connections between these
diverse subjects must be superficial: no themes
in the traditional sense, but rather repetition
of signifiers across discourses (the model of the
puncept).
Ulmer’s theory of electracy answers the
calls of Gunther Kress (among others) for a
new media literacy. As Kress is careful to point
out,
we can no longer treat literacy (or ‘language’) as the sole, the main, let alone
the major means for representation
and communication. Other modes are
there as well, and in many environments
where writing occurs these other modes
may be more prominent and more
significant. (35)
Kress later notes that each new “literacy” also
entails a new writing system, not in the sense
of letters (from which literacy gets its name) but
in the sense of representation and recording
(61-4). As such, visual and oral rhetorics enter
the picture. While much has been written
recently on visual and multimodal rhetorics,
the work of Todd Taylor, Diana George, and
Scott McCloud are of particular note.

During my technical writing class in the
Fall of 2007, we read the second chapter of
McCloud’s Understanding Comics to introduce
basic rhetorical concepts such as amplification
through simplification, McCloud’s way of saying that clarity and brevity can create sincerity.
Early in the semester, the class also read the
first few chapter’s of Internet Invention. Students were by and large puzzled by Ulmer’s
project.
As a result, I attempted to teach theory
through practice through two sections of a
technical writing course. Each section was
given the same syllabus, which called for
four main multimodal projects throughout the
semester, pulled together into a single narrative or "Mystory". This narrative would take the
form of a website that would link all four projects. The Mystory had to include four themes:
career, entertainment, history, and family. For
the course, each theme became a project.
In the analysis which follows, I will trace the
projects of two students' mystory assignments,
pseudonymously called Kelly and Kevin.
I asked students to sketch their own
Mystory, assigning each category a medium
(e.g. entertainment as graphic design, history
as website, career as graphic narrative, family
as film—though any combination was possible).
Through the sketch they also were asked to
discover (the Mystory is after all a heuristic) a
single image that would unite all four threads
(Ulmer's “image of wide scope” or “puncept”).
That image, as described above, had to be
superficial and yet connective. Kelly chose
soap and Kevin chose the Ark.
The students were divided into groups of
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four or five and given the
assignment of writing instructions for each medium.
Each student was to become an expert in the medium and then teach
the rest of the group. The more traditional assignments of instructions, memos, and project
reports were then created as adjuncts to the
Mystory project. Students wrote instructions on
a medium, sent each other memos about their
projects, and created two project reports at
the end of the semester (one written individual
report and one multimodal group report).
The class progressed through each medium
sequentially, although the Mystory category
differed from student to student (i.e. while all
began with graphic design, some depicted
entertainment visually while others chose family, etc.). Each medium took up three weeks of
class time. The first week focused on learning
the software and at the end of the week the
instructions assignments were due. At the end
of the second week, rough drafts were due.
The final project was turned in at the end of
the third week.
Each assignment was organized to help
the students progress sequentially. The graphic
design segment helped the students learn
the basics of visual rhetorics. The web segment built on this by focusing on visually-based
(rather than text-based) design. The graphic
narrative taught the principles of timing, framing, and editing that the students would later
use for the video project.
For the graphic design component, students created posters, fliers, package designs,
and website backgrounds. While they were

not required to use any software in particular,
Adobe Illustrator and Photoshop were recommended and, with a few exceptions, used by
the students. After a few class periods de-

voted to studio time learning the software, the
students turned in rough drafts of the projects. Most students learned quickly that the
projects demanded more of their time than
they had thought and their rough drafts were
noticeably lacking. However, the final drafts
blew me away.

Kelly, a nursing major, designed the
cover of a nursing magazine that depicted
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a revolutionary new hand
sanitizer. Kevin, a secondary
education major, chose to
present a modified picture
of his home as an ark of safety, complete
with a ninja-squirrel security force. Kelly stayed
relatively close to the assignment's guidelines
throughout, while Kevin only nodded at them
occasionally.
For the web design segment, I was
unable to get my students access to Dream
Weaver and was forced to recommend they
use free software like Mozilla Composer. I
asked the students to create an image-based
Website that would look identical across
browsers and computers. Using images allowed the students to dictate every facet of
the site's appearance. Most of these sites still
included a great deal of words (or rather,
pictures of words), but by proceeding from text
to image to design, they made a site that was
on the whole more aesthetically pleasing and
more readable.
During this segment students created a
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polished website devote
to the ark of Bukhara, an
ancient fortress in Bukhara,
Uzbekistan.
In the graphic narrative section, students
made a comic using a free trial download of
ComicLife. This relied on all their prior learning
by involving visuals, texts, and the web experfront page for the entire project as well as a
web-project contained within. Kelly created a
history of soap operas and a main page with
soap-dish buttons. Kevin's lack of adherence
to the guidelines led to a much more creative

tise to integrate it into their site. Some students
imported photographs they had taken themselves to tell a story. Others drew their images

main page, a fake dictionary entry in which
each definition linked to a separate page
of the Mystory. His history section offered a

free-hand or used images from the web. Kelly
told the story of her experience at a Christian
camp and Kevin created a cynical retelling
of Noah's ark in which mythical animals are
kicked off the ark one-by-one by a cantankerous, 8-bit Noah.
The final section, video, was by far the
most difficult for students. Most had only two
alternatives for software: the bug-ridden,
crash-prone Windows Movie Maker or the
ram-dependent, complex Adobe Premier;
both of which exceeded the capabilities of the
school-supplied laptops. Students also found it
difficult to either make or find footage. Video
cameras were out of reach for most and even
stock footage was difficult to import. However,
having worked extensively with video in the
past, I warned the students of all these pitfalls
ahead of time and recommended they have
all their footage together and imported at
least a week before the final was due. Once
they finished the video, they still had to upload
it to YouTube and link it to their site.

Kelly created a fake Entertainment Tonight spot about Kelly Rippa and Clay Aiken's
recent run-in on Live! She used clips from the
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show and did a voice-over
to pull it all together. Kevin
followed a well-known
internet genre, the fifteen
second version of a feature film. He titled his
video "Raiders of the Lost Ark in fifteen seconds". It opens with a character telling Indy,
"Any army with the Ark of the Covenant
before them would be invincible." A sudden
jump-cut gives us the Nazi's eventual destruction at the hands of the Ark and we cut back
to Indy saying, "Haven't you guys ever been
to Sunday school?" The simplicity belies the
subtly ironic humor of the piece, again fitting
with the genre.
Looking back on the projects, I’ve noted
some strengths and weaknesses. Conductive logic encourages abnormal thought (cf.
Bruffee and Myers) which can in turn result in
paradigm shifts. The creativity it engages can
help students take ownership of composition.
However, by its very nature it forces students
to get off track.
One of my favorite projects from that
semester was a comic composed by a student
I’ll call “Keith.” Keith, a civil engineering major,
prepared a graphic narrative combining various mystorical elements. I’ve included his comic
in its entirety on the next few pages.
Likewise, multimodal composition helps
students realize that the message is never
independent of the medium. Throughout the
semester, students meditated on the potential
uses of each medium: Should I make a video
resume? Should I make a website instead of a
research paper? The answer to both of these
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is probably no. However, students noticed
how useful videos are in instructions and
reports. The experience the gained through
working with the media then was not just
technical but also theoretical.
Multimodal composition also has its
downsides. It’s much more demanding for both
students and teachers. For me, attempting to
teach new media can often become an epic
battle with the very technology I had earlier
lauded. In the feedback from the semester a
pattern emerged. While some students embraced new technologies, others resisted. An
electrical engineering student approached me
at the end of the semester, saying that he had
never been forced to think creatively before at
school. It was one of the most fulfilling classes
he had ever taken, he told me. Another
student asked why he would ever need to
know how to make a website. His inability to
see the practicality of my instruction left me
dumbfounded.
The next semester, I decided to make the
mystory a smaller project, teaching each medium as an end to itself and offering the students a moment of self expression only at the
end of the semester in the mystory project. I
taught each medium through in class exercises
(visual remixes, document design, etc.). At the
end of the semester students were allowed to
choose a medium for their mystory. Students
really flourished under the new system. Upon
further reflection, much of what students had
articulated the previous semester as resistance
to technology seemed to be resistance to
forced self-expression.
Not only were students more interested
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in the technology throughout the semester, but the
mystories at the end of the
semester were far more
innovative. Students pushed the boundaries of
what are traditionally understood as media.
I received mystories as comics, film, fortune
cookies, and even prescriptions. One student,
a graphic design major, incorporated all four

elements of the mystory into a single poster.
I began to wonder how I might incorporate the lessons I’d learned from my students
into my own teaching. How could I teach with
electracy? I found the answer in augmented
pedagogy.

Augmented
Pedagogy
In efforts to teach (with) electracy, I used
Adobe Breeze (now Adobe Connect) and
traditional lecturing to achieve an augmented
reality pedagogy. Adobe Breeze incorporates webinar modalities: chat space, video
conferencing, collective notepads, and shared
control of screens. By using emerging software
like Adobe Breeze simultaneously with a
traditional lecture we create an augmented
classroom. Students are free to engage in
chat based conversations while the teacher
lectures, thereby encountering the material in
multiple representations.
Adobe Breeze can easily be co-opted
and used in the composition classroom to
teach (with) electracy on two levels: thinking
and doing. First, the augmented classroom
allows us to better exemplify electracy through
samples: websites, PowerPoints, Flash games,
etc. Second, it allows students to experience
electracy for themselves in the classroom, thus
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making possible conductive (and often productive) leaps within the traditionally hegemonic academic environment.
By giving students the freedom to chat
tangentially during the lecture, the classroom
becomes a more playful and potentially more
productive environment. The lecture becomes
a base off of which students riff. Abnormal
thought becomes acceptable, even encouraged. As a result, I hoped students would think
in new and exciting ways and tend to pay
closer attention as their tangential thought
results from things stated in the lecture.
The basic research question was (How)
does the augmented classroom (lecturing
while students use chat technology etc.) produce in students abnormal discourse and an
increased critical awareness of their relationship with all technologies?

Future
Anterior
My initial forays into electracy had been inspired mainly by Ulmer’s research. For this new
project, I began casting a wider net.
An obvious place to begin was Heidegger's "The Question Concerning Technology." Heidegger's seminal article highlights
the effects of technology on humans and vice
versa. Rather than technology serving humans,
humans are made to serve technological
thought. He invents key issues like "enframing"
and "standing reserve". Yet, techne seems to
be humanity's mode of being. It both blocks us
from being and opens new ways of being. He
ends by quoting Rilke: "Poetically man dwells
on the earth," and technology is our poetry.
The article offers vocabulary for analyzing the
ethical dimensions of emerging technologies,
allowing us to reflect upon the complex issues
my project raised.
Following Heidegger (and integrating
Leroi-Gourhan's work in evolutionary biology),
Bernard Stiegler's Technics and Time connects
emerging technology with human evolution
and the experience of exteriorization. I’ve already summarized much of Stiegler’s multivolume work. It provided a theoretical framework
for analyzing the relationships students will
have with augmented pedagogy. Individual
students have to undergo new levels of exteriorization which may result in self-alienation.
However, as something is lost something else
is gained. Students gain a larger awareness of
their own technological position even as they
lose their assumed presence.
The concept of augmented pedagogy
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depends largely on Walter
Ong's concept of secondary orality, a communication mode that follows
literacy and parallels orality in many of its
characteristics. Some of its major features are
decompartmentalization, resurgence of kairos,
and a return to mythos over logos. When
compared with Ong's work on Peter Ramus,
we discover a new rhetoric far less hegemonic
than the traditional phallologocentric model.
In hindsight we can connect with him not only
the work of Derrida (whom he references
throughout), but Deleuze and Guattari, Ulmer,
and Stiegler. Ong, like Heidegger, Stiegler,
and Ulmer, provides the theoretical framework
within which I formulate the experiment.
Ulmer's corpus has investigated many
of the pedagogical implications of applying
the theories of Ong, Derrida, Heidegger,
and Stiegler. Rather then merely teaching
about deconstruction, he teaches students to
deconstruct actively and furtively through his
Mystory assignments. Ulmer poses perhaps
the best example of the pedagogical linkage
in his title Applied Grammatology. Ulmer and
those who would follow him seek to apply
Not
to follow in the
Not to follow in
footsteps
of the
the footsteps
of the
masters
to seek
seek
masters but
but to
what
they
sought
what they sought
- Basho

the theoretical findings of deconstruction and
poststructuralist philosophy. However, we must
also look to our own roots in both industry
and the classroom.
On the industry side, Nathan Shedroff introduces the concept of Experience Design, a
design aimed at the user's overall experience
rather than merely filling a user's immediate
needs. An experiential design engages users
holistically rather than compartmentally (cf. his
delineation of data-information-knowledgewisdom found in Chapter 3 of this volume). Users are people not numbers. The augmented
classroom offers a holistic experience, engaging students as partners in knowledge creation
rather than mere consumers of information.
Todd Taylor’s “Design, Delivery, and
Narcolepsy” recognizes the issue of attention
deficit in the classroom—in this case due to no
mental illness, but rather to poor classroom
design. As Janice Redish has noted, “Students
truly learn only when they are actively engaged in constructing knowledge for themselves. Lecturing at students rarely results in
real learning” (80).Taylor eventually calls for
a classroom designed along the principles
established by Donald Norman (and furthered
by Nathan Shedroff), one in which students
participate instead of sleeping.
When bringing technology into the
classroom, we bring students face to face with
the oft neglected rhetorical doctrine of kairos.
Michael Harker brilliantly discusses varying
definitions of kairos and its use in the classroom
culminating in a move from rhetorical triangle
to a rhetorical pyramid consisting of ethos,
pathos, logos, and kairos. We've already seen
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the importance of kairos to
a rhetoric of digital technology. He differentiates
between Aristotelian and
Isocratean kairos. The first puts emphasis on
appropriateness, the second on timeliness. In
composition we can teach appropriateness
through conventions and timeliness through rewrites. This may seem to have little or nothing
to do with technology and Harker certainly
never makes the connection. However, the
central rhetorical principle of new media is not
one of the big three (ethos, pathos, logos) but
kairos. Timeliness becomes essential in teaching digital literacy, no longer in the sense of
rewriting, but now in interactivity. Internet time
is time full of now (invoking Walter Benjamin, as
Harker does). The internet teaches us to teach
kairos. Augmented pedagogy incorporates
delivery and kairos with digital media.
Simmons and Grabill explain that technology enables and increases civic responsibility.
Interactive technologies depend upon collaboration throughout the invention process.
By designing interactive experiences, the
performance itself becomes another moment
of collaboration. Participation is then moved
outward, causing students to be civically
responsible members of society.
Andrea Lunsford provides another
bridge between theory and practice. Lunsford
begins by placing us in the context of Ong's
secondary orality and juxtaposing a secondary literacy:
As I'm using it, then, secondary literacy
advances a looser prose style, infiltrated by visual and aural components

to mirror the agility and shiftiness of language filtered through and transformed
by digital technologies and to allow
for, indeed demand, performance. To
describe such literacies, we need more
expansive definitions of writing along
with a flexible critical vocabulary and
catalogue of the writing and rhetorical
situations that call for amplified, performative, and embodied discourses of
many different kinds. (170)
She describes modes of writing that are closer
to speaking (Shankar and Rosenberger's "sprit-

130

ing"), resulting in a writing
that is "epistemic, performative, multivocal, multimodal,
and multimediated"(171).
This writing aligns most closely with the fifth,
sometimes forgotten, canon of rhetoric: delivery. She describes attempts to integrate this
new writing in the Program for Writing and
Rhetoric at Stanford University, mostly with
little success. Despite this, she makes a call to
all first year writing instructors to engage these
new technologies.

Reflection
Redux
When reflecting on most research that incorporates technology and pedagogy, we are
too often confronted with the unquestioning
belief in the myth of transparency—technology
is an invisible medium, something with which
we get things done (see my discussion of Stuart Selber in Chapter 3). The issue is one of
seeing technology in the classroom as mainly
CMC (Computer Mediated Communication)
and rarely HCI (Human Computer Interaction)
let alone augmented reality, a strange hybrid
we might call Computer Mediated Interaction. Few take into account the greater implications (technology is by no means invisible)
and possibilities (technology may be used as
augmentation rather than pure medium) of
technology. Current compositionists tend to
see technology as CMC rather than HCI.

In WAC for example, Mike Palmquist’s
“Notes on the Evolution of Network Support
for Writing Across the Curriculum” offers a
recap of the history of technology in WAC,
beginning with the introduction of the word
processor in the eighties to the adoption of
online writing labs throughout the nineties.
At the end he introduces the Online Writing
Center, mentions some of the impediments
to OWLs and OWCs, and calls for further
investigation by WAC scholars. The article
provides a good bit of context for where
WAC, and most writing pedagogy, has been
with regard to technology. Specifically, it
illustrates my major point that until now almost
all pedagogical scholarship has focused on
technology as pure medium not augmented
reality. Palmquist suffers from this error more

than most, ultimately confusing human and
computer networks (computer networks are
more than mere CMC).
In his 2007 article, “Technological
Activism,” Dickie Selfe calls for a pedagogy
that teaches students to use technology and
to reflect upon it. He includes pedagogical appendices on applying these lessons
to investigating digital environments. I follow
Selfe's suggestion by teaching students to both
perform and analyze technology. However,
his assignments put more stress on collecting
and interpreting data than on critically analyzing technology. I determined to include more
theoretical grounding and reflection in my own
development of augmented pedagogy.
Stuart Selber offers a much more balanced view of the effect of technology on
composition. He presents three myths of
technology: the myth of progress, the myth of
access, and the myth of transparence. Technology does not produce real progress, but
is a complex system with benefits and disadvantages. Merely giving everyone access
to technology will not decrease the distance
between the haves and have-nots. Transparency is not the ultimate goal of technology,
nor should it be. He states that technology
has brought five basic changes. Technology
has moved us from reception to engagement,
from the classroom to the real world, from text
to multiple representations, from coverage to
mastery, from isolation to interconnection, and
from products to processes. Selber's reflections
on transparency provide an interesting foil on
the one hand to Selfe, and on the other to
Bolter and Gromala (their Windows and Mir-
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rors is largely an exposition
of the myth of transparency).
Sonny and Jamie
Kirkley's article on "Blended
Learning" features a potpourri of theory and
pedagogy. They outline issues involved in
designing the learning environment (an environment concerned with space, surely, but also
with various media and their relative purity).
They track pedagogy through a constructivist
perspective, the goal of which "is the creation
and transfer of context-dependent, flexible
and adaptive learning and complex problem
solving" (44). Augmented reality technology
allows for this. While, most of the technology
they use involves the use of virtual reality and
space mapping, its theory applies to the use
of Adobe Breeze in the classroom.
Finally, my experiment called for a reflection on abnormal thought. Kenneth Bruffee's
analysis of Kuhn provides arguments for
promoting abnormal discourse in composition
classes. Greg Myers furthers this by showing
that group work will never achieve abnormal
thought, but merely reinscribes students into
preconstructed knowledge discourses. Teaching with emerging technology, especially
Adobe Breeze, may encourage students to
reflect upon their own relationship with technology and generate the kind of abnormal
thinking Bruffee and Myers call for. Rather
than enforcing consensus, anonymity mixed
with face-to-face interaction helps students
who normally would not communicate in one
of those modes to get their ideas out. Students
are able to think more tangentially because of
it.
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The

Experiment

The

Set-Up
My experiment attempted to discover whether
or not participating in an augmented classroom produces knowledge about electracy
and writing. Can students write better after
using Breeze? What kinds of writing does it
encourage? How does teaching in the augmented classroom differ from merely using
technology in the classroom? Does it effect

in them a more aware relationship with all
technologies? I hoped to discover not only the
benefits of augmented pedagogy, but also
the impediments.
My methodology aimed at each of the
two assessment goals: abnormal thought and
increased critical awareness of technologies.
During the literature review I posed two ad-

Figure 1

ditional issues that became evident during the
study: kairos and participation. I judged students' ability to engage in abnormal thought
by evaluating their discussions. I gauged their
awareness of technology by assessing in-class
writings done at the end of each class. While
there were no specific measures, the evaluation procedures explain themselves. These
writings each focused on a different reflection
question (e.g. What technologies have you
used today? How do different technologies
influence your writing?).
Our school had bought licenses for
Adobe Breeze, a webinar themed program
that enables teleconferencing. The program
consists of various “pods” displayed in real
time across all users’ screens. Examples of pods
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include chat, note, share
(for displaying PowerPoint
or flash presentations) and
video pods. Figure one
shows (from left to right) the main chat space
along with a roll sheet and note pod. This is
the Breeze configuration for the lecture portion of this study. During the lecture, students
were able to discuss in the main chat pod and
follow the outline in the note pod. Figure two
shows the Breeze configuration for the discussion segment. Here there are four chat spaces
open, with a quarter of the class in each chat
pod. I was able to thus view all four groups
and participate in each, both aloud and in
text.
While I experimented with Breeze a few

Figure 2

times throughout the semester, I decided to
focus my experiment upon a specific lecture
given in two sections of my Technical Writing
course. The lecture was on the third chapter
of Richard Lanham's The Economics of Attention: http://www.rhetoricainc.com/eofa Chat
occurred during lecture and then students
were placed into groups to answer one of
four questions. The initial question was placed
at the top of each group chat pod. During
the first class period, group members were
moved through all four groups. My second
section's class remained in the same groups
the entire time. The goal of this rotation was to
determine the degree to which the anonymity
of the digital environment prompts students to
think tangentially. The first section had enough
trouble with the rotations that I did not repeat
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them in the second. After
group discussion had gone
on for approximately twenty
minutes, a secondary question was then asked of all the groups:
How has this experience been different
based upon the media in which it was performed? I.e. what would it have been like if I
was the only one with a computer and I had
made you talk in groups instead?
What about if I had no computer either
and just gave a lecture and then told you to
discuss in groups?
Will this class period change the way you
act during the rest of the day at all? How?
I recorded both sections’ classes and
later reviewed the results.

The
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Results
Having overviewed the recordings, I have
divided the results into four categories: kairos,
abnormal thought, participation, and awareness of relationship with technology. While I

initially aimed at merely discussing abnormal
thought and relationship with technology, the
actual process led me to add these additional
sections as well.

Kairos
First, let's look at sections that reflect strides
in the kairotic dimension of rhetoric. Kairos,
defined broadly, would result in a focus on the
present, maximizing class time. One example
would be when a student asked aloud if the
class could have the day before Thanksgiving
Break off. I responded (again, aloud) that they
should write up a proposal and send it to me.
Immediately the chat board lit up:
Student A: I said i could
do it
Student B: that will work
Student A: [student's
email address]@clemson.
edu
Student C: So, who wants
to be in charge of putting everyone's quotes
together?
Student C: ok good!
Student D: How about "Jason, if you come to class
on the tuesday before
Thanksgiving, you will

be a loser and no one
will like you. Hence, no
class."
Student A: just send them
ASAP
Student E: lol
Student B: haha
Student F: or if you come
to class, no one will be
here
Student F: hence, we can
all just agree not to
come
Student E: sucks for him
lol
Student F: agreed? (Session 1, Main Chat)

While their mutiny never occurred, they did
compile a very nice proposal done in a more
traditional format—complete with an actual
rhetorical argument—and I gave them the day
off. This conversation happened only aloud in
my other section and the proposal was notably lacking, taking the form of a bulleted list of

reasons to get the day off.
Students also noted that Breeze let them
feed off each other simultaneously. Conversations therefore went further more quickly than
they would have if they'd only been aloud.
Student E: It would have
been a less interesting
discussion because this
lets me feed of everyone's comments
Student D: we talk more
on the computer because
of electracy. oral discussion would not get as
much done and would not
be as entertaining
…
Student G: we can scroll
through and see what everyone is saying
Student G: if we are
talking, we can't rewind
the conversation
Student D: and you dont
have to worry about letting someone have time to
speak
Student H: true true
Student E: its more fun
with computers...this way
i will actually listen
lol
Student I: i agree to
that
Student D: true dat!
Student G: lol, i remember not liking it all
that much when we did
this the first time (Session 1, Group Chat)

The students grasp in practice the kind of engaged learning scholars like Redish call for. In
a world of such simultaneous communications,
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kairos is even more important than in orality.
When asked to reflect
on their experience with
Breeze, students pointed to the oral and
textual dimensions of electracy:
Student J: I would probably leave if I had to
listen to jason for an
hour or more
Student J: no offense jason
Student K: we could have
only done one discussion
at a time without computers
Student A: thats true
Student J: Class wouldn't
have been very efficient
Student J: plus nothing
would have gotten done
…
Jason Helms: can you envision even more helpful
things that can be done?
…
Student J: It is more entertaining but, it also
helps class to.
Student J: It would be
way to confusing to have
this type of discussion
out loud
Student K: it makes class
more enjoyable and usually less confusing
Jason Helms: [Student
J], good point, run with
that: why would it suck
out loud?
Student J: Everyone talking about different topics and then about the

assigned one
Student J: would confuse
people
Student J: an the teacher
wouldn't have a clue on
what was going on
Student A: i agree because with different conversations going on
Student A: it is just
easier that way
Student A: b/c the other
discussions dont apply to
me but this one does
Student A: it keeps people seperated but together as well
Student J: good point.
(Session 1, Group Chat)

While such a conversation would obviously be
unfeasible aloud, participants
evidently felt that the deficiencies of a more traditional
oral discussion (one at a
time with hands raised) went
without saying.
Traditional discussions certainly allow for
much less “chatter”, and, though staying closer
to the task at hand, sacrifice the learning of
the silent majority to the whims of the vocal
minority. Students also reflected on the positives and negatives of kairotic dialogue:
Student L: i think that
we've all gotten used to
using this medium so it's
easier to communicate on
here now
Student L: if you had
asked us this question on
the first time we used
breeze, i think the response would be different
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Student L:
the first
time, i
didn't enjoy
it, i thought
it was impersonal
Student L: but now it's
easier to just type out
what im thinking without
knowing that i'm not going to interrupt anyone
…
Student C: I didn't care
for it either, but I like
it now...communication is
more open
…
Student L: i also feel
like it's similar to oral
communication as well
though b/c you can
still go off on tangents
Student C: this
won't change the
way I act at all
though
Student C: there are more
distractions with this
too
Student L: especially
when the side chat board
is up...sometimes i feel
like we get less done.
(Session 1, Group Chat)

While the group chat spaces opened up
communication and allowed students to better
follow their own trains of thought, the augmented lecture seemed to some to be less
effective. For all their heralded multitasking
abilities, it seems even the Nintendo Generation finds it difficult to negotiate the spoken
and the written.

Their feeding off of each other increased
what Ulmer calls conductive logic (and what
one of my students referred to as "conjective
thinking or whatever it is" thereby stumbling
upon a rather useful amalgam of conductive,
conjunctive, and conjecture. The resulting term

Again, working off of Thomas Kuhn and Gregs
Ulmer and Myers, I sought to create opportunities for abnormal and tangential thought.
Often these opportunities can backfire (as in
the case of the near mutiny noted above), but
I've found that when their potential pay-off
outweighs their risks.
At one point in the group chat, students
were asked to look at an interactive resume
done for a job in interactive design. They
responded by connecting it back to the Ulmerian Mystory project I had assigned and their
ePortfolios required by the school:
Jason Helms: Reflect on
the following job application: http://www.
rhetoricainc.com/eofa/e_
of_a/media/mateo.html
Jason Helms: Remember,
the original was interactive, not a movie. Do
you find it persuasive?
How could you do something similar in your
field? Remember, unless
your field is interac-
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might embody a Lyotardian
version of electracy, conjunctively relying upon "and
… and … and" and based
upon little more than intuitive conjecture. The
figure erupts into discourse.

Abnormal
Thought
design (as this per-

tion
son's is) you don't have
to show off your interaction design skillz. Instead, show off skillz
your employer might want
(computer hacking skillz,
bow-hunting skillz).
. . .
Student J: Its just showing how well he can use
interactive design
Student M: thats really
neat
Student J: Its really
well put together
Student J: Depending on
the job I would hire him
Student M: yeah if i
needed someone to make
bad ass computer stuff
hed get hired
Student J: Agreed
Student M: You could just
make a mystory type of
resume with little film
clips of your work depending on the field
Student M: thats kinda

what that whole new Eportfolio thing is with
the school. (Session 1,
Group Chat)

Clearly students are completely capable of
making connections from theoretical discussions back to their discipline and eventual
career if we just let them. While the prompt
directed them towards personal reflection, the
connections toward the school’s “ePortfolio”
system were the students’ own. Abnormal,
tangential thought has the power to surprise
even its instigator.
Another turn down this road saw students reflecting on how digitality reveals a
tacit ethos:
Student N: i feel like
the print readers would
be the OCD types, or old
people stuck iin their
ways
. . .
Student N: the "bi-stable" seriousness allows
one to look at a work,
and analyze it, take
things not so seriously
Student O: ok, that fits
me
Student O: I never take
anything seriously
Student O: well, except
for during times of occasional mental breakdown
Student P: Seriousness is
for noobs.
Student N: a lot of people read something and
take it for absolute...
graphics etc, restate or
emphasize the text and
allow you to think more
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about and
form personal opinions
about the
author, text,
etc.
…
Student O: I'm really not
understanding the meaning
of alphabetic seriousness
Student P: That's what we
are proving is overrated
Student O: my fault for
being on a bus during
class on monday
Jason Helms: so alphabetic is through
Student P: Darn Fencing
Jason Helms: oral is at
(like when someone mispeaks and we all laugh)
Jason Helms: digital is .
. .
Student
O: both? Seriousness is
for n00bs
Student
N: yes,
but a
very styilized analytically conformist way of
looking at things
Student O: typos = mispeak. (Session 2, Group
Chat)

While the conversation occasionally seemed
to get away from the point, the students
were able to maintain focus with a minimum of
coaxing. “Seriousness is for noobs” (n00bs is
current internet slang for the technologically
naïve) could well be the battle cry of a new
generation of Homo rhetoricus, one discovered through abnormal thought.
Some students reflected on the extra

time it takes to type answers rather than talk:
Student R: It seems
weird. I think there are
more tangents with this
media.
Student Q: hmm, it takes
longer to type than to
talk as well, that would
have been different
Student R: More time
means more free thinking.
(Session 2, Group Chat)

While a traditional class discussion would have
probably led to lengthier responses, those
responses would probably be less thorough.
Others reflected on the way in which the
augmented classroom places "seriousness and
craziness" face to face, unknowingly invoking
Lanham's homo seriousus and homo rhetoricus:
Student C: More of us

Answering Todd Taylor's vision for a classroom
environment designed to combat narcolepsy,
the augmented classroom offers multiple
means for teachers to increase participation. In
fact, lack of participation becomes incredibly
obvious to both teacher and fellow students.
At one point I was able to pick out the one
student in class who was working on something else (she hadn't typed anything in five
minutes) and the rest of the students joined in
when I asked her to join us. The very fact that
only one student was not participating is a
great success for any teacher willing to admit
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probablyt do
pay attention
but it isn't
to important
class information
Student L: it's about
random conversation...
it's the juxtaposition of
seriousness and craziness
Student C: So there could
be a trade off...I feel
like that's up to the
teacher though (session
1, Group 3)

The instructor obviously needs to be much
more alert and involved in the augmented
classroom. I was constantly pushed to the limits
of my attention, lecturing while reading a chat
space and then jumping from group to group
in the discussion segment.

Participation

the fact that all too often the majority of our
students are passive and bored.
During the reflection period, students
noted their own increased desire to participate in the discussion with Breeze, not only
because of its entertainment value, but also
because it makes demanding theoretical discussions easier to follow:
Jason Helms: can you envision even more helpful
things that can be done?
Jason Helms: (serious
question, cuz i'm still
just experimenting with

it)
Student J: It is more entertaining but, it also
helps class to.
Student J: It would be
way to confusing to have
this type of discussion
out loud
Student K: it makes class
more enjoyable and usually less confusing
Jason Helms: [Student
J], good point, run with
that: why would it suck
out loud?
Student J: Everyone talking about different topics and then about the
assigned one
Student J: would confuse
people
Student J: an the teacher
wouldn't have a clue on
what was going on
Student A: i agree because with different conversations going on
Student A: it is just
easier that way
Student A: b/c the other
discussions dont apply to
me but this one does
Student A: it keeps people seperated but together as well
Student J: good point.
(Session 1, Group Chat)

I was especially surprised that they noted
that I could pay better attention to them with
Breeze. Also, the statement of separation and
unity revealed the general tenor of the class.
Participation was individualized for students,
but the teacher was able to participate in
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all conversations at once
(partially due to the fact
that I was the one who had
posed the questions and
they were faced with them for the first time).
Though the teacher may feel more responsive,
students still betray a sense of isolation in a
mostly silent room of furious typing.
In a traditional group discussion,
students are typically able to discuss whatever
they want so long as the teacher is currently
paying attention to another group. In the augmented classroom, teachers can move quickly
from group to group monitoring participation:
Student T: tell you the
truth none of it bothered
me i really just dont
want to be productive at
this time
Student U: if i was more
away i prob wouldve liked
that better
Jason Helms: [Student V],
if you don't like video
or text, what do you prefer?
Student T: no offense jason
Student V: understandable...its like 8:30 am
Student U: He prefers to
sleep i think
Student V: yeah, things
did move around. they
had the block of text and
then the words dissappeared to make it easier
Jason Helms: WAKE UP!!
Student U: say his name,
it may help
Student V: if you just

read the text it kept going on and on about the
same thing "in different
words"
Student V: im awake.
sorta. (Session 2, Group
Chat)
Students who might normally get away with
sleeping with their eyes
open are forced to participate.
Students also began to
explain concepts to each
other, displaying yet
another check on lack of
participation:
Student I: someone who
looks at that would def.
remember this resume more
than just another paper
he read over
Student W: because he had
skillz
Student M: thats true
Student H: well most companies weed out using
resumes and then there
are practical tests that
the potentials must go
against
Student M: you stand out
Student E: Hey group
Student K: here now
Student X: that was a
stupid video huh
Student E: i think that
it was all over the place
Student X: but how is it
a job application
Student X: it seemed more
to me like it was selling
you the desire to work
for AOL
Student K: i hope he
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didn't get
the job
Student E:
lol
Student E: he
was in graphic design and
stuff so he made his application work for him
Student X: oh i get it
now. (Session 1, Group
Chat)

In all likelihood, a traditional lecture
would have left Students X and K in the dark
about the importance of exigency in resumes
(whether interactive or not). In this case,
Student E was able to follow the thread and
move the others onto the right track. In traditional group discussions, the student with the
most knowledge and experience often monopolizes the discussion. In chat-based discussion groups the students most in need of help
are able to get a word in edge-wise.
Students also noted their tendency to be
more honest in their participation with Breeze:
Student S: i am usually
more apt to say what i am
thinking in this situation than in actual group
conversation]
Student R: That is a nice
feature, but the same
could be done with a tape
recorder.
Student Q: yeah, removing
us from actual personal
interaction does definitely make people more
honest
Student Y: true. (Session
2, Group Chat)

Their increased honesty was certainly a result
of the feeling of "being watched" that elec-

tronic discourse encourages. Too much “drive
by Foucault” research has already been written on panoptical nature of digital media. The
class was small enough that at this point in the
discussion, any anonymity had mostly dissipated. A future version of this experiment might
try to engage theories of control societies as
articulated by Deleuze and Hardt and Negri.
As students continued to reflect on their
own participation, the themes of boredom
and entertainment arose again and again:
Jason Helms: would it
have been easier/better/more efficient if we
just did this all the old
fashioned way?
…
Student L: i don't think
it would have been better b/c i would have been
bored, honestly
Student L: this at least
adds entertainment value
to the afternoon b/c i
have a 2 hour break before this class so most
of the time i have no desire to come to it
Student C: Yea I would
have been really bored
too. (Session 1, Group
Chat)
Student V: if we were
sitting in groups talking
we wouldnt have been this
productive the little
amount of productive we
were
Student U: that would
probably make me cranky.

(Session 2,
Group Chat)
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Student G:
lol, i remember not liking it all
that much when we did
this the first time
Student W: this class has
changed my life forever
Student H: true but it
also makes me more ADD.
Student G: I prefer this
type of group work now
Student E: yea, it will
change the way i act
during the rest of the
day...i will bust out
laughing for no apparent
reason, but the truth is
i am remembering something [Student K] said
lol
Student D: this class is
my Anti-Drug. (Session 1,
Group Chat)

Some instructors might be reticent about the
benefits of an "entertaining" classroom experience, but I would assert that the goals of
teaching are, like poetry, two-fold: to delight
and instruct. Only through instruction will it be
delightful. Only through delight will the students be instructed.
One of the major critiques students
had was that this level of participation was
too demanding:
Student S: it takes me a
little longer to keep up
though...my brain isn't
quite awake enough to
keep track of everything

that's being said
Student S: but i
don'tknow if that would
be any different if we
were actually talking...
Student Q: I think being
forced to talk in chat
rooms before 10 am may be
constitutionally defined
as torture
Student Y: but we still
know who is talking/typing.
Jason Helms: it doesn't
let u fake it, does it?
…
Student S: no no at all.
(Session 2, Group Chat)
Student N: i am really
ADD, and when I read I
jump around (ex. I can't
read a list of five
things in order) so typing and writing somewhat
screws with my head, esp.
if someone near me starts
talking
Student P: Sorry
Student O: my bad yo
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Student N:
thats okay
Student N:
you say what
you type, it
helps actually
Student P: I think it is
easier to think "digitally"
Student O: Well, for one
thing, if we'd had a more
typical lecture class,
I'd have finished my
[homework] by now. (Session 2, Group Chat)

The second selection in particular raises the
dual issues in participation. Sometimes I worry
that I may be requiring too much of students,
especially when they claim Attention Deficit
Disorder as a reason for the difficulty of the
assignment. However, when they complain
that they are less able to do other work in
class because of the required participation, I
am less sympathetic.

Technological
Reflections
The end goal of the experiment was that
students would become more aware of and
reflective on their own relationship with
technology, not only within the experiment
(an awareness implied by many of the above
quotes), but also within their career and everyday life. This goal built upon Dickie Selfe’s
demand for a technological awareness that
allowed students to both work with technology and analyze it simultaneously. During the
course of the experiment students were able
to reflect upon technology as more than just
computers and turn their analysis on their
careers and everyday lives.
I had emphasized early on that
technology is much more than just electronic,
but that even writing is technological. As the
semester continued on, however, I became
increasingly worried that students had forgotten this reality and were thinking of technology
strictly in terms of computers etc. However a
single conversation restored my faith:
Jason Helms: k, so how do
u apply into your career?
just add tech to anything?
Student U: nope, only add
tech when needed
Student T: well if you
dont then you will surely
fall behind
Student U: it's like when
ppl make ppt's when only
a handout is needed
Student U: it's annoying
Student U: or like me-

145

chanical engineers, they
make things so complicated, an industrial engineer has to make it saleable and userfriendly
Student T: even a career
such as agriculture that
people think or view to
be very premative a lot
technology is actually
envolved
Student V: true, but i
think technology in the
workplace is a good idea.
as a chem major im going
to use it to run tests
ect. tech isnt just computers
Student U: true, bc u
would use the technology
u understand
Student V: and comp applicatiosn
Student U: yep yep
Student T: with farmers
the work place is a lager field full of corn or
cattle and there is still
a ldecient amount of tech
stuff envolved
Student V: so reflection
is that technology helps
careers well when used
wisely and correctly?
Student U: yep, but in
farming i'm guessing
that over technology can
bring harm or make things
toxic, etc. (Session 2,
Group Chat)

Their realization that technology has limits was
an excellent one, and fairly organic within this
discussion. I was also quite glad to see that
they connected it to their careers with little
prodding on my part.
Other groups made the same connections, this time when reflecting on Lanham's
distinctions between at and through:
Student L: well if you
look at something, you
just see it for what it
is
Student E: i think it is
more marketable to look
through something and see
the bigger picture
Student L: when you see
through something, you're
seeing behind the face
value, you're taking away
the bigger meaning of it
…
Student D: at means what
you see on the surface,
through means analyzing
it
Student H: at makes it
seem as if the person
were shallow
Student G: or maybe
rushed?
Student G: at would be
for memos
Student D: I think "at"
os referring to seeing
an advertisement, whereas
"through" means seeing
the meaning behind the
advertisement
Student W: So it would
good to be able to see
both the surface and
meaning
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Student G:
ok, so in
that case, do
we ever know
what an advirtisement is saying if
we only look at it and
not through it?
Student G: or do we have
to do both? (Session 1,
Group Chat)

Although they seem to invert the dichotomy
(Lanham's discussion shows that at reveals
the rhetoric inherent in any discourse, while
through aims at ignoring it), they were able to
grasp the need to do both well.
Another group (who did seem to understand at and through correctly) made the
same connection:
Student R: [Student Q]
says, "The at and through
merge to give purpose."
Student Q: Weren't we
supposed to be talking
more specifically about
marketability
Student Q: like how does
knowing the difference
between at and through
and how they complement
one another help in what
you're going to do?
Student Q: hell, what are
you going to do?
Student R: I don't know
anymore.
…
Student R: Employers what
a person to be both an at
and through person, but
at times this is lacking.
(Session 2, Group Chat)

That the students used examples from their

careers and everyday lives to bolster their
arguments showed a particularly nuanced
understanding of the issues.
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Conclusions
This experiment in augmented pedagogy
reveals the medium’s strengths and weakness.
It certainly brings kairos to a privileged position with the three other pillars of rhetoric. It
rewards tangential thought and, as this experiment has hopefully shown, is rewarded in turn
by those acts of abnormality. It encourages
participation and allows instructors oversight
on student participation. It enables digital
literacy while simultaneously making a space
for reflection on technology and our relationship with it.
The process of engaging simultaneously in the actual and the virtual can be
quite taxing for instructors and students alike. It
extends our attention’s capacities to the near
breaking point. The very strengths mentioned
above can turn quickly to weaknesses. Many
instructors would see little benefit in tangential
conversations and fear that teaching kairos
through experience can only further the alienation of our tech savvy students from all things
academic. Whatever the case, more work is

certainly needed. While this study was conducted in a writing course, there is no reason
other disciplines would not discover the same
advantages. Also, a more quantitative analysis
comparing augmented and traditional pedagogies would likely reveal other trends. Yet the
most immediate concern is for other instructors
to begin to dabble in this on their own. As they
do, I’m sure we will begin to form a picture of
what augmented pedagogy can and cannot
do.
The students in this course were taught
the importance of delivery in the form and
content of the class. They composed multimodal assignments relying on discourse and
figure, learned the promises and perils inherent in various media, and reflected on their
own relationship with rhetoric and technology.
This is one way of applying the theories I’ve
articulated throughout this dissertation, but
there are of course infinite other possibilities
for application. The classroom is a blank space
waiting to be given form.

Conclusion:

Compose
Yourself!

The question is ambiguous and perhaps
grammatically incorrect. Did I mean whom?
Should there be a comma? By asking what “I” mean,
the reader (one
of whom I am) falls
prey to the representationalist
paradigm
I
have so assiduously attacked
throughout this
book. Compositionists love to
ask these questions, though,
often uncritically. We/they
can use terms
like agency
to cover their
tracks,
but
we/they really
mean someone
who can “really
mean.” Perhaps
there once was
someONE who
could
mean
transparently. I
have argued
that such a
person
no
longer exists,
and such nostalgic attempts

Who am I
composing

are doomed to
failure and shot
through with dishonest assertions
of continuity.
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I am not sure who I am.
I do not mean this in any
Sartrean,
high-school
angst search for meaning (do I?). I mean, who
is this first person pronoun used throughout

Can

this work? With all I have
said of the complex relationship between figure
and discourse, why would
I still rely upon a singular
marker, knowing full well
that the body typing
these words is not even
singular. Moreover, when
the massively recursive
modes of writing THIS dissertation – modes which
include pencil, pen, eraser, a variety of papers,
books, scans, half of Adobe’s creative suite, and
the full force of the collective intelligence of the
internet – are brought into
account, notions of singularity, continuity, agency,
intention become virtually
meaningless. Should I then
bracket [I]? Eliminate I?
Could each sentence be
uttered passively? One
could (many would) follow
Raul Sanchez in eliminating the subject from the
composition classroom:

tell you something?
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all of our available terms –
agency, subject,
consciousness
–
are so deeply implicated in the representationalist paradigm that it
is all but impossible to imagine
a writer or even an appropriately
postmodernized “writing subject” that is
not fundamentally prediscursive, that solves
or identifies problems through the medium or tools of
language and writing. (Sanchez 97)
Here we (Raul and I,
though the I of the last
paragraph, not this
one) are falling prey to the
correspondence
theory of truth I complicated in
chapter three. However,
the opposing concept of
truth I proposed, Heidegger’s infinite, generative
play of (un)concealement,
relies not just upon reflexivity. It is not enough,
in other words, to ask
whether I should use the
first person pronoun. That
is merely to interrogate an
always already Cartesian
subject. Truth as aletheia,
which is to say composition as apophasis, is in
constant struggle with
itself. It depends upon a
multiplicity (Deleuze and
Guattari’s useful evasion
of the word subject) who
never arrives.
Žižek’s metaphor
of the parallax view (the
metaphor with which I began this text) is careful not
to presuppose a transcen-

At the end
of the day,

some

must compose.
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dental
I with two eyes. Instead,
the parallax view creates the transcendental I:
“What, then, is this new dimension that emerges
in the gap itself? It is that of the transcendental I itself, of its
“spontaneity”: the ultimate parallax, the third space between phenomena and the noumenon itself, is the subject’s freedom / spontaneity,
which — although, of course, it is not the property of a phenomenal entity,
so that it cannot be dismissed
as a false appearance which
conceals the noumenal
fact that we are totally
caught in an inaccessible necessity — is
also not simply
noumenal” (22).
E v e n
in our contingency, when
we are at
our
most
“thrown,” our spontaneity reveals
us to ourselves.
The transcendental I reappears as
medium,
which is
also, of course, message.
“The philosophical consequences of
this Kantian parallax are fully explored in
their notion of ontological difference, the focus of Heidegger’s entire thought, which can
be properly grasped only against the background of the theme of finitude. There is a
double doxa on Heidegger’s ontological differe n ce :
it is a difference between the Whatness,
the essence of
beings, and the mere That-ness of their
being – it
li b e ra t e s
beings from subordination to any
groung /
arche / goal;
furthermore, it is a difference
not merely
between (different levels of) beings, of
reality, but between the All of reality and something else which,
with regard to reality,
cannot but appear as
“Nothing.” . . . This doxa is
deeply misleading” (23).
Žižek’s declaration of our freedom, however, may leave us looking a bit like
the emoticon that introduces his quote — not entirely happy. Our spontaneity is always already in the face of our contingency. We are free
only insofar as we are bound to act.
We are composed by others at least as much as we
compose ourselves. Heidegger is able to bridge the
gap between phenomena and the noumenon,
but at a cost: I am not the master
of my own fate,
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though
I may instead become
its lover. And still, his assertion that
existence preceeds essence is taken as a
grand proclamation of the freedom of the will. The
composer is bound by a variety of conventions, some
grammatical, some material, all rhetorical.
The composer is always already a gap bridger. I have
made much of the etymology of composition, literally to put
together. Multimodality lies at the heart of composition (for how
can one put together one ingredient?).
At the core of this multimodality is the gap between the
phenomenal and the noumenal, discourse and figure. It is here
that the multiplicity composes itself with (un)conscious (un)
intentionality.
And we are left with a single dot. It can signify
circularity. A pupil (eye or student?). It signifies,
and bears witness to the supplement which
I was unable to include. It also signifies an end. Period.
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